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Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern macroeconomic theory looks for microeconomic foundations, namely consumers
and firms, and it considers how these microeconomic entities in an economy make
their decisions and then how these many individuals’ choices give rise to economy-
wide macroeconomic outcomes (see Gillman [23] and Mankiw [43], [44]). The earliest
macroeconomic models were based on hypotheses about relationships between aggre-
gate quantities, such as aggregate output, employment, consumption, and investment.
Weintraub [63] mentioned that critics and proponents of these models disagreed as to
whether these aggregate relationships were consistent with the principles of microeco-
nomics. Bo¨hm-Bawerk in 1895 was possibly the first economist to insist that propositions
about macroeconomics have firm microeconomic foundations. In [13] (see also page 74
in Hennings [28]), he wrote:
“One cannot eschew studying the microcosm if one wants to understand prop-
erly the macrocosm of a developed economy.”
Therefore, in recent decades macroeconomists have attempted to combine microe-
conomic models of consumer and firm behaviour to derive the relationships between
macroeconomic variables, and a revitalised group of new macroeconomic theorists pre-
fer to adapt micro to macro theory for explaining economic fluctuations. Important
figures here include Akerlof [1], Blanchard [11], Gordon [25], Mankiw and Romer [45]
and Stiglitz [59].
“All macroeconomic events are the accumulation of millions of decisions
made by individual people. From this observation, it seems to follow im-
mediately that if we are ever going to understand macroeconomy, we need to
understand the microeconomic behaviour which forms its basis.”
-James Hartley
Since in realistic models consumers and firms are heterogeneous, an accurate and
comprehensive mathematical description of the aggregate behaviour is typically an in-
tractable problem. One solution is to assume the existence of a representative agent in
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a loosely defined sense. Indeed, in mathematical models of macroeconomic theory, the
assumption of a representative agent is ubiquitous (see Snowdon and Vane [58], Mankiw
[42] and Sargent [56]), although it is controversial. The notion of the representative
agent can be traced back to the 20th century. Marshall [47] in 1920 introduced a rep-
resentative firm, however, after Lucas’ critique in 1976 which motivated development
of microfoundations for macroeconomics, the notion of the representative agent became
more prominent and more controversial. Lucas [39] pointed out that policy recommen-
dations based on observed past macroeconomic relationships may neglect subsequent
behavioural changes by economic agents, which, when added up, would change the
macroeconomic relationships themselves. The representative agent models are thus an
attempt to model rigorously the structural relationships in an economy and for this
purpose, one needs to model the behaviour of individuals, which is exactly the same as
saying one needs to provide microfoundations for the macroeconomic models.
Hartley [26] (see also Hartley [27]) found this reason for the representative agent
model unconvincing and he punctuated that the representative agent models do not meet
the goals for which they are constructed. Later on Kirman [34] provided an example
in which the representative agent disagrees with all individuals in the economy. He
concluded that the reduction of a group of heterogeneous agents to a representative agent
is not just an analytical convenience, but is both unjustified and leads to conclusions
which are usually misleading and often wrong.
The search for a rigorous justification for the representative agent models has so
far been unsuccessful and was ultimately abandoned until very recently. Clark [16]
developed a theory of the representative agent, whose optimal behaviour is equivalent
to the collective behaviour of a society of rational individuals. He proposed a method
for aggregating the random preference relation into a determinate preference relation on
random actions1. Later on, Herzberg [31] constructed a representative utility function for
finite-dimensional social decision problems, based on a bounded ultrapower construction
over the real numbers, with respect to the ultrafilter induced by the underlying social
choice function (via the Kirman-Sondermann [35] correspondence).
However, since the decision problems of macroeconomic theory are typically infinite-
dimensional2, Herzberg’s original result is insufficient for many applications. Therefore,
one of the main contributions of our work is to generalise his result to the case of
1There is some literature about the construction of a representative agent in general equilibrium
theory (for example see Negishi [48]) which does not provide a social choice theoretic foundation and for
our work, we are not interested in this kind of representative agents.
2Macroeconomic studies emphasise decisions with a time dimension and in practice, the macroe-
conomic framework used in research almost always involves an infinite number of time periods (see
Aliprantis et al. [3] and Ljungqvist and Sargent [37]). The reason for this is mainly analytical conve-
nience: it allows stationary in the sense that the remaining time horizon is the same – it is infinite –
as time passes. It is essential that the time horizon be long enough that the idea that “the world ends
soon” not influence the results too much.
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infinite-dimensional social decision problems and to pave the way for applications in
actual macroeconomic models.
Mathematical framework
For achieving our goal in this work, we combine arguments from mathematical logic
and analysis with arguments from social choice theory. The theory of social choice is
the formal study of mechanisms for collective decision making, and investigates issues
of philosophical, economic, and political significance, stemming from the classical Arro-
vian problem of how the preferences of the members of a group can be democratically
aggregated into one outcome.
In the last decades, ultrafilters and ultraproducts from mathematical logic have fa-
cilitated the build-up of a critical mass of results and insights generalising the original
Arrovian problem. Arrow [7] showed that if the set of individuals is finite and the set of
alternatives is at least three, then Arrow’s axioms3 which are intuitive and reasonable,
are inconsistent. This theorem is called Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. In the same
logical vein, Fishburn [21] showed that if the set of individuals is infinite and the set of
alternatives is at least three, then Arrow’s axioms are consistent, which is called Fish-
burn’s Possibility Theorem. Kirman and Sondermann [35] proved that there is a one to
one correspondence between the social welfare function satisfying all Arrovian rationality
axioms and the set of decisive coalitions generated by this social welfare function, which
is an ultrafilter on individuals. Armstrong [5], [6] generalised Kirman and Sondermann’s
results to measure spaces of individuals. For the first time, Lauwers and Van Liedekerke
[36] used ultraproducts to show that there is a one to one correspondence between the
aggregation function, which satisfies all Arrovian rationality axioms, and non-principal
ultrafilters. Herzberg and Eckert [32] generalised Kirman and Sondermann’s correspon-
dence by using model-theoretic method. They characterised Arrovian rationality social
welfare functions as being exactly those defined with respect to an ultraproduct con-
struction parametrised by the ultrafilter induced by the associated decisive coalitions.
Ulam [61] and Tarski [60] proved the existence of non-principal ultrafilters under the
assumption of the Axiom of Choice and  Los´ [38] proved  Los´’s Theorem which is one of
3Arrow’s axioms are:
1. Unrestricted domain (universality): All preferences of all individuals (votes) are allowed.
2. Unanimity preservation: If every individual prefers alternative x over alternative y, then the
society prefers x over y.
3. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: If every individual’s preference between x and y remains
unchanged, then the society’s preference between x and y will also remain unchanged (even if
individuals’ preferences between other pairs like x and z, y and z, or z and v change).
4. No dictatorship: No single individual possesses the power to always determine the society’s pref-
erence.
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the main results on ultraproducts. Makkai [41] replaced the standard model-theoretic
ultraproduct construction with a generalised one in a category-theoretic setting.
We employ a very special ultraproduct construction, the so called bounded ultrapow-
ers, which are used to build foundations for nonstandard analysis (see Robinson and
Zakon [53]). In other words, we apply a bounded ultrapower with respect to a given
ultrafilter as a framework for nonstandard analysis.
“There are good reasons to believe that nonstandard analysis, in some version
or other, will be the analysis of the future.”
-Kurt Go¨del
Nonstandard analysis was established for the development of calculus and of other
branches of analysis in terms of infinitely small and infinitely large quantities. The notion
of an infinitesimal (infinitely small) number has been used in mathematical arguments
since before the time of Archimedes (see Dijksterhuis [19]). In the late 1600’s, Newton
and Leibniz, in particular Leibniz used infinitesimal numbers to define the derivative
and the integral (see Baron and Bos [8] and Child [15]). He created the notion dx for
the difference in successive values of a variable x, thinking of this difference as infinitely
small or less than any assignable quantity. Loeb in [64] said that it is helpful to think in
terms of infinitesimals in branches of mathematics beyond calculus. He continued with
this example: Brownian motion is the random motion of microscopic particles suspended
in a liquid or gas. Under a microscope you can clearly see the zig-zag random motion
caused by the collision of the particles with molecules in the suspending medium. An
important part of mathematical probability is the construction of mathematical models
for this motion. A very convenient model has each particle performing a random walk
with steps of infinitesimal length. That is, one divides time into infinitesimal intervals,
and in each interval, the particle moves in a straight line over an infinitesimal distance
equal to the square root of the time change. At the end of each time interval, the particle
chooses at random a new direction for its motion.
“In the fall of 1960 it occurred to me that the concepts and methods of con-
temporary mathematical logic are capable of providing a suitable framework
for the development of the differential and integral calculus by means of in-
finitely small and infinitely large numbers.”
-Abraham Robinson
Nonstandard analysis was originated in the early 1960’s by the mathematical logician
Abraham Robinson. He gave a clear, mathematically correct foundation for the use of
infinitesimals in all branches of mathematics (see Robinson [51]). He set up a formal
language to express facts about the mathematical objects with which he was working.
He called this mathematical object a standard model for the theorems expressed in this
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formal language. He also showed that there is another mathematical object, called a
nonstandard model, in which there exist positive infinitesimal numbers. The most im-
portant achievement of his work was that he showed any theorem which is a correct
statement in the standard model, is also a correct statement in the nonstandard model
(Transfer Principle). In 1955,  Los´ [38] proved the Transfer Principle for any hyper-
real number system. Its most common use is in Robinson’s nonstandard analysis of
the hyperreal numbers, where the Transfer Principle states that any sentence express-
ible in a certain formal language that is true of real numbers is also true of hyperreal
numbers. Furthermore, Robinson turned the Transfer Principle into a working tool of
mathematical reasoning. In the last few decades it has been applied to many areas,
including analysis, topology, algebra, number theory, mathematical physics, probability
and stochastic processes, and mathematical economics4.
In addition to many mathematical techniques that we use in this work, like convex
analysis, optimisation problems, functional analysis and etc., there are some reasons
that we choose mathematical logic and nonstandard analysis as a main technique for
our work. First of all, so far except Herzberg [31], neither bounded ultrapowers nor
nonstandard analysis have ever been applied in the social choice theory literatures. Sec-
ondly, nonstandard analysis offers some features to our understanding of mathematics.
For example, by learning nonstandard analysis, we learn new definitions of familiar con-
cepts, often simpler and more intuitively, new and insightful constructions of familiar
objects as well as new and insightful (often simpler) proofs of familiar theorems.
The use of mathematical logic in our work is in some ways similar to the use of
geometric language in mathematics. The intuition enabling us to read a “meaning” into
a “sentence” of a formal language can be compared to the intuition that enables us to
understand and perceive geometric truths by checking a diagram.
Structure of the thesis
As we have mentioned above, this thesis tries to give an answer to the following question:
Is it possible to generalise Herzberg’s result [31] to the case of infinite-dimensional
social decision problems and to pave the way for applications in actual macroe-
conomic models?
In order to do this, we suppose that individuals have cardinal utilities, i.e. for every
individual, there is an utility function which induces his (or her) preference ordering.
4One can find some literature for applications of nonstandard analysis in diverse areas. For exam-
ple, Anderson [4] provides an introduction to nonstandard analysis with applications to mathematical
economics. We suggest also Albeverio et al. [2] for nonstandard methods in stochastic analysis and
mathematical physics, Salbany and Todorov [55] for nonstandard analysis in topology, Jin [33] for ap-
plications of nonstandard analysis in additive number theory, Wolf and Loeb [64] for applications of
nonstandard analysis in topology and measure theory.
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We suppose that every individual’s utility function belongs to some class of functions,
where the elements of this class are called admissible utility functions. Furthermore, the
aggregation of individual preferences is assumed to result from a social welfare function
satisfying all Arrovian rationality axioms (universality, unanimity preservation, inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives and no dictatorship). In Theorem 3.17 which has
been shown for the first time by Kirman and Sondermann [35], we show that the collec-
tion of decisive coalitions generated by a social welfare function satisfying all Arrovian
rationality axioms is always a non-principal ultrafilter. This is only possible if the set of
individuals is infinite.
We generalise Herzberg’s result by allowing the set of social alternatives to belong
to a general Banach space W . We suppose that this set is a compact non-empty convex
subset of the given Banach space W (Herzberg [31] supposed that the set of alternatives
is a finite-dimensional vector space). Furthermore, we assume that the set of admissible
utility functions are parametrised and the parameter set is a compact subset of a given
Banach space X. For our results, the set of parametrised admissible utility functions
contains only continuous and strictly concave functions.
The key for existence of a representative utility function is the proof of existence of a
socially acceptable utility function. A socially acceptable utility function is an admissible
utility function whose maximiser can never be quashed in the ultrafilter hierarchy (in
other words, the maximiser can never be quashed by any other decisive coalition). We
call an admissible utility function representative if and only if the maximiser of this rep-
resentative utility function is the optimal alternative according to the social preference
relation.
Using a nonstandard enlargement of the superstructure over (X ⊕W )∪R, obtained
by a bounded ultrapower construction with respect to the non-principal ultrafilter, we
prove that there exists for every utility profile, some D-socially acceptable utility func-
tion (Theorem 3.23). For the proof of this theorem5, we introduce a superstructure over
(X⊕W )∪R, i.e. V ((X ⊕W )∪R), where X⊕W is a Banach space given as the algebraic
direct sum of two Banach spaces X and W with norm ‖x⊕w‖∞ = max{‖x‖X , ‖w‖W }.6
We define the superstructure V ((X ⊕W )∪R) by iterating the power-set operator count-
ably many times. Then we construct a bounded ultrapower of V ((X ⊕W ) ∪ R) by
collecting the equivalence classes of sequences in V ((X ⊕W )∪R), that are bounded in
the superstructure hierarchy, using the non-principal ultrafilter D on N . Afterwards we
embed this bounded ultrapower into the superstructure V (∗(X ⊕ W ) ∪ ∗R) in such a
way that this embedding satisfies the Extension and Transfer Principles. We work on
5This is an informal discussion of the proof methodology. The complete proof can be found in
Section 3.4.
6One can show that the two norms ‖x⊕w‖p = (‖x‖pX + ‖w‖pW )1/p for 1 ≤ p <∞ and ‖x⊕w‖∞ =
max{‖x‖X , ‖w‖W } for p =∞, are equivalent on R.
Chapter 1 Introduction 7
this nonstandard universe, which consists of equivalence classes of sequences of super-
structure elements with respect to the equivalence relation of “almost sure agreement”
according to D. On the ∗image of X ⊕ W , a standard operator with respect to the
canonical topology on X ⊕ W is definable. We verify that the standard part of the
D-equivalence class of a utility profile is the parameter of a D-socially acceptable util-
ity function. The proof of this assures the continuity and S-continuity arguments with
features of the bounded ultrapower construction.
We use Theorem 3.23 for proving the existence of a σ-representative utility function
(Theorem 3.24). These results depend on certain regularity features of the admissible
utility functions7 (Assumption 3.19) and we show that the maximiser of this representa-
tive utility function maximises the D-socially acceptable utility function, where D := Fσ
is the ultrafilter of σ-decisive coalitions. In other words, the maximiser of this representa-
tive utility function is the optimal alternative according to the social preference relation.
The complete proof can be found in Section 3.4. For paving the way for applications
in actual macroeconomic models, we provide sufficient conditions for the preceding the-
orems (Theorems 3.23 and 3.24) to be satisfied in economic applications. The idea is
that, since the agents maximise some function (we call it happiness function) subject
to the constraints they face, we consider that the utility function of each agent is the
maximum value of this happiness function subject to some budget constraint, where the
social alternative is given. Then we show that this utility function has the same proper-
ties as the utility functions in Assumption 3.19 (see Lemma 4.1). We prove that for these
new utility profiles, there exists some D-socially acceptable and σ-representative utility
functions. Afterwards, in Section 4.2, we give an example of possible macroeconomic
applications.
After these arguments, the following question comes to our mind:
Are the previous conditions and assumptions weak enough? Or could we
generalise our results to the case of weak topology?
For this purpose, we generalise and extend our previous results to the case of weak
compact social decision problems. At first, we introduce a new and simple nonstandard
account of the weak topology and provide a mathematical foundation for the applica-
tion of the powerful tools of nonstandard analysis to the weak topology. We give a
nonstandard universe for pseudo-normed linear spaces and study the properties of the
nonstandard hull with respect to this new nonstandard universe (see Section 5.1.1 and
Proposition 5.9). The notion of nonstandard hull was introduced for the first time by
7According to this regularity on the admissible utility functions, the representative utility function
is considered as the utility function of some individual. Kirman and sondermann [35] studied the case
where the society’s preferences will be controlled by a group of individuals. They created an agent
whose preferences represent those of the group and called this agent an invisible agent. To see this, they
considered the case where the set of social alternatives is finite, which is not the case in our work.
8 Chapter 1 Introduction
Luxemburg in [40]. He considered the case when X is a linear normed space. Later,
Henson and Moore in [29] introduced this notion for Banach spaces. But, we study the
nonstandard hull for the pseudo-norm linear spaces.
Then we define a weak topology on a given normed linear space by some pseudo-
norms on this space and investigate the properties of the nonstandard hull with respect
to this new weak topology (see Section 5.1.2 and Proposition 5.18). We assume that the
set of social alternatives forms a weakly compact non-empty convex subset of a given
reflexive separable Banach space W . We also assume that the admissible utility func-
tions are parametrised and the parameter set is a weakly compact non-empty subset of
a given separable Banach space X. For our results, the set of parametrised admissible
utility functions contains w-uniformly continuous, Gaˆteaux-differentiable with continu-
ous derivative, and strictly concave functions. Due to the nice results that we achieve
about weak compactness (Theorems 5.23 and 5.24) and according to the w-S-continuity
and w-uniform continuity arguments with features of this new nonstandard construc-
tion, we prove that there exist for every utility profile some D-socially acceptable and
σ-representative utility functions (Theorems 5.36 and 5.37).
Typically in the aggregation problems (which are used often in this work), we use
some ultrafilters on the set of individuals to model the set of decisive coalitions. The more
general case is suited to cater for those situations in aggregation theory in which some
voters might abstain from voting, thus giving rise to profiles in which some coordinates
might be empty8. Hence, there is one question:
Is the vote abstention situation satisfactorily covered by the generalised Kirman-
Sondermann correspondence in [32]?
At the moment, the vote abstention situation is not satisfactorily covered by the
generalised Kirman-Sondermann correspondence in Herzberg and Eckert [32], because
it is not reasonable to assume that the abstention of any single voter would force the
outcome of an Arrovian rational aggregation to be empty. Therefore, for covering this
gap, we apply a generalised definition of the ultraproduct in Makkai [41] (see Section
6.2) and generalise the Kirman-Sondermann correspondence by using this new type
of ultraproduct in which empty models in some coordinates do not necessarily make
the generalised ultraproduct also empty (Theorem 6.19). More technically, Makkai’s
ultraproduct yields the empty model unless non-empty models occur in each coordinate
belonging to some member of its associated ultrafilter. Using this definition, we can give
a more intuitive explanation for the situation of vote abstention.
8There are several ways to study and consider abstention in the social choice theory. For example,
one can ignore any voters that abstain (see Pivato [50]), one can study abstention as if the voters ranked
all candidates equally, and one can study abstention as if the voters submit two kind of inputs: ranking
of candidates or abstention. In this work, we study the last approach.
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Summary of contents
The plan of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2 we introduce the mathematical methods
and techniques that are used in this work. We start with topics in mathematical logic
and give some important results on ultrafilters (Ultrafilter Existence Theorem) and
ultraproducts ( Los´ Theorem). To accommodate the reader, we continue with a simple
ultrapower construction of a nonstandard model of real numbers associated with a very
understandable system of logic and prove the Basic Transfer Principle. Afterwards,
we introduce the full theoretical background (superstructure and bounded ultrapowers)
needed to establish nonstandard universe for modern developments and applications, like
when we are dealing with mathematical objects such as Banach spaces and topological
spaces. We also prove the important principles in this nonstandard universe (Transfer
Principle, Internal Definition Principle, Overspill Principle and etc.).
Chapter 3 applies ultraproducts to find microfoundations for constructing a rep-
resentative agent model. We construct a representative utility function for infinite-
dimensional social decision problems, based on a bounded ultrapower construction with
respect to the ultrafilter induced by the underlying social choice function.
In Chapter 4 we provide sufficient conditions for the preceding theorems in Chapter 3
to be satisfied in economic applications. After this modification, we show a possible
macroeconomic application as an example.
Chapter 5 brings us to the theory of existence of a representative agent model for
weaker conditions. We establish weaker conditions for our previous results and introduce
an easy nonstandard approach to weak topological spaces. Then we prove the existence
of a representative utility function with respect to this new constructed weak topology.
In Chapter 6 we study an aggregation problem with the model theoretic approach by
means of generalised ultraproducts. We give preliminaries for Arrow-rational aggrega-
tors and generalised ultraproduct. Then we prove the generalised Kirman-Sondermann
correspondence which covers the gap in Herzberg and Eckert’s model-theoretic approach
for voting abstention.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we give the conclusions of this thesis in a short and clear
manner.

Chapter 2
Mathematical methodology
In this chapter we introduce the mathematical methods and techniques that are used
in this work. We follow the notations and concepts from Bell and Slomson [10], Marker
[46], Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [36], Albeverio et al. [2], Robinson [52], Goldblatt
[24], and Wolff and Loeb [64].
2.1 Boolean algebra
One of the important concepts which will be used later to derive some consequences in
predicate logic is the Boolean algebra. Moreover, the ultraproduct construction which
has a main role in this work, is constructed by ultrafilters in power set Boolean algebras.
Hence, for the convenience of the reader, we recall some notions on this topic.
2.1.1 Lattices
We have the following definition:
Definition 2.1. Let X be a non-empty set and ≤ be a binary relation on X. 〈X,≤〉 is
called a partially ordered set if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) Reflexivity: For all x ∈ X, x ≤ x.
(2) Antisymmetric: For all x, y ∈ X, if x ≤ y and y ≤ x, then x = y.
(3) Transitivity: For all x, y, z ∈ X, if x ≤ y and y ≤ z, then x ≤ z.
A partially ordered set 〈X,≤〉 is called totally ordered if in addition to reflexivity, anti-
symmetric and transitivity, ≤ has the following property:
(4) Dichotomy: For all x, y ∈ X, either x ≤ y or y ≤ x.
Definition 2.2. A subset A of a partially ordered set X is called a chain if and only if
≤ is dichotomy on A.
Example 2.1. Examples of partially and totally ordered sets are:
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• Let X be any set. We denote the power set of X, i.e. the set of all subsets of X,
by P(X). If ⊆ is the relation of set inclusion, then 〈P(X),⊆〉 is a partially ordered
set.
• As an example of a totally ordered set, let N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} be the set of natural
numbers and let ≤ be the usual ordering of the natural numbers. Then 〈N,≤〉 is
a totally ordered set.
For brevity, we denote the partially ordered set 〈X,≤〉 only by X, when there is no
risk of confusion.
Definition 2.3. If A is a subset of the partially ordered set X, an upper bound for A
in X is an element of X greater than all the elements of A. The set of upper bounds of
A is
{u ∈ X : ∀a ∈ A a ≤ u}.
Similarly a lower bound for A in X is an element of X less than all the elements of A.
The set of lower bounds of A is
{l ∈ X : ∀a ∈ A l ≤ a}.
Definition 2.4. The supremum (or least upper bound) of A is an element x ∈ X, where
x is an upper bound for A in X and is a lower bound for the set of all upper bounds for
A in X. In other words, x ∈ X is the supremum of A iff for all a ∈ A, a ≤ x and given
any other upperbound y for A in X, we have x ≤ y. We denote the supremum of A by
sup(A).
Similarly x ∈ X is called the infimum (or greatest lower bound) of A if it is a lower bound
for A and greater than any other lower bound for A in X. We denote the infimum of A
by inf(A).
A lattice is a partially ordered set in which the infimum and supremum of any two
element set is defined, in other words:
Definition 2.5. A partially ordered set X is a lattice if and only if for all x, y ∈ X,
x ∧ y := inf{x, y} 6= ∅ and x ∨ y := sup{x, y} 6= ∅. x ∧ y is called the meet of x and y,
and x ∨ y is called the join of x and y.
Example 2.2. Examples of lattices are:
• The partially ordered set 〈P(X),⊆〉 of Example 2.1 is a lattice for any set X, since
for any A,B ∈ P(X), sup{A,B} = A ∪B, and inf{A,B} = A ∩B.
• The space of all continuous real valued functions defined on a topological space X
is a lattice, where the order relation for every two continuous real valued functions
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f and g is defined by
f ≤ g iff ∀x ∈ X f(x) ≤ g(x).
In this case, inf{f, g}(x) = min{f(x), g(x)}, and sup{f, g}(x) = max{f(x), g(x)}
for all x ∈ X.
A partially ordered set can only have one lower bound and one upper bound. Since
a lattice is a partially ordered set, this is true also for the lattice and we call the unique
upper bound of a lattice, the maximum of the lattice and denote it by 1. Similarly, we
call the unique lower bound of a lattice, the minimum of the lattice and denote it by 0.
Definition 2.6. An element x of a lattice is said to be maximal if there is no y in the
lattice, which is strictly greater than x.
Definition 2.7. For each x ∈ L, where L is a lattice, we define
complement(x) := { y ∈ L : x ∧ y = 0, x ∨ y = 1 },
as the set of complements of x. A lattice L is called complemented if and only if
(1) It has a maximum element 1 and a minimum element 0,
(2) For each x ∈ L, the set of complements of x is non-empty.
Remark 2.8. If the lattice L is complemented, then for all x ∈ L we have:
(1) x ∧ 0 = 0,
(2) x ∨ 1 = 1,
(3) x ∧ 1 = x,
(4) x ∨ 0 = x.
We impose an extra condition on a complemented lattice to ensure the uniqueness
of complements. In other words, a lattice can have more than one complement, except
in the case that the meet and join operations are distributive:
Definition 2.9. A lattice L is said to be distributive if and only if
∀x, y, z ∈ L (x ∧ y) ∨ z = (x ∨ z) ∧ (y ∨ z),
and
∀x, y, z ∈ L (x ∨ y) ∧ z = (x ∧ z) ∨ (y ∧ z).
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Notation 2.10. If a lattice is distributive and complemented, then the unique comple-
ment of an element x is denoted by x∗.
Lemma 2.11. If L is complemented and distributive, then each element has a unique
complement.
Proof. Suppose that x ∈ L and since L is complemented, complement(x) is non-empty
and has at least one element. Now suppose that y, z ∈ complement(x), then x ∨ y = 1
and x ∧ z = 0. By using Remark 2.8, we have:
y = y ∨ 0
= y ∨ (x ∧ z) (since x ∧ z = 0)
= (y ∨ x) ∧ (y ∨ z) (since L is distributive)
= 1 ∧ (y ∨ z) (since x ∨ y = 1)
= y ∨ z. (by Remark 2.8)
Similarly one can show that z = y ∨ z, and hence y = z. This completes the proof of
the lemma.
2.1.2 Boolean algebras
We have introduced above the complementation and distributivity of the lattices. Now
we give the definition of the Boolean algebra according to this notions.
Definition 2.12. A Boolean algebra is a complemented and distributive lattice with at
least two elements.
In other words, we can define a Boolean algebra B to be a structure
B = 〈B,∨,∧,∗ , 0, 1〉,
where B is a set that contains the elements 0 and 1, and ∨, ∧ and ∗ are defined as
above1, satisfying the following conditions for every x, y, z ∈ B:
(1) (Associativity and commutativity of ∨ and ∧):
x ∨ (y ∨ z) = (x ∨ y) ∨ z, x ∧ (y ∧ z) = (x ∧ y) ∧ z
and
x ∨ y = y ∨ x, x ∧ y = y ∧ x.
1We assume that in any Boolean algebra, 0 is different from 1.
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(2) (Distributivity):
x ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∨ y) ∧ (x ∨ z) and x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z).
(3) (Idempotent and absorbtion laws):
x ∨ x = x, x ∧ x = x
and
x ∨ (x ∧ y) = x, x ∧ (x ∨ y) = x.
(4) (Laws of zero and one):
x ∨ 0 = x, x ∧ 0 = 0, x ∧ x∗ = 0
and
x ∨ 1 = 1, x ∧ 1 = x, x ∨ x∗ = 1.
(5) (De Morgan laws and the law of double negation):
(x ∨ y)∗ = x∗ ∧ y∗, (x ∧ y)∗ = x∗ ∨ y∗
and
(x∗)∗ = x.
If we had introduced Boolean algebra as above, we could define the relation ≤ on B
by
x ≤ y iff x ∨ y = y.
Example 2.3. Examples of Boolean algebras are:
• The lattice of truth values 2 = {0, 1}, with the partial ordering ≤ defined by 0 ≤ 0,
0 ≤ 1 and 1 ≤ 1 is a Boolean algebra. In other words, this is the smallest Boolean
algebra 2 = 〈{0, 1},∨,∧,∗ , 0, 1〉 consists of only two elements.
• The partially ordered set 〈P(X),⊆〉 in Example 2.2 is a Boolean algebra. In this
case the maximum element is the set X and the minimum element is the empty
set ∅, and complementation corresponds to set theoretic complementation, i.e. for
any C ∈ X, C¯ = X−C. We call this Boolean algebra, a power set Boolean algebra.
In other words, the power set Boolean algebra can be denoted as follows:
P(X) = 〈2X ,∪,∩,− , ∅, X〉,
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where 2X is set of all subsets of X, ∪ the union, ∩ the intersection and − the
complement.
2.1.3 Filters and ultrafilters
Let L be a lattice and B a Boolean algebra.
Definition 2.13. A non-empty subset F of L is called a filter if and only if
(1) x ∧ y ∈ F for all x, y ∈ F , and
(2) z ∈ F whenever x ≤ z for all x ∈ F and z ∈ L.
A filter F is called proper if and only if F 6= L.
Definition 2.14. A subset U of B is called an ultrafilter if and only if U is a maximal
proper filter.
In other words, an ultrafilter U is a proper filter such that the only filter F with
U ( F is the whole Boolean algebra.
Definition 2.15. For every A ⊆ B, we define
• A0 := {x ∈ B : ∃a ∈ A a ≤ x}
• Ac := {inf(X) : X ⊆ A X finite}.
If F is a filter, then a base of F is a set A with A0 = F , and a sub-base of F is a set A
such that Ac is a base for F , that is Ac0 := (Ac)0 = F . If A is a sub-base of F , then we
also say that A generates F .
Remark 2.16. (1) A ⊆ Ac and A ⊆ A0 for all A ⊆ B, hence
A ⊆ Ac ⊆ Ac0,
for all A ⊆ B. Also we have
Ac0 = {x ∈ B : ∃X ⊆ A (X finite, inf(X) ≤ x)},
for every A ⊆ B.
(2) A filter F is proper if and only if 0 /∈ F .
(3) By definition, filters are closed under infima of pair-subsets.
Definition 2.17. Let A ⊆ B. We say that A has the finite intersection property (fip)
if and only if inf(X) 6= 0 for all finite X ⊆ A.
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Then we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2.18. Let A ⊆ B. Then
(1) Ac0 is a filter.
(2) Any filter F containing A, contains Ac0.
(3) Ac0 is a proper filter if and only if A has the finite intersection property.
Proof. (1) Let x, y ∈ Ac0 and let z ∈ B such that x ≤ z. Then there exist finite
subsets X,Y of A such that
inf(X) ≤ x, inf(Y ) ≤ y.
Then, X ∪ Y also is a finite subset of A and one can show that
inf(X ∪ Y ) = inf(X) ∧ inf(Y ) ≤ x ∧ y,
which yields that x ∧ y ∈ Ac0. Now by transitivity of ≤, one has inf(X) ≤ z, so z
also is in Ac0. Therefore Ac0 is a filter.
(2) Let F ⊇ A be a filter, and let x ∈ Ac0. Then there must be a finite subset X ⊆ A
such that inf(X) ≤ x. Since A ⊆ F , we have X ⊆ F , and since F is a filter,
inf(X) ∈ F by Remark 2.16. Again using the fact that F is a filter, we have
x ∈ F . Thus Ac0 ⊆ F .
(3) Since Ac0 is a filter (according to the first part), we need to prove that Ac0 6= B if
and only if A has the fip. Suppose Ac0 6= B. If A does not have the fip for some
X ⊆ A, then inf(A) = 0. Therefore 0 ∈ Ac0 and so Ac0 is not proper and this a
contradiction with Ac0 6= B.
Conversely, suppose that A has the fip. If Ac0 = B, then 0 ∈ Ac0, and there-
fore there is some finite X ⊆ A such that inf(X) ≤ 0, hence inf(X) = 0. This
contradicts the fip.
The following theorem about the characterisation of ultrafilters is fundamental for
applications in mathematical logic:
Proposition 2.19. Let U be a proper filter. U is an ultrafilter if and only if for every
x ∈ B, either x ∈ U or x∗ ∈ U .
Proof. First, suppose that U is an ultrafilter and let x /∈ U . Define G := (U ∪{x})c0. By
the previous lemma, G is a filter which contains U . On the other hand, x ∈ U∪{x} ⊆ G.
Since U is an ultrafilter, G is not proper. Therefore U ∪ {x} does not have the fip and
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for some finite X ⊆ U , inf(X) ∧ x = 0. This means that inf(X) ≤ x∗. But inf(X) is in
U and hence x∗ ∈ U (by the definition of filter).
Conversely, suppose that for every x ∈ B, either x ∈ U or x∗ ∈ U . Let G be a filter
with U ( G, and let x ∈ G\U . Since x /∈ U , x∗ ∈ U ⊆ G. This shows that G is not
proper. Hence U is a maximal proper filter, i.e. and ultrafilter.
Definition 2.20. Let I be a set and B = P(I) (the power set Boolean algebra). Then
for every i ∈ I, the set
{X ∈ P(I) : i ∈ X},
is an ultrafilter. We call this ultrafilter the principal ultrafilter generated by i. An
ultrafilter which is not principal is called non-principal.
Clearly, an ultrafilter on I is principal as soon it contains a finite subset of I. Hence,
if I itself is finite, all ultrafilters on I are principal.
Theorem 2.21. (Ultrafilter Existence Theorem). Every proper filter in a Boolean al-
gebra can be extended to an ultrafilter.
Proof. Let F 6= B be a filter, and define
F := {G ( B : G ⊇ F, G filter}.
Since F ∈ F , F is not empty. (F ,⊆) is a partially ordered set. We will prove that with
respect to this ordering, every chain in F has an upper bound in F .
Let {Di}i∈I be a chain in F and define D := ∪i∈IDi. For all i ∈ I, Di ⊆ D and
D ⊇ F . Also, 0 /∈ Di for all i ∈ I (as otherwise Di = B for some i ∈ I), hence 0 /∈ D.
We claim that D is a filter: Let x, y ∈ D and let z ∈ B with x ≤ z. There exist i, j ∈ I
such that x ∈ Di and y ∈ Dj . Since {Di}i∈I is a chain, either Di ⊆ Dj or Dj ⊆ Di. We
may assume that Di ⊆ Dj . Then, x, y ∈ Dj , which is a filter, hence x ∧ y, z ∈ Dj ⊆ D.
Thus, D is a proper filter containing F , so D ∈ F , and D is an upper bound for {Di}i∈I .
Hence, every chain in F has an upper bound in F . We deduce from Zorn’s lemma
that F contains a maximal element U . In other words there can be no proper filter
which includes U but is not equal to U , so U is an ultrafilter and this is the required
ultrafilter which is an extension of F .
Definition 2.22. Let I be a set and B = P(I). A subset X ⊆ I is called co-finite if
and only if I\X is finite.
Remark 2.23. Let I be an infinite set. The filter F of co-finite subsets of I can be
extended to a non-principal ultrafilter U .
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Proof. Since I is infinite, F is proper. By the previous theorem (Ultrafilter Existence
Theorem), it can be extended to an ultrafilter U . If U were principal, then there would
be some i ∈ I such that {i} ∈ U whilst on the other hand, I\{i} being co-finite would
be in F ⊆ U . This would mean that
0 = ∅ = {i} ∩ (I\{i}) ∈ U,
hence U = P(I), so U would not be an ultrafilter and this is a contradiction.
2.2 Predicate Logic
In this section we introduce the formal language of predicate calculus (PC). We use this
framework in order to define the notion of an interpretation and of a true formula.
2.2.1 Syntax of PC
Definition 2.24. The language L of PC is the set of symbols
{v˙n : n ∈ N} ∪ {P˙n : n ∈ N} ∪ { .=, ∃˙, ∧˙, ¬˙, (˙, )˙},
where v˙n is called an individual variable for every n ∈ N, P˙n is called a predicate letter
for every n ∈ N, .= is called the equality symbol, ∃˙ is called the existential quantifier, ∧˙
and ¬˙ are called logical connectives, ∃˙, ∧˙ and ¬˙ are called logical symbols, and (˙ and )˙
are called punctuation symbols.
Definition 2.25. A string of L is a finite sequence of symbols of L. A string is an
atomic formula if and only if it is of the form v˙m
.
= v˙n or P˙n(˙v˙l0 , . . . , v˙ln−1 )˙ where
m,n, l0, . . . , ln−1 ∈ N.
Definition 2.26. The set F of formulae of PC is the smallest subset of strings for
which every atomic formula is in F , and for all φ, ψ ∈ F and every n ∈ N, the strings
(˙∃˙v˙n)˙φ, (˙φ∧˙ψ)˙, ¬˙φ,
are all in F .
Remark 2.27. For all φ, ψ ∈ F and every n ∈ N, we introduce the following abbrevia-
tions:
(˙∀˙v˙n)˙φ := ¬˙(˙∃˙v˙n)˙¬˙φ;
(˙φ∨˙ψ)˙ := ¬˙(˙¬˙φ∧˙¬˙ψ)˙;
(˙φ→˙ψ)˙ := ¬˙(˙φ∧˙¬˙ψ)˙;
(˙φ↔˙ψ)˙ := (˙(˙φ→˙ψ)˙∧˙(˙ψ→˙φ)˙)˙.
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When we are talking about the specific occurrence of some substring of a given string
(e.g. a formula), we underline its position in the string. Let m,n ∈ N with m 6= n, and
let φ, ψ be formulae. Moreover, suppose that X,Y are strings, and v˙m is an individual
variable. The scope of the occurrence of (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ in φ is defined as follows:
• The scope of the occurrence of (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ in (˙∃˙v˙n)˙φ equals the formula (˙∃˙v˙n)˙φ.
• The scope of the occurrence of (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ in ¬˙X (˙∃˙v˙n)˙Y equals the scope of the occur-
rence of (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ in X (˙∃˙v˙n)˙Y .
• The scope of the occurrence of (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ in (˙X (˙∃˙v˙n)˙Y ∧˙ψ)˙ equals the scope of the
occurrence of (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ in X (˙∃˙v˙n)˙Y .
• The scope of the occurrence of (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ in (˙∃˙v˙m)˙X (˙∃˙v˙n)˙Y equals the scope of the
occurrence of (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ in X (˙∃˙v˙n)˙Y .
Definition 2.28. The occurrence of v˙n in φ is said to be bound if and only if v˙n occurs
in the scope of some occurrence of (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ in φ. Otherwise, that occurrence of v˙n is said
to be free and we often write φ(v˙n).
Definition 2.29. A formula φ is called a sentence of L if and only if all occurrences of
individual variables in φ are bound.
2.2.2 Semantics of PC
Definition 2.30. A relational structure is a pair A = 〈A, (Rn)n∈N〉, where A is a
non-empty set, called the domain of A, and Rn ⊆ An for every n ∈ N. A is called
L-structure2.
Definition 2.31. If A′ ⊆ A, then the restriction of A to A′ is the relational structure
A′ = 〈A′, (R′n)n∈N〉, where R′n = Rn ∩ (A′)n for all n ∈ N and is denoted by resA′A.
Definition 2.32. If A is an L-structure, then any sequence J : N → A is called a
valuation on A. If J is a valuation, m ∈ N and a ∈ A, then we define J(m/a) as follows:
J(m/a) : n 7→
J(n), n 6= ma, n = m .
Now we have the following Tarski’s definition of truth:
Definition 2.33. (Tarski’s definition of truth). Let A be an L-structure, and let J be
a valuation on A. We define the predicate (or relation) A |=J φ, which is read as ’J
satisfies φ in A’, for all L-formulae φ, ψ and m,n, l0, . . . , ln−1 ∈ N, as follows:
2A is also called a realisation of L.
2.3 Ultraproducts 21
• A |=J v˙m .= v˙n if and only if J(m) = J(n),
• A |=J P˙n(˙v˙l0 , . . . , v˙ln−1 )˙ if and only if (J(l0), . . . , J(ln−1)) ∈ Rn,
• A |=J (˙∃˙v˙n)˙φ if and only if there exists some a ∈ A such that A |=J(n/a) φ,
• A |=J ¬˙φ if and only if A 2J φ3,
• A |=J φ∧˙ψ if and only if A |=J φ and A |=J ψ.
Definition 2.34. Let λ be a sentence and let Λ be a set of sentences. A is a model of
λ if and only if A |=J λ for some (and hence every) valuation J . In this case we write
A |= λ and we say that λ is true or valid in A.
A is a model of Λ if and only if there exists some J such that A |=J λ for every λ ∈ Λ.
In this case we write A |= Λ.
Definition 2.35. Let λ be a sentence. λ is universally valid ifB |= λ for all L-structures
B.
Notation 2.36. Let A be an L-structure, and let J be a valuation on A. Suppose φ is a
formula with n free variables v˙0, . . . , v˙n−1 such that the valuation J assigns v˙j the value
xj ∈ A for all j ≤ n− 1. We shall often write
A |= φ[x0, . . . , xn−1],
instead of A |=J φ, and say φ[x0, . . . , xn−1] is true in A.
2.3 Ultraproducts
In this section we introduce the ultraproduct construction which will be of high relevance
in the rest of this work. Let I be a set. A filter and an ultrafilter on I is respectively a
filter and an ultrafilter in the power set Boolean algebra P(I). We fix some filter F on
I.
We fix a relational structure Ai = 〈Ai, (Rin)n∈N〉 for every i ∈ I, which is adapted to
the language L of PC. We write ∏i∈I Ai for the cartesian product of all Ai. Where the
index set is clear from the context, we write just
∏
Ai. If a ∈ ∏Ai, we denote its i-th
coordinate by a(i).
2.3.1 Reduced products and ultraproducts
At first we define the binary relation ∼F on
∏
i∈I A
i as follows:
3A 2J φ is read as ’J does not satisfy φ in A’.
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Definition 2.37. For every a, b ∈∏i∈I Ai we have
a ∼F b⇔ {i ∈ I : a(i) = b(i)} ∈ F.
Remark 2.38. ∼F is an equivalence relation.
Proof. Since F is a filter on I, I ∈ F and since = is symmetric and reflexive, the relation
∼F is also symmetric and reflexive. We will show that it is also a transitive relation.
Suppose that a ∼F b and b ∼F c for all a, b, c ∈
∏
i∈I A
i. Then by definition of ∼F we
have
{i ∈ I : a(i) = b(i)} ∈ F,
and
{i ∈ I : b(i) = c(i)} ∈ F.
Since F is a filter, it is closed under intersections. Hence
{i ∈ I : a(i) = b(i)} ∩ {i ∈ I : b(i) = c(i)} ∈ F.
But
F 3 {i ∈ I : a(i) = b(i)} ∩ {i ∈ I : b(i) = c(i)} = {i ∈ I : a(i) = b(i) = c(i)}
⊆ {i ∈ I : a(i) = c(i)}.
Since F is closed under supersets, {i ∈ I : a(i) = c(i)} ∈ F , which means a ∼F c. Thus,
∼F is also transitive.
Now we define a relation S on
∏
i∈I A
i as follows:
Definition 2.39. For every a, b ∈∏i∈I Ai,
(a, b) ∈ S ⇔ {i ∈ I : (a(i), b(i)) ∈ Ri} ∈ F.
Definition 2.40. For all n ∈ N, define
Sn :=
{(
a0, . . . , an−1
)
: {i ∈ I : (a0(i), . . . , an−1(i)) ∈ Rin} ∈ F} .
Lemma 2.41. For all n ∈ N and for all a0, . . . , an−1, b0, . . . , bn−1 ∈
∏
i∈I A
i, if (a0, . . . , an−1) ∈
Sn and al ∼F bl for all l ≤ n− 1, then (b0, . . . , bn−1) ∈ Sn. It means that ∼F is a con-
gruence relation.
Proof. For n ∈ N and a0, . . . , an−1, b0, . . . , bn−1 ∈
∏
i∈I A
i, we have
{i ∈ I : (a0(i), . . . , an−1(i)) ∈ Rin} ∩
n−1⋂
l=0
{i ∈ I : al(i) = bl(i)}.
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Since (a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ Sn, {i ∈ I :
(
a0(i), . . . , an−1(i)
) ∈ Rin} is in F , and by definition
of ∼F , {i ∈ I : al(i) = bl(i)} is also in F . But F , as a filter on I, is closed under
intersections, therefore
{i ∈ I : (a0(i), . . . , an−1(i)) ∈ Rin} ∩
n−1⋂
l=0
{i ∈ I : al(i) = bl(i)} ∈ F.
The last intersection can be written as follows:
{i ∈ I : a0(i) = b0(i), . . . , an−1(i) = bn−1(i), (a0(i), . . . , an−1(i)) ∈ Rin},
which is a subset of
{i ∈ I : (b0(i), . . . , bn−1(i)) ∈ Rin)}.
The filter F is also closed under supersets, this means that
{i ∈ I : (b0(i), . . . , bn−1(i)) ∈ Rin)} ∈ F,
and hence (b0, . . . , bn−1) ∈ Sn.
We have the following important definition:
Definition 2.42. For all a ∈∏Ai, the equivalence class of a with respect to F is defined
as follows:
[a]F := [a]∼F =
{
b ∈
∏
Ai : b ∼F a
}
.
We use the following notation for the collection of all equivalence classes of the elements
of
∏
Ai: ∏
Ai/F :=
{
[a]F : a ∈
∏
Ai
}
.
For all n ∈ N, let
RFn := {([a1]F , . . . , [an]F ) : (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Sn)} .
Now
∏
Ai/F :=
〈∏
Ai/F, (RFn )n∈N
〉
is called the reduced product of the Ai with respect
to F . If the Ai are all equal, then AI/F =
∏
Ai/F is said to be a reduced power.
Note that, since ∼F is a congruence relation, RFn is well-defined for every n ∈ N.
Hence the reduced product
∏
Ai/F is an L-structure.
Definition 2.43. In the previous definition, if F is an ultrafilter, then
∏
Ai/F is called
an ultraproduct and AI/F is said to be an ultrapower.
24 Chapter 2 Mathematical methodology
2.3.2  Los´’s Theorem
We consider the following definition for every sequence x = (x0, x1, . . .) ∈
(∏
Ai
)N
:
[x]F := ([x0]F , [x1]F , . . .) ∈
(∏
Ai/F
)N
.
We let x(i) = (x0(i), x1(i), . . .) be the sequence of elements of A
i, that is x(i) ∈ (Ai)N.
The most important and fundamental result on ultraproducts is  Los´’s Theorem
which was established in 1955 [38] by the Polish mathematician, logician, economist
and philosopher Jerzy  Los´.
Theorem 2.44. ( Los´’s Theorem). If F is an ultrafilter, then for every L-formula φ and
every sequence x ∈ (∏Ai)N,∏
Ai/F |=[x]F φ⇔ {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) φ} ∈ F.
Proof. The proof follows by induction with respect to the complexity of φ, i.e., the
number of logical symbols in φ. Suppose φ is an atomic formula of the form φ = v˙m
.
= v˙n
for some m,n ∈ N, then by Tarski’s definition of truth we have∏
Ai/F |=[x]F v˙m
.
= v˙n ⇔ [xm]F = [xn]F .
But [xm]F = [xn]F if and only if xm ∼F xn, and by the definition of ∼F , xm ∼F xn
if and only if {i ∈ I : xm(i) = xn(i)} ∈ F . Again by Tarski’s definition of truth,
{i ∈ I : xm(i) = xn(i)} ∈ F if and only if
{i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) v˙m .= v˙n} ∈ F.
Therefore, for the atomic formula of the form φ = v˙m
.
= v˙n, we have shown∏
Ai/F |=[x]F φ⇔ {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) φ} ∈ F.
Suppose that φ is an atomic formula of the form φ = P˙n(˙v˙l0 , . . . , v˙ln−1 )˙ for some
n ∈ N and l0, . . . , ln−1 ∈ N, then, using Tarski’s definition of truth we have∏
Ai/F |=[x]F P˙n(˙v˙l0 , . . . , v˙ln−1 )˙⇔
(
[xl0 ]F , . . . , [xln−1 ]F
)
∈ RFn .
But
(
[xl0 ]F , . . . , [xln−1 ]F
)
∈ RFn if and only if (xl0 , . . . , xln−1) ∈ Sn, and by the definition
of Sn, we have
(xl0 , . . . , xln−1) ∈ Sn ⇔ {i ∈ I : (xl0(i), . . . , xln−1(i)) ∈ Rin} ∈ F.
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Again, by Tarski’s definition of truth, {i ∈ I : (xl0(i), . . . , xln−1(i)) ∈ Rin} ∈ F if
and only if {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) P˙n(˙v˙l0 , . . . , v˙ln−1 )˙} ∈ F . Hence, for the atomic formula of
the form φ = P˙n(˙v˙l0 , . . . , v˙ln−1 )˙ we have shown:∏
Ai/F |=[x]F φ⇔ {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) φ} ∈ F.
Therefore the result is true for all atomic formulae. This forms the basis of the
induction. Now, we prove the induction step of the proof. Suppose that the result
is true for all formulae containing less than r logical symbols and that φ is a formula
containing r logical symbols. There are three cases to consider:
(1) If φ = ¬˙ψ for some L formula ψ. Then by Tarski’s definition of truth we have∏
Ai/F |=[x]F ¬˙ψ ⇔
∏
Ai/F 2[x]F ψ.
By using the induction hypothesis,
∏
Ai/F 2[x]F ψ if and only if
{i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) ψ} /∈ F.
Since F is an ultrafilter,
{i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) ψ} /∈ F ⇔ I\
(
{i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) ψ}
)
∈ F
⇔ {i ∈ I : Ai 2x(i) ψ} ∈ F.
(2.1)
Again by Tarski’s definition of truth, {i ∈ I : Ai 2x(i) ψ} ∈ F if and only if
{i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) ¬˙ψ} ∈ F . Hence for the formula of the form φ = ¬˙ψ, we have
shown ∏
Ai/F |=[x]F φ⇔ {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) φ} ∈ F.
(2) If φ = ψ∧˙χ for some L formulae ψ and χ. Then by Tarski’s definition of truth, we
have ∏
Ai/F |=[x]F ψ∧˙χ⇔
∏
Ai/F |=[x]F ψ and
∏
Ai/F |=[x]F χ.
By using the induction hypothesis,
∏
Ai/F |=[x]F ψ and
∏
Ai/F |=[x]F χ if
and only if {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) ψ} ∈ F and {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) χ} ∈ F respectively.
Since F is closed under finite intersections,
{i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) ψ} ∩ {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) χ} ∈ F
⇔ {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) ψ, Ai |=x(i) χ} ∈ F.
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Again by Tarski’s definition of truth, {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) ψ, Ai |=x(i) χ} ∈ F if and
only if {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) ψ∧˙χ} ∈ F . Hence for the formula of the form φ = ψ∧˙χ,
we have shown ∏
Ai/F |=[x]F φ⇔ {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) φ} ∈ F.
(3) If φ = (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ψ for some n ∈ N and some L formula ψ. Then by using Tarski’s
definition of truth we get∏
Ai/F |=[x]F (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ψ ⇔ ∃[a]F ∈
∏
Ai/F
∏
Ai/F |=[x]F (n/[a]F ) ψ
⇔ ∃a ∈
∏
Ai
∏
Ai/F |=[x]F (n/[a]F ) ψ
⇔ ∃a ∈
∏
Ai
∏
Ai/F |=[x(n/a)]F ψ.
By using the induction hypothesis,
∃a ∈
∏
Ai
∏
Ai/F |=[x(n/a)]F ψ,
if and only if
∃a ∈
∏
Ai {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ} ∈ F.
Since there exists an a ∈∏Ai with {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ} ∈ F , clearly
{i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ} ⊆ {i ∈ I : ∃a(i) ∈ Ai Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ},
and since {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ} ∈ F and F is closed under supersets,
we get {i ∈ I : ∃a(i) ∈ Ai Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ} ∈ F . On the other hand, if
{i ∈ I : ∃a(i) ∈ Ai Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ} ∈ F , then by the Axiom of Choice, there
exists some a ∈∏Ai such that
{i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ} ⊇ {i ∈ I : ∃a(i) ∈ Ai Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ} ∈ F.
Since F is closed under supersets, we have found some a ∈∏Ai with
{i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ} ∈ F.
Therefore we have shown that
∃a ∈
∏
Ai {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ} ∈ F
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if and only if
{i ∈ I : ∃a(i) ∈ Ai Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ} ∈ F.
Hence∏
Ai/F |=[x]F (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ψ ⇔ {i ∈ I : ∃a(i) ∈ Ai Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ} ∈ F.
Now by using again Tarski’s definition of truth,
{i ∈ I : ∃a(i) ∈ Ai Ai |=x(i)(n/a(i)) ψ} ∈ F
if and only if
{i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ψ} ∈ F.
Therefore for the formula of the form φ = (˙∃˙v˙n)˙ψ, we have shown∏
Ai/F |=[x]F φ⇔ {i ∈ I : Ai |=x(i) φ} ∈ F,
and this completes the proof of the  Los´ theorem.
2.4 An ultrapower construction of a nonstandard model of
the real numbers
In this section we extend the real numbers R to the nonstandard real numbers ∗R which
contain infinitesimals and infinitely large numbers. At first we will do this in a simple
way4.
Recall from Section 2.1.3 that a non-principal ultrafilter on N is a collection F ⊂ P(N)
such that
(1) ∅ /∈ F ,
(2) If F1, F2 ∈ F , then F1 ∩ F2 ∈ F ,
(3) If F1 ⊂ N and F1 /∈ F , then N\F1 ∈ F ,
(4) If F1 is a finite subset of N, then N\F1 ∈ F .
From Properties (1), (2) and (3) one can deduce the property that any superset of a
set in F is also in F , i.e., F is closed under supersets5. For proving this, suppose that
4We will study the general case in Section 2.6.
5That is, if F1 ⊆ F2 and F1 ∈ F , then F2 ∈ F .
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F2 /∈ F . Hence by Property (3), N\F2 ∈ F . By using Property (2), ∅ = F1 ∩N\F2 ∈ F ,
which is a contradiction with Property (1).
If we replace Property (3) with this weak property (F is closed under supersets),
then, given Property (4), we have just a free filter on N. In other words, an ultrafilter
on N is the collection of all subsets of N which have ν-measure 1 for some ν, which is a
finitely additive {0, 1}-valued measure on 2N.
Let F be a non-principal ultrafilter on N and we have the following equivalence
relation for sequences x and y in RN:
x ∼F y iff {i ∈ N : x(i) = y(i)} ∈ F. (2.2)
Definition 2.45. Given x ∈ RN, let [x]F denote the equivalence class of x with respect
to the equivalence relation ∼F . The set of nonstandard real numbers or hyperreals,
denoted by ∗R, is the collection of such equivalence classes. In symbols,
∗R = RN/F = {[x]F : x ∈ RN}.
If x ∈ RN, we denote its image in ∗R by [x]F . Of course, every element in ∗R is of the
form [x]F for some x ∈ RN.
For any real number r ∈ R, let r = (r, r, . . .) be the constant sequence in RN. Then
we have an embedding
∗ : R→ ∗R, (2.3)
where ∗r = [r]F for every r ∈ R.
Remark 2.46. In the last definition, RN/F is an ultrapower construction which is
defined in Section 2.3.
The structure 〈R,+,×, <, 0, 1〉 is an ordered field, where R is the set of elements of
the structure, + and × are the binary operations of addition and multiplication, < is
the ordering relation, and 0 and 1 are two distinguished elements of the domain.
By Embedding (2.3), we have ∗0 = [0]F and ∗1 = [1]F . From the Equivalence (2.2),
we can introduce the equality of any two elements [x]F , [y]F in
∗R as follows:
[x]F
∗ = [y]F iff {i ∈ N : x(i) = y(i)} ∈ F. (2.4)
In a similar way we extend the ordering relation < to ∗R by setting for every
[x]F , [y]F ∈ ∗R:
[x]F
∗ < [y]F iff {i ∈ N : x(i) < y(i)} ∈ F. (2.5)
Remark 2.47. The relation ∗ < on ∗R extends the relation < on R, i.e., given any
x, y ∈ R we see that x < y in R if and only if ∗x ∗ < ∗y in ∗R.
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In addition to = and <, we extend the operations + and · for any two elements
[x]F , [y]F in
∗R in a similar way:
[x]F
∗ + [y]F ∗ = [z]F iff {i ∈ N : x(i) + y(i) = z(i)} ∈ F, (2.6)
[x]F
∗ × [y]F ∗ = [z]F iff {i ∈ N : x(i)× y(i) = z(i)} ∈ F. (2.7)
Now, we have the following proposition which will be proved later, after stating the
Basic Transfer Principle.
Proposition 2.48. The structure 〈∗R, ∗+, ∗×, ∗ <, ∗0, ∗1〉 is an ordered field extension
of the ordered field 〈R,+,×, <, 0, 1〉.
From the previous proposition, we can verify that ∗R contains infinitesimals and
infinite numbers.
Convention 2.49. Henceforth, for the ease of reading, common operation and relation
symbols on ∗R, such as ∗+, ∗×, ∗ <, . . . , are simply written as +,×, <, . . . . We also
denote the elements of ∗R without the asterisk.
Definition 2.50. Let δ ∈ ∗R. Then we say δ is a (positive) infinitesimal if ∗0 < δ < ∗r
for all r > 0 in R.
Let f : R× . . .× R→ R be an n-ary function. We introduce as before the extended
function ∗f by the equivalence:
∗f ([x0]F , . . . , [xn−1]F ) = [y]F iff {i ∈ N : f(x0(i), . . . , xn−1(i)) = y(i)} ∈ F. (2.8)
Remark 2.51. The function ∗f extends f , i.e., given any x ∈ Rn, f(x0, . . . , xn−1) = x
if and only if ∗f(∗x0, . . . , ∗xn−1) = ∗x.
Due to Equivalence (2.8), we can extend the absolute value function to ∗R and denote
it by |·| instead of ∗|·|. We have the following important definition:
Definition 2.52. An element x ∈ ∗R is called finite if |x| < ∗r for some r > 0 in R.
We let Fin(∗R) denote the finite elements of ∗R.
Definition 2.53. Given x ∈ ∗R, we say that x is infinitely close to some r ∈ R, in
notation x ≈ r, if |x− ∗r| is infinitesimal in ∗R.
There is an alternative definition for finite and infinitesimal elements in ∗R:
Definition 2.54. For any x ∈ ∗R,
• x is finite if |x| < n for some n ∈ N;
• x is infinitesimal if |x| < 1n for every n ∈ N\{0}.
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Note that 0 is the only infinitesimal in R. Clearly, ≈ is an equivalence relation on
∗R, and we have the following definition:
Definition 2.55. Let x ∈ ∗R. The equivalence class of x with respect to the relation
≈ is called the monad of x and denoted by:
µ(x) = {y ∈ ∗R : y ≈ x}.
Proposition 2.56. Let x ∈ ∗R be finite, i.e., x ∈ Fin(∗R). Then there exists a unique
r ∈ R such that x ≈ r.
Proof. Fix a finite x ∈ ∗R, and set A := {y ∈ R : ∗y ≤ x}. Here we have used x
to define an upper bounded subset of ordinary real numbers. Let r be the least upper
bound in R of the set A. Assume |∗r−x| is not infinitesimal. Then for some n ∈ N\{0},
|∗r − x| ≥ 1n . In this case, if ∗r < x, then r + 1n is still in A, so r is not the least upper
bound of A. On the other hand, if ∗r > x, then r − 1n is an upper bound of A, and this
again contradicts the definition of r. It follows that, r ≈ x.
Now let r1, r2 ∈ R and r1 ≈ x ≈ r2, then r1 ≈ r2, so |r1 − r2| is infinitesimal. Since 0 is
the only infinitesimal in R, r1 = r2.
By the previous proposition, the following definition is well-defined:
Definition 2.57. If x ∈ ∗R is finite, then the unique real number r with x ≈ r is called
the standard part of x. We write ◦x = r.
We have already noticed that R and ∗R are similar in many respects, for example,
both are ordered fields. We shall now make precise in which sense R and ∗R are similar.
We will specify in more detail which properties of R transfer to ∗R. For this, we need a
formal language for an ordered field (OF).
The structure R has a language LOF that can be used to describe the kind of prop-
erties of R that are preserved under the embedding ∗ : R → ∗R. The language LOF is
the set of symbols
{x˙, y˙, z˙, x˙0, x˙1, . . . , y˙0, y˙1, . . .} ∪ {0˙, 1˙,u, ×˙, <˙} ∪ { .=, ∃˙, ∧˙, ¬˙, (˙, )˙},
where
• x˙, y˙, z˙, x˙0, x˙1, . . . , y˙0, y˙1, . . . are variables,
• 0˙ and 1˙ are unary predicate letters,
• u and ×˙ are binary operations,
• <˙ is a binary relation,
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• .= is the equality symbol,
• ∃˙ is the existential quantifier,
• ∧˙ and ¬˙ are logical connectives, and
• (˙ and )˙ are parentheses.
A string is an atomic formula if and only if it is of the form x˙
.
= y˙, x˙u y˙, x˙×˙y˙ or x˙<˙y˙.
The set of formulae is the smallest subset of strings for which every atomic formula is a
formula of LOF , and if φ, ψ are formulae of LOF and x˙ is a variable, then
¬˙φ, (˙φ∧˙ψ)˙, (˙∃˙x˙)˙φ,
are formulae of LOF .
For all formulae φ, ψ of LOF and all variables x˙ and y˙, we introduce the following
abbreviations:
(˙x˙ ˙6=y˙)˙ := ¬˙(˙x˙ .= y˙)˙;
(˙x˙>˙y˙)˙ := ¬˙(˙x˙<˙y˙)˙;
(˙∀˙x˙)˙φ := ¬˙(˙∃˙x˙)˙¬˙φ;
(˙φ∨˙ψ)˙ := ¬˙(˙¬˙φ∧˙¬˙ψ)˙;
(˙φ→˙ψ)˙ := ¬˙(˙φ∧˙¬˙ψ)˙;
(˙φ↔˙ψ)˙ := (˙(˙φ→˙ψ)˙∧˙(˙ψ→˙φ)˙)˙.
0˙x˙ is meant to be interpreted as x = 0 and 1˙x˙ is meant to be interpreted as x = 1.
Hence 〈R,+,×, <, 0, 1〉 is an LOF -structure and so is 〈∗R, ∗+, ∗×, ∗ <, ∗0, ∗1〉.
Definition 2.58. Define R := 〈R,+,×, <, 0, 1〉 and ∗R := 〈 ∗R, ∗+, ∗ <, ∗0, ∗1〉.
Remark 2.59. Both R and ∗R are LOF -structures.
Theorem 2.60. (Basic Transfer Principle). If φ(x0, . . . , xn−1) is an LOF -formula with
n free variables, then for all r0, . . . , rn−1 ∈ R,
R |= φ[r0, . . . , rn−1] ⇔ ∗R |= φ[ ∗r0, . . . , ∗rn−1].
Proof. The proof of this theorem is an immediate corollary of  Los´’s Theorem 2.44.
(⇒): φ[r0, . . . , rn−1] is true in R, then
{i ∈ N : R |= φ[r0(i), . . . , rn−1(i)]} = {i ∈ N : R |= φ[r0, . . . , rn−1]} = N,
where rj is constant sequence (rj , rj , . . .) for all j = 0, . . . , n− 1. But N ∈ F , therefore
{i ∈ N : R |= φ[r0(i), . . . , rn−1(i)]} ∈ F and by  Los´’s Theorem, φ[ ∗r0, . . . , ∗rn−1] is true
in RN/F = ∗R.
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(⇐): Since φ[ ∗r0, . . . , ∗rn−1] is true in ∗R, by  Los´’s Theorem we have:
{i ∈ N : R |= φ[r0(i), . . . , rn−1(i)]} = {i ∈ N : R |= φ[r0, . . . , rn−1]} ∈ F.
But the set {i ∈ N : R |= φ[r0, . . . , rn−1]} is equal to N ∈ F if φ[r0, . . . , rn−1] is true in
R, and is equal to ∅ /∈ F if φ[r0, . . . , rn−1] is not true in R. Hence φ[r0, . . . , rn−1] must
be true in R.
For showing the usefulness and the power of the Transfer Principle, we give the proof
of the Proposition 2.48 by using this machinery.
Proof of Proposition 2.48. We need to verify that the structure 〈∗R, ∗+, ∗×, ∗ <, ∗0, ∗1〉
has the properties of an ordered field (for the properties of being an ordered field see
page 63 in Bloch [12]). Note that, the property of being an ordered field is a sentence
(i.e. a formula without free variables) in LOF . By the Transfer Principle this means
that ∗R is an ordered field if and only if R is. In detail:
1. (Commutative law for addition).
R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙ (˙x˙+˙y˙=˙y˙+˙x˙)˙ ⇔ ∗R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙ (˙x˙+˙y˙=˙y˙+˙x˙)˙.
2. (Associative law for addition).
R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙(˙∀˙z˙)˙ (˙(˙x˙+˙y˙)˙+˙z˙=˙x˙+˙(˙y˙+˙z˙)˙)˙
m
∗R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙(˙∀˙z˙)˙ (˙(˙x˙+˙y˙)˙+˙z˙=˙x˙+˙(˙y˙+˙z˙)˙)˙.
3. (Identity law for addition).
R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙ (˙0˙y˙ →˙ x˙+˙y˙ .= x˙)˙ ⇔ ∗R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙ (˙0˙y˙ →˙ x˙+˙y˙ .= x˙)˙.
4. (Existence of an additive inverse).
R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∃˙y˙)˙ (˙0˙(˙x˙+˙y˙)˙)˙ ⇔ ∗R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∃˙y˙)˙ (˙0˙(˙x˙+˙y˙)˙)˙.
5. (Commutative law for multiplication).
R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙ (˙x˙×˙y˙=˙y˙×˙x˙)˙ ⇔ ∗R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙ (˙x˙×˙y˙=˙y˙×˙x˙)˙.
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6. (Associative law for multiplication).
R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙(˙∀˙z˙)˙ (˙(˙x˙×˙y˙)˙×˙z˙=˙x˙×˙(˙y˙×˙z˙)˙)˙
m
∗R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙(˙∀˙z˙)˙ (˙(˙x˙×˙y˙)˙×˙z˙=˙x˙×˙(˙y˙×˙z˙)˙)˙.
7. (Identity law for multiplication).
R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙ (˙1˙y˙ →˙ x˙×˙y˙ .= x˙)˙ ⇔ ∗R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙ (˙1˙y˙ →˙ x˙×˙y˙ .= x˙)˙.
8. (Existence of a multiplicative inverse).
R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙ (˙¬˙(˙0˙x˙)˙ →˙ (˙∃˙y˙)˙ 1˙(˙x˙×˙y˙)˙)˙
m
∗R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙ (˙¬˙(˙0˙x˙)˙ →˙ (˙∃˙y˙)˙ 1˙(˙x˙×˙y˙)˙)˙.
9. (Distributive law).
R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙(˙∀˙z˙)˙ (˙x˙×˙(˙y˙+˙z˙)˙=˙(˙x˙×˙y˙)˙+˙(˙x˙×˙z˙)˙)˙
m
∗R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙(˙∀˙z˙)˙ (˙x˙×˙(˙y˙+˙z˙)˙=˙(˙x˙×˙y˙)˙+˙(˙x˙×˙z˙)˙)˙.
10. (Trichotomy law).
R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙ (˙x˙<˙y˙ ∨˙ x˙ .= y˙ ∨˙ x˙>˙y˙)˙
m
∗R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙ (˙x˙<˙y˙ ∨˙ x˙ .= y˙ ∨˙ x˙>˙y˙)˙.
11. (Transitive law).
R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙(˙∀˙z˙)˙ (˙x˙<˙y˙ ∧˙ y˙<˙z˙ →˙ x˙<˙z˙)˙
m
∗R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙(˙∀˙z˙)˙ (˙x˙<˙y˙ ∧˙ y˙<˙z˙ →˙ x˙<˙z˙)˙.
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12. (Addition law for order).
R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙(˙∀˙z˙)˙ (˙x˙<˙y˙ →˙ x˙+˙z˙<˙y˙+˙z˙)˙
m
∗R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙(˙∀˙z˙)˙ (˙x˙<˙y˙ →˙ x˙+˙z˙<˙y˙+˙z˙)˙.
13. (Multiplication law for order).
R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙(˙∀˙z˙)˙ (˙x˙<˙y˙ ∧˙ z˙>˙0˙ →˙ x˙×˙z˙<˙y˙×˙z˙)˙
m
∗R |= (˙∀˙x˙)˙(˙∀˙y˙)˙(˙∀˙z˙)˙ (˙x˙<˙y˙ ∧˙ z˙>˙0˙ →˙ x˙×˙z˙<˙y˙×˙z˙)˙.

2.5 Superstructures and bounded ultrapowers
We will construct superstructures which will be used for introducing the nonstandard
universe. We construct some superstructure over an arbitrary set S, by assuming that
the relation ∈ on this superstucture is the same as the ordinary element relation, except
the elements of S are interpreted as atoms by ∈, i.e. v /∈ s for all s ∈ S and v is in the
constructed superstructure over S (see Herzberg [30] and Anderson [4]).
Definition 2.61. Given a set S (with atom elements), the superstructure V (S) over S
is defined by
V0(S) = S,
Vn(S) = Vn−1(S) ∪ P(Vn−1(S)), for all n ∈ N
V (S) =
⋃
k∈N
Vk(S).
Example 2.4. Let V (S) be a superstructure such that S contains N. The number 7
and the set {7} are in V1(S). The number 7, the set {7}, and the set of all finite subsets
of N are in V2(S).
In general, we have the following remark for the superstructure V (S) over an arbi-
trary set S:
Remark 2.62. (1) V0(S) ⊆ V1(S) ⊆ · · · ⊆ Vn−1(S) ⊆ · · · .
(2) V (S) consists of atoms and sets. That is,
∀s ∈ V0(S) [s 6= ∅ ∧ (∀v ∈ V (S), v /∈ s)] ,
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and all other members of V (S) are sets.
(3) Vn(S) = S ∪ P(Vn−1(S)).
(4) Vn−1(S) ∈ Vn(S). Hence Vn−1(S) ∈ V (S), and in particular S ∈ V (S).
(5) a ∈ A ∈ Vn(S) implies a ∈ Vn−1(S).
(6) If a, b ∈ Vn−1(S), then {a, b} ∈ Vn(S).
(7) If A,B ∈ Vn−1(S), then A ∪B ∈ Vn(S).
(8) A ∈ Vn−1(S) implies P(A) ∈ Vn+1(S).
(9) Each Vn(S) is transitive, i.e., each element of Vn(S) which is not an atom, is a
subset of Vn(S).
Properties (6)–(8) ensure that V (S) is a universe, and by (4) it is a universe over S.
In fact, V (S) is the smallest universe containing S, that is, if any universe V ′ has the
property S ∈ V ′, then V (S) ⊆ V ′.
Remark 2.63. The superstructure V (S) consists of all mathematical objects. The
atoms are in V0(S); the ordered pairs (x, y) ∈ S×S belongs to V2(S), since they can be
perceived as sets of the type {{x}, {x, y}}; the functions f : S → S, and more generally,
the relations in S are subsets of V2(S) and hence, belong to V3(S). If O is a topology
on S, then O ⊆ P(S) and hence O belongs to V2(S). Where S = X ∪ R, the algebraic
operations in S are perceived as subsets of S × S × S and hence also belong to V (S).
Definition 2.64. A sequence A = (A(0), A(1), . . .) of elements of V (S) is bounded if
there exists a fixed n ∈ N such that for every i ∈ N, A(i) ∈ Vn(S).
Definition 2.65. Let F be a non-principal ultrafilter on N. Two bounded sequences
A and B are equivalent with respect to F if and only if {i ∈ N : A(i) = B(i)} ∈ F ,
and we denote it by A ∼F B. We let [A]F be the equivalence class of A and define the
bounded ultrapower by
V (S)N/F := {[A]F : A is a bounded sequence in V (S)}.
We define the membership relation ∈F in the bounded ultrapower as follows:
Definition 2.66. Let F be a non-principal ultrafilter on N and suppose [A]F and [B]F
are equivalence classes of the sequences A and B in V (S). Then
[A]F ∈F [B]F ⇔ {i ∈ N : A(i) ∈ B(i)} ∈ F.
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As in Section 2.4, we need a formal language for V (S) to state  Los´’s Theorem and
the Transfer Principle. The language LV (S) consists of the symbols
{x˙, y˙, z˙, x˙0, x˙1, . . . , y˙0, y˙1, . . .} ∪ {∈˙} ∪ { .=, ∃˙, ∧˙, ¬˙, (˙, )˙},
where x˙, y˙, z˙, x˙0, x˙1, . . . , y˙0, y˙1, . . . are variables, ∈˙ is the set membership, .= is the equality
symbol, ∃˙ is the existential quantifier, ∧˙ and ¬˙ are logical connectives, and (˙ and )˙ are
parentheses.
A string is an atomic formula if and only if it is of the form x˙
.
= y˙ or x˙ ∈˙ y˙. The set
of formulae is the smallest subset of strings for which every atomic formula is a formula
of LV (S), and if φ, ψ are formulae of LV (S) and x˙ is a variable, then
¬˙φ, (˙φ∧˙ψ)˙, (˙∃˙x˙)˙φ,
are formulae of LV (S). We can achieve the other formulae with abbreviations (see Section
2.2). The atomic formulae x˙
.
= y˙ and x˙ ∈˙ y˙ are interpreted as x = y, x ∈ y for every
variables x, y ∈ S, respectively. Since the logical symbols have a fixed meaning over any
domain, this means that every formula φ of LV (S) has an interpretation in V (S).
 Los´’s Theorem extends to the bounded ultrapower V (S)N/F by a very similar proof.
Theorem 2.67. ( Los´’s Theorem for Bounded Ultrapowers). If F is a (non-principal)
ultrafilter on N and φ is an LV (S)-formula with bounded quantifiers and n free variables,
then for all bounded sequences A0, . . . , An−1 ∈ V (S)N,
V (S)N/F |= φ[[A0]F , . . . , [An−1]F ] ⇔ {i ∈ N : V (S) |= φ[A0(i), . . . , An−1(i)]} ∈ F.
Proof. The idea of the proof is that we modify  Los´’s Theorem 2.44 for bounded, rather
than ordinary, ultrapowers. We again proceed by induction on the length of φ. At first,
suppose φ is an atomic formula of the form φ = x˙
.
= y˙. Then for some k,m ∈ N, we
have
V (S)N/F |= [Ak]F .= [Am]F ⇔ [Ak]F = [Am]F
⇔ {i ∈ N : Ak(i) = Am(i)} ∈ F. (by definition of ∼F )
Since Ak, Am are bounded sequences, there exists a fixed n ∈ N such that for every
i ∈ N, Ak(i) ∈ Vn(S) ⊆ V (S) and Am(i) ∈ Vn(S) ⊆ V (S). Hence
{i ∈ N : Ak(i) = Am(i)} ∈ F ⇔ {i ∈ N : V (S) |= Ak(i) .= Am(i)} ∈ F.
Therefore, the theorem is true for the atomic formula of the form φ = x˙
.
= y˙. Now
suppose that φ is an atomic formula of the form φ = x˙ ∈˙ y˙. Then for some k,m ∈ N, we
2.5 Superstructures and bounded ultrapowers 37
have
V (S)N/F |= [Ak]F ∈˙ [Am]F ⇔ [Ak]F ∈F [Am]F
⇔ {i ∈ N : Ak(i) ∈ Am(i)} ∈ F. (by definition of ∈F )
Again, since Ak and Am are bounded sequences,
{i ∈ N : Ak(i) ∈F Am(i)} ∈ F ⇔ {i ∈ N : V (S) |= Ak(i) ∈˙Am(i)} ∈ F.
Hence, the theorem is true for the atomic formula of the form φ = x˙ ∈˙ y˙.
For induction steps, the proof of the cases φ = ¬˙ψ and φ = ψ∧˙χ for some LV (S)-
formula ψ and χ, is exactly the same with the proof of  Los´’s Theorem 2.44. It remains
to consider the case where φ is of the form (˙∃˙x˙ ∈˙ y˙)˙ψ(x˙0, . . . , x˙n−1, x˙). We want to show
that
V (S)N/F |=(˙∃˙x˙ ∈˙ [Am]F )˙ψ [[A0]F , . . . , [An−1]F , x˙]
⇔ {i ∈ N : V (S) |= (˙∃˙x˙ ∈˙Am(i))˙ψ[A0(i), . . . , An−1(i), x˙]} ∈ F.
Suppose s = {i ∈ N : V (S) |= (˙∃˙x˙ ∈˙Am(i))˙ψ[A0(i), . . . , An−1(i), x˙]} ∈ F . Then for
each i ∈ s, there exists in V (S) an element C(i) ∈ Am(i) such that
V (S) |= ψ[A0(i), . . . , An−1(i), C(i)].
Let h : N→ S be such that h(i) ∈ Am(i) for all i ∈ N. Define the function g : N→ V (S)
by
g(i) :=
C(i), for i ∈ sh(i), for i /∈ s .
Since Am is a bounded sequence, there exists some n ∈ N such that
{i ∈ N : Am(i) ∈ Vn(S)} ∈ F,
and by transitivity of Vn(S),
{i ∈ N : g(i) ∈ Vn(S)} ⊇ {i ∈ N : Am(i) ∈ Vn(S)} ∈ F.
But F is closed under supersets, hence {i ∈ N : g(i) ∈ Vn(S)} ∈ F and therefore
[g]F ∈ V (S)N/F . Moreover
{i ∈ N : V (S) |= ψ[A0(i), . . . , An−1(i), g(i)]} ⊇ s ∈ F.
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Thus {i ∈ N : V (S) |= ψ[A0(i), . . . , An−1(i), g(i)]} ∈ F . By induction hypothesis,
V (S)N/F |= ψ[[A0]F , . . . , [An−1]F , [g]F ].
Therefore
V (S)N/F |= (˙∃˙x˙ ∈˙ [Am]F )˙ψ[[A0]F , . . . , [An−1]F , x˙].
Now suppose that V (S)N/F |= (˙∃˙x˙ ∈˙ [Am]F )˙ψ [[A0]F , . . . , [An−1]F , x˙]. This means
that there exists [g]F ∈F [Am]F such that
V (S)N/F |= ψ [[A0]F , . . . , [An−1]F , [g]F ] .
By induction hypothesis,
{i ∈ N : V (S) |= ψ[A0(i), . . . , An−1(i), g(i)]} ∈ F.
But
{i ∈ N : V (S) |= (˙∃˙x˙ ∈˙Am(i))˙ψ[A0(i), . . . , An−1(i), x˙]}
⊇ {i ∈ N : V (S) |= ψ[A0(i), . . . , An−1(i), g(i)]} ∈ F.
Since F is closed under supersets,
{i ∈ N : V (S) |= (˙∃˙x˙ ∈˙Am(i))˙ψ[A0(i), . . . , An−1(i), x˙]} ∈ F,
and this completes the proof of the theorem.
2.6 Nonstandard universe
In Section 2.4, we have shown that ∗R is a proper extension of R which already contains
infinitesimals and infinitely large numbers. But it is an insufficient setting for many
applications of nonstandard analysis. We need an extended universe that in addition
to numbers and functions, also contains sets of functions, sets of spaces of functions.
Therefore we require an enlargement of the whole superstructure over the reals, that is
V (R). However, for the sake of generality, we consider the case of the superstructure
V (S) over an arbitrary set S.
As we have introduced in Section 2.5, the superstructure over S is obtained by
iterating the power-set operator countably many times. The nonstandard universe will
be constructed by assuming an extension ∗S of S and assuming an embedding
∗ : V (S)→ V ( ∗S), (2.9)
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with the properties similar to the embedding (2.3). At first, we have the following
principle:
Extension Principle. ∗s = [s]F for every s ∈ S, where [s]F ∈ SN/F is the equiva-
lence class of the constant sequence s = (s, s, . . .) ∈ SN with respect to the non-principal
ultrafilter F .
We shall demonstrate that the superstructure embedding (2.9) satisfies the Transfer
Principle. We do this in two stages. First, we map the superstructure V (S) into the
bounded ultrapower V (S)N/F , which has been introduced in Definition 2.65. Then we
map this bounded ultrapower into the superstructure V ( ∗S) in such a way that the
embedding 2.9 satisfies the Transfer Principle.
• Embedding V (S) into V (S)N/F : We consider the following embedding for every
A ∈ V (S):
i : V (S)→ V (S)N/F,
such that i(A) = [A]F , where A = (A,A, . . .) is a bounded constant sequence
in V (S) and [A]F is the equivalence class of A with respect to the non-principal
ultrafilter F .
• Embedding V (S)N/F into V (∗S): We construct the following embedding:
j : V (S)N/F → V (∗S),
such that (i) j is identity on ∗S and (ii) if [A]F /∈ ∗S, then
j([A]F ) = {j([B]F ) : [B]F ∈F [A]F },
where ∈F is defined in Definition 2.66.
Remark 2.68. The last embedding mapped the relation ∈F in the ultrapower into the
ordinary membership relation in V (∗S).
Remark 2.69. We can define j by induction. Let
Vk(S)
N/F = {[A]F : A is a sequence in Vk(S)}.
Then the bounded ultrapower is the union of the chain
∗S = V0(R)N/F ⊆ . . . ⊆ Vk(S)N/F ⊆ . . . .
Then for k = 0, j must be the identity. If [A]F ∈ Vk(S)N/F and [A]F /∈ ∗S, we set
j([A]F ) = {j([B]F ) : [B]F ∈F [A]F }. This makes sense, since if [B]F ∈F [A]F , it follows
from Definition 2.66 that {i ∈ N : Bi ∈ Vk−1(S)} ∈ F , i.e., [B]F ∈ Vk−1(S)N/F , which
means that j([B]F ) is defined at the previous stage of the inductive construction.
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Definition 2.70. The composition of i and j, denoted by ∗ : j ◦ i, is an embedding of
the structure V (S) into V (∗S), where for every A ∈ V (S), ∗A = j(i(A)). We call V (∗S)
the extended nonstandard universe.
Now, we give the Transfer Principle:
Theorem 2.71. (Transfer Principle). If φ(x0, . . . , xn−1) is an ∈-formula with bounded
quantifiers and n free variables, then for all A0, . . . , An−1 ∈ V (S),
V (S) |= φ[A0, . . . , An−1] ⇔ V (∗S) |= φ[ ∗A0, . . . , ∗An−1].
Proof. According to  Los´’s Theorem for Bounded Ultrapowers (Theorem 2.67), for any
[A0]F , . . . , [An−1]F ∈ V (S)N/F , we have
V (S)N/F |= φ [[A0]F , . . . , [An−1]F ] ⇔ {i ∈ N : V (S) |= φ [A0(i), . . . An−1(i)]} ∈ F,
(2.10)
from which transfer follows between V (S) and V (S)N/F , exactly as in 2.60.
But we are looking for the transfer between V (S) and V (∗S). In order to prove this
we need to replace 2.10 by
V (S)N/F |= φ[j([A0]F ), . . . , j([An−1]F )] ⇔ {i ∈ N : V (S) |= φ[[A0]i, . . . [An−1]i]} ∈ F.
(2.11)
This is also an immediate extension which follows from the fact that every element
j([A]F ) in V (
∗S) is of the form j([B]F ) for some [B]F in V (S)N/F (see the construction
of the j-map). Therefore the Extended Transfer Principle 2.71 follows by the same proof
as in 2.60.
Remark 2.72. If S = R, all properties of ∗R discussed in Section 2.4 hold for ∗R in
V (∗R). Elements of ∗R are either finite or infinite, and every finite element in ∗R has a
unique standard part in R.
Definition 2.73. Let A ∈ V (∗S), then
• A is called standard if A = ∗B for some B ∈ V (S),
• A is called internal if A ∈ ∗B for some B ∈ V (S).
• A is called external if A is not internal.
Remark 2.74. A ∈ V (∗S) is internal if and only if there exists m ∈ N such that
A ∈ ∗Vm(S).
Proof. Suppose there exists m ∈ N such that A ∈ ∗Vm(S). Since Vm(S) ∈ V (S), A is
internal. Conversely, suppose that A is internal. By the previous definition, there exists
m ∈ N such that A ∈ ∗B and B ∈ Vm+1(S). Hence A ∈ ∗Vm(S). This is true, because
∀m ∈ N and ∀x ∈ y ∈ ∗Vm+1(S), x ∈ ∗Vm(S).
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Remark 2.75. N is an external set.
Proof. Suppose that N is internal, which means that N ∈ ∗P(N). Let
∀A ∈ P(N) (N\A ∈ P(N)).
By the Transfer Principle,
∀A ∈ ∗P(N) (∗N\A ∈ ∗P(N)),
and hence the set ∗N\N is also internal. Again, by using the Transfer Principle for
∀A ∈ P(N) (A 6= ∅ ⇒ (∃m ∈ A)(∀k ∈ A)(m ≤ k)),
there is a first element m in ∗N\N. Therefore, m − 1 is the last element of N, which is
impossible. Hence N is external.
Proposition 2.76. (Internal Definition Principle). Let B,A0, A1, . . . , An−1 be internal
sets in V (∗S) and let φ(x, x0, x1, . . . , xn−1) be an ∈-formula with bounded quantifiers
and n+ 1 free variables, then the set
{y ∈ B : V (∗S) |= φ [y,A0, A1, . . . , An−1]},
is internal.
Proof. Since B,A0, A1, . . . , An−1 are internal sets in V (∗S), there exists some integer m
such that B,A0, A1, . . . , An−1 ∈ ∗Vm(S). In V (S) we have the following true sentence:
∀x, x0, x1, . . . , xn−1 ∈ Vm(S) ∃z ∈ Vm+1(S) (z = {t ∈ x : φ (t, x0, x1, . . . , xn−1)}),
where z = {t ∈ x : φ (t, x0, x1, . . . , xn−1)} is an abbreviation of the formula
∀t(t ∈ z ⇔ t ∈ x ∧ φ(t, x0, x1, . . . , xn−1)),
which implies
∀t ∈ Vm+1(S) (t ∈ z ⇔ t ∈ x ∧ φ(t, x0, x1, . . . , xn−1)) .
By using the Transfer Principle we have
∀x, x0, x1, . . . , xn−1 ∈ ∗Vm(S) ∃z ∈ ∗Vm+1(S)
∀t ∈ ∗Vm+1(S) (t ∈ z ⇔ t ∈ x ∧ φ(t, x0, x1, . . . , xn−1)) ,
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is true in V (∗S). Since B,A1, . . . , An ∈ ∗Vm(S),
∀y ∈ ∗Vm+1(S) (y ∈ z ⇔ y ∈ B ∧ V (∗S) |= φ[y,A0, A1, . . . , An−1)] .
But z ∈ ∗Vm+1(S) and by the transitivity of ∗V (S), z ⊆ ∗Vm+1(S). Hence z ∩
∗Vm+1(S) = z. Which means that
{y ∈ B : V (∗S) |= φ [y,A0, A1, . . . , An−1]},
is in ∗Vm+1(S), and therefore it is internal.
Example 2.5. Since ∗N is internal, any n ∈ ∗N is internal. Then the set
{v ∈ ∗N : v > n},
is also an internal set.
Proposition 2.77. (Overspill Principle). Let A ⊆ ∗R be a non-empty internal set. If A
contains arbitrary large finite positive numbers, then it also contains an infinite number.
Proof. (First proof). If A is unbounded, then A contains at least one infinite element
and so the assertion is obvious. Otherwise, let
X = {m ∈ ∗N : m is an upper bound of A}.
By the Internal Definition Principle, X is a non-empty internal subset of ∗N, with a least
element M (every non-empty subset of N has a least element, by the Transfer Principle,
every non-empty internal subset of ∗N has a least element). Since A contains arbitrary
large finite positive numbers, M must be infinite. Indeed, if there is no x ∈ A so that
M −  ≤ x ≤ M for some positive , then M −  is the least upper bound of A, which
is a contradiction. So there is some x ∈ A such that M −  ≤ x ≤ M , and hence this
completes the proof of the theorem.
Proof. (Second proof). In the first proof we have shown that A is a non-empty internal
subset of ∗N. Furthermore, by hypothesis, we know that ∃N ∈ N such that
{N,N + 1, . . .} ⊆ A.
We want to show that there exists M ∈ ∗N\N such that M ∈ A. For proving this by
contraposition, suppose that @M ∈ ∗N\N such that M ∈ A. Therefore A = {N,N +
1, . . .} is internal, and hence {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} ∪ {N,N + 1, . . .} = N is internal, which is
a contradiction with the Remark 2.75
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In the future, we will deal with some normed linear spaces, especially Banach spaces,
over real numbers, and will prove some theorems by using the machinery that we have
described in this chapter. Therefore, we need to construct the superstructure V (X ∪R),
where X is a Banach space over R, by assuming that the elements of X and R are
interpreted as atoms. Then we construct a bounded ultrapower of V (X∪R) by collecting
the equivalence classes of sequences in V (X∪R), that are bounded in the superstructure
hierarchy, using the non-principal ultrafilter F on N. As we have seen in the construction
of ∗ : j ◦ i, the ultrapower construction can easily be adapted to construct an embedding
∗ : V (X ∪ R)→ V (∗X ∪ ∗R),
where ∗X is a Banach space over ∗R satisfying:
• Extension Principle: ∗X and ∗R are proper extensions of X and R, respectively,
and ∗x = [x]F for every x ∈ X ∪ R, and
• Transfer Principle: If φ(v0, · · · , vn−1) is an ∈-formula with bounded quantifiers
and n free variables, then for every A0, · · · , An−1 ∈ V (X ∪ R),
V (X ∪ R) |= φ[A0, · · · , An−1] ⇔ V (∗X ∪ ∗R) |= φ[ ∗A0, · · · , ∗An−1].
Convention 2.78. If x ∈ X ∪ R, we write x for ∗x.
2.7 Saturation and topology
We shall introduce a new principle of nonstandard analysis, saturation, which is very
important when we are dealing with mathematical objects such as Banach spaces and
topological spaces.
Proposition 2.79. (Countable Saturation Principle). If A0 ⊇ A1 ⊇ . . . is a decreasing
countable sequence of non-empty internal sets in V (∗S), then⋂
i∈N
Ai 6= ∅.
Proof. For any i ∈ N, since Ai is internal, it is of the form Ai = j(A′i), where
A′i = [(A
i
0, A
i
1, . . .)]F .
We may assume that each Aik ⊆ Vn(S) for some fixed n ∈ N. For k ≥ 0, let
Ik := {i ≥ k : A0i ⊇ A1i ⊇ . . . ⊇ Aki 6= ∅}.
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Then I0 = N and for all k ∈ N, Ik ∈ F and Ik−1 ⊇ Ik. Also we have
⋂
k∈N Ik = ∅. This
implies that
m(i) := max{m : i ∈ Im},
is well-defined for each i ∈ N. Let Bi be some element in Am(i)i . We shall prove that
B = [(B0, B1, . . .)]F ∈F A′k for every k ≥ 0. Note that i ∈ Ik implies that m(i) ≥ k, and
hence Bi ∈ Am(i)i ⊆ Aki . Thus
{i ∈ N : Bi ∈ Aki } ⊇ Ik ∈ F,
and since F is an ultrafilter, {i ∈ N : Bi ∈ Aki } ∈ F . Therefore B = [(B0, B1, . . .)]F ∈F
A′k and according to the construction of j-map, j(A
′
k) = j(B) = Ak. Since k is arbitrary,
the proof is finished.
Definition 2.80. A family F of subsets of some set S has the finite intersection property
(fip) if for every finite set of elements F0, F1, . . . , Fn−1 in F , we have
F0 ∩ F1 ∩ . . . ∩ Fn−1 6= ∅.
Definition 2.81. (κ-Saturation Principle). Let κ be an infinite cardinal. ∗ is κ-
saturated if and only if for every collection of internal sets (Ai)i∈I in V (∗S) with |I| < κ,
if (Ai)i∈I has the finite intersection property, then the intersection
⋂
i∈I Ai is non-empty,
i.e. contains some internal object. Note that, if κ = ℵ1, the first uncountable cardinal,
then the κ-saturation principle is Countable Saturation Principle 2.79.
Remark 2.82. Chang and Keisler in [14] (Chapter 5) have proved the existence of the
κ-saturated embeddings.
Now, we want to introduce the monad of an element of some topological space X
and then give some results about the compactness of X. Later we will talk about the
continuity of a function on X.
Definition 2.83. Let (X,O) be a topological space and for x ∈ X, Ox be the family of
open sets containing x. The monad of x ∈ X is given by
µ(x) :=
⋂
{ ∗O : O ∈ Ox}.
Remark 2.84. If y ∈ ∗X and y ∈ µ(x) for some x ∈ X, then we write y ≈X x.
Definition 2.85. Suppose (X,O) is a topological space. An element x ∈ ∗X is near-
standard if and only if x ∈ µ(y) for some y ∈ X.
Remark 2.86. If (X,O) is a Hausdorff space, x ∈ ∗X and x ∈ µ(y) for some y ∈ X,
then y is unique and in this case we write y = ◦x.
2.7 Saturation and topology 45
Proof. The proof of this remark is an immediate corollary of the fact that, (X,O) is a
Hausdorff space if and only if for every x, y ∈ X with x 6= y, µ(x)∩µ(y) = ∅. The reader
can find the proof of this fact at page 48 in Albeverio et al. [2].
Proposition 2.87. Suppose (X,O) is a topological space. If X is compact, then every
element in ∗X is nearstandard.
Proof. Suppose X is compact and that there is some y ∈ ∗X which is not nearstandard.
Then for every x ∈ X, there exists Ox with x ∈ Ox ∈ O and y /∈ ∗Ox. Therefore
{Ox : x ∈ X} is an open cover of X. Let {Ox0 , . . . ,Oxn−1} be a finite subcover of X for
n ∈ N. Hence
n−1⋃
i=0
∗Oxi =
∗
(
n−1⋃
i=0
Oxi
)
= ∗X,
so y /∈ ∗X, which is a contradiction, and this completes the proof of the proposition.
We have the following definition from Diener and Diener [18].
Definition 2.88. Suppose (X,O) and (Y,T ) are topological spaces. f : ∗X → ∗Y is
S-continuous in x ∈ ∗X if and only if
∀y ∈ ∗X (x ≈X y ⇒ f(x) ≈Y f(y)).
f is S-continuous on ∗X if and only if for all nearstandard x ∈ ∗X, f is S-continuous
in x.
Proposition 2.89. If f : X → R is continuous, then ∗f : ∗X → ∗R is S-continuous.
Proof. Choose a nearstandard x¯ ∈ ∗X. Let x ≈ x¯ for some x ∈ X. Since f is continuous,
it is also continuous in x, and we can write
(∀ ∈ R+) (∃δ ∈ R+) ((∀y ∈ X)(|x− y| < δ ⇒ |f(x)− f(y)| < )) .
Transfer Principle can be applied to (∀y ∈ X)(|x− y| < δ ⇒ |f(x)− f(y)| < ), and for
every  ∈ R+ there exists δ ∈ R+ such that
(∀y ∈ ∗X)(|x− y| < δ ⇒ | ∗f(x)− ∗f(y)| < ).
Now suppose that y ∈ ∗X and y ≈ x¯. Thus, since x ≈ x¯, we have y ≈ x; hence |x−y| < δ
for all δ ∈ R+. Then | ∗f(x) − ∗f(y)| <  for all  ∈ R+. Therefore ∗f(x) ≈ ∗f(y).
In particular, this holds for y = x¯. So ∗f(x) ≈ ∗f(y) and ∗f(x) ≈ ∗f(x¯). Hence
∗f(x¯) ≈ ∗f(y) for all y ≈ x¯.

Chapter 3
Theorem on microeconomic foundations
of representative agent models
This chapter builds on a recent proposal for microeconomic foundations of “represen-
tative agents”. Herzberg in [31] constructed a representative utility function for finite-
dimensional social decision problems and since the decision problems of macroeconomic
theory are typically infinite-dimensional, Herzberg’s original result is insufficient for
many applications. We therefore generalise his result by allowing the social alternatives
to belong to a general Banach space.
3.1 The model and formulation
We are concerned with a social decision problem, therefore we need a model for intro-
ducing population, alternatives and utility functions. We use the following model:
3.1.1 Individuals and social alternatives
Let N be a set of individuals. Subsets of N are called coalitions. We fix some subset D
of the power-set of N and call the elements of D potentially decisive coalitions.
We also let C be a set of social alternatives. For generalising Herzberg’s [31] results,
we will have to assume that C is a compact non-empty convex subset of a given Banach
space W (with norm ‖ ·‖W ).
3.1.2 Utilities
We fix some classM of functions from C to R. The elements ofM are called admissible
utility functions. Every individual’s utility function, ui, belongs toM. Elements ofMN
will be called utility profiles and u = (ui)i∈N ∈MN .
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3.1.3 Aggregation
We now employ some social choice theory notations and formulations from Kirman and
Sondermann [35].
Definition 3.1. A relation P ⊆ C × C is called a weak order if and only if P satisfies
the following properties:
• P is asymmetric: ∀x, y ∈ C (xPy ⇒ ¬yPx).
• P is negatively transitive: ∀x, y, z ∈ C (¬xPy ∧ ¬yPz ⇒ ¬xPz).
Lemma 3.2. (Theorem 2.1. in Fishburn [22]). A weak order P ⊆ C × C is transitive.
Proof. Since P is negatively transitive, for all x, y, z ∈ C we have
xPy ⇒ (xPz ∨ zPy). (3.1)
Indeed, suppose that (3.1) is not true, i.e., (xPy ∧ ¬xPz ∧ ¬zPy). By negative tran-
sitivity, ¬xPz and ¬zPy implies ¬xPy, which contradicts xPy. Therefore, negative
transitivity implies (3.1). Now suppose xPy and yPz. Then by (3.1) we have
(xPz ∨ zPy) ∧ (yPx ∨ xPz).
Since zPy and yPx are false by asymmetry, xPz is true. Thus P is transitive.
Remark 3.3. Due to the previous lemma, a weak order P on C is transitive and satisfies
((¬yPx ∧ yPz) ∨ (xPy ∧ ¬zPy))⇒ xPz, (3.2)
for all x, y, z ∈ C.
Notation 3.4. For all x, y ∈ C, when we write xPy it means that (x, y) ∈ P and should
be read as ‘x is preferred to y’.
Definition 3.5. P denotes the set of all weak orders1 on C. For all x, y ∈ C and
P = (Pi)i∈N ∈ PN , we define the coalition supporting x over y under P as follows:
C(x, y, P ) := {i ∈ N : xPiy}.
Definition 3.6. For x ∈ C and P ∈ P, x will be called P-maximal if and only if for all
y ∈ C\{x}, we have xPy.
1Do not confuse this notation with the power-set notation.
3.2 Kirman-Sondermann correspondence 49
Definition 3.7. For u : C −→ R and P ∈ P, we say that u is a utility representation of
P if and only if for all x, y ∈ C,
u(x) > u(y)⇔ xPy.
Notation 3.8. We use P u ∈ P to denote that the utility function u, induces the pref-
erence P . Similarly, given an N -sequence u = (ui)i∈N of functions from C to R, we
define
P u := (P ui)i∈N ∈ PN .
We say that the utility profile u induces the preference profile P u.
Definition 3.9. A social welfare function (with universal domain) is a map
σ : PN −→ P.
According to our notations, Arrow’s rationality axioms for σ will be formulated as
follows:
Axiom 3.10. (Unanimity Preservation). For all x, y ∈ C and P ∈ PN , if C(x, y, P ) =
N then xσ(P )y.
Axiom 3.11. (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives). For all x, y ∈ C and P , P ′ ∈
PN , if C(x, y, P ) = C(x, y, P ′) and C(y, x, P ) = C(y, x, P ′), then
xσ(P )y ⇔ xσ(P ′)y, yσ(P )x⇔ yσ(P ′)x.
Axiom 3.12. (No Dictatorship). There is no i0 ∈ N such that for all x, y ∈ C and
P ∈ PN ,
xPi0y ⇒ xσ(P )y.
Definition 3.13. We say that a coalition C ⊆ N is σ-decisive if and only if for all
x, y ∈ C and P ∈ PN one has xσ(P )y whenever xPiy for all i ∈ C. The set of σ-decisive
coalitions is denoted by Fσ.
Remark 3.14. In notation, a coalition C ⊆ N is σ-decisive if and only if for all x, y ∈ C
and P ∈ PN one has
(∀i ∈ C (xPiy)) ⇒ xσ(P )y.
3.2 Kirman-Sondermann correspondence
For the following, recall from Section 2, that an ultrafilter on N is a filter F on N which
is maximal with respect to inclusion. We have shown in Section 2.1.3 that a filter F is an
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ultrafilter if and only if for all A ⊆ N , either A ∈ F or N\A ∈ F . An ultrafilter is non-
principal if the intersection of all its members is empty. Otherwise it is called principal,
and one can show that the intersection has exactly one element (in our interpretation a
dictator).
Let Σ be the set of social welfare functions satisfying the Arrovian rationality axioms
(Axioms 3.10 and 3.11).
Definition 3.15. For any σ ∈ Σ, define the following subsets of the power-set of N :
F :=
{
C ⊆ N : ∃x, y ∈ C ∃P ∈ PN (∀i ∈ C ∀j ∈ N\C xPiy ∧ yPjx ∧ xσ(P )y)
}
,
F ′ :=
{
C ⊆ N : ∃x, y ∈ C ∀P ∈ PN (∀i ∈ C ∀j ∈ N\C (xPiy ∧ yPjx)) ⇒ xσ(P )y
}
,
F ′′ :=
{
C ⊆ N : ∀x, y ∈ C ∀P ∈ PN (∀i ∈ C ∀j ∈ N\C (xPiy ∧ yPjx)) ⇒ xσ(P )y
}
.
Lemma 3.16. (Kirman and Sondermann [35]). Let F, F ′, F ′′ be as above, then
1. F = F ′ = F ′′, and
2. F is an ultrafilter.
Proof. 1. We know that F ′′ ⊂ F ′ ⊂ F . We have to show that F ⊂ F ′ ⊂ F ′′. From
Axiom 3.11 F ⊂ F ′. It only remains to prove that F ′ ⊂ F ′′. Take C ∈ F ′ and
z ∈ C with z 6= x and z 6= y. Now assume that there exists P ∈ PN such that
xPiz for all i ∈ C, and zPjx for all j ∈ N\C. Consider P ′ ∈ PN , such that
∀i ∈ C xP ′iy ∧ yP ′iz, (3.3)
∀j ∈ N\C yP ′jz ∧ zP ′jx. (3.4)
By transitivity of P ′, we have
∀i ∈ C ∀j ∈ N\C xP ′iz ∧ yP ′jx. (3.5)
Since C ∈ F ′,
(∀i ∈ C ∀j ∈ N\C (xP ′iy ∧ yP ′jx)) ⇒ xσ(P ′)y.
By (3.3) and (3.4), C(y, z, P ′) = N , and thus by Axiom 3.10, yσ(P ′)z. Therefore
by transitivity, xσ(P ′)z. However from (3.4) and (3.5), C(x, z, P ) = C(x, z, P ′)
and C(z, x, P ) = C(z, x, P ′). Thus by Axiom 3.11 xσ(P )z. With a similar argu-
ment we get
(∀i ∈ C ∀j ∈ N\C (zPiy ∧ yPjz)) ⇒ zσ(P )y. (3.6)
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Now take w ∈ C with w 6= x, w 6= y and w 6= z. If we replace x by w in the above
argument, for all P ∈ PN we have
(∀i ∈ C ∀j ∈ N\C (wPiz ∧ zPjw)) ⇒ wσ(P )z.
Finally, if we replace w by y in (3.6), for all P ∈ PN we have
(∀i ∈ C ∀j ∈ N\C (zPiw ∧ wPjz)) ⇒ zσ(P )w,
and this completes the proof of the first part.
2. We have to verify the ultrafilter properties2 for F . First, since σ satisfies Axiom
3.10, the empty set cannot belong to F . The next property which we have to verify
is that F is closed under intersections. Let C1, C2 ∈ F . Put
D1 := C1 ∩ C2,
D2 := C1 ∩ (N\C2),
D3 := C2 ∩ (N\C1),
D4 := N\(C1 ∪ C2).
Choose x, y, z ∈ C. We define P ∈ PN as follows:
∀i ∈ D1 zPix ∧ xPiy,
∀i ∈ D2 xPiy ∧ yPiz,
∀i ∈ D3 yPiz ∧ zPix,
∀i ∈ D4 yPix ∧ xPiz.
From C1 = D1∪D2 ∈ F = F ′′ it follows that xσ(P )y. Also C2 = D1∪D3 ∈ F = F ′′
implies that zσ(P )x. Thus by transitivity of σ(P ), zσ(P )y, which proves
D1 = C1 ∩ C2 ∈ F.
Now we prove that if C1 ⊆ N , then either C1 ∈ F or N\C1 ∈ F . Take an element
a ∈ C and a weak order P on C\{a}. Define P ∈ PN as follows:
∀i ∈ N Pi = P, (3.7)
∀i ∈ C1 ∀x ∈ C\{a} xPia,
∀i ∈ N\C1 ∀x ∈ C\{a} aPix.
2The ultrafilter properties are (i) ∅ /∈ F , (ii) if C1, C2 ∈ F , then C1 ∩ C2 ∈ F , (iii) if C1 ∈ F and
C1 ⊆ C2, then C2 ∈ F , and (iv) if C1 ⊆ N , then either C1 ∈ F or N\C1 ∈ F .
52 Chapter 3 Theorem on microeconomic foundations of representative agent models
Since P is a weak order on C\{a}, we can assume that for x, y ∈ C\{a}, xPy.
Hence by (3.7) and Axiom 3.10, xσ(P )y. By formula (3.1), xσ(P )a or aσ(P )x.
Therefore either C1 = {i ∈ N : xPia} ∈ F or N\C1 = {i ∈ N : aPix} ∈ F .
Finally we need to show that F is closed under supersets. Let C1 ∈ F and
C1 ⊆ C2 ⊆ N . We have just proved that either C2 ∈ F or N\C2 ∈ F . But if
N\C2 ∈ F , we have
∅ = (N\C2) ∩ C1 ∈ F,
which is impossible according to the property that empty set cannot belong to F .
Hence F is an ultrafilter.
We have the following important theorem from Kirman and Sondermann [35]:
Theorem 3.17. (Kirman-Sondermann Correspondence). Let Σ, as before, be the set of
social welfare functions satisfying Arrovian rationality axioms (Axioms 3.10 and 3.11)
and F be the set of all ultrafilters on N . Then
1. There is a bijection between Σ and F , given by λ : Σ → F , σ 7→ Fσ, where Fσ is
as in Definition 3.13.
2. In addition, σ ∈ Σ satisfies Axiom 3.12 if and only if the corresponding ultrafilter
λ(σ) = Fσ is non-principal.
Proof. 1. According to the previous lemma, for all x, y ∈ C and P ∈ PN , the set
Fσ = {C ⊆ N : (∀i ∈ C ∀j ∈ N\C (xPiy ∧ yPjx)) ⇒ xσ(P )y} ,
is an ultrafilter on N . Due to Definition 3.13, we have to show that if C ∈ Fσ and
xPiy for all i ∈ C, then xσ(P )y. For given x, y ∈ C and P ∈ PN , put
D1 := {i ∈ N : xPiy},
D2 := {i ∈ N : yPix},
D3 := N\(D1 ∪D2).
Define P ′ = (P ′i )i∈N ∈ PN for x, y, z ∈ C as follows:
∀i ∈ D1 xP ′iz ∧ zP ′iy, (3.8)
∀i ∈ D2 yP ′iz ∧ zP ′ix, (3.9)
∀i ∈ D3 ¬xP ′iy ∧ ¬yP ′ix ∧ xP ′iz. (3.10)
By (3.2) and (3.10), we deduce yP ′iz for all i ∈ D3. Furthermore C(x, y, P ) =
C(x, y, P ′) and C(y, x, P ) = C(y, x, P ′). Since C ∈ Fσ, C ⊆ D1 and Fσ is closed
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under supersets, D1 ∈ Fσ. Therefore for all i ∈ D1 and j ∈ N\D1, zP ′iy and yP ′jz
imply zσ(P ′)y. Again, since Fσ is closed under supersets, C ′ = D1 ∪ D3 ∈ Fσ.
Therefore (∀i ∈ C ′ ∀j ∈ N\C ′ (xP ′iz ∧ zP ′jx)) ⇒ xσ(P ′)z.
By transitivity of σ(P ′), xσ(P ′)z and zσ(P ′)y imply xσ(P ′)y. Since we have
C(x, y, P ) = C(x, y, P ′) and C(y, x, P ) = C(y, x, P ′), by Axiom 3.11, xσ(P ′)y if
and only if xσ(P )y. Hence we showed that λ(σ) = Fσ is well-defined. Suppose
that there exists an F ′σ ∈ F with the same properties as Fσ, such that F ′σ 6= Fσ.
There exists an element C ∈ F ′σ which does not belong to Fσ. Since Fσ is an
ultrafilter, N\C ∈ Fσ, which is a contradiction.
Now, we prove that the mapping σ 7→ Fσ is surjective. Given an F ∈ F , we have
to show that there exists a σ0 ∈ Σ such that λ(σ0) = F . For arbitrary x, y ∈ C
and P ∈ PN , we define σ0 as follows:
xσ0(P )y ⇔ C(x, y, P ) ∈ F.
σ0 satisfies Axiom 3.10, since if C(x, y, P ) = N , we know that N ∈ F , and hence by
the definition of σ0, xσ0(P )y. σ0 also satisfies Axiom 3.11, since for all P , P
′ ∈ PN
and x, y ∈ C, xσ0(P )y if and only if C(x, y, P ) ∈ F . If C(x, y, P ) = C(x, y, P ′),
then also C(x, y, P ′) ∈ F , and this is true if and only if xσ0(P ′)y. We have to
show that for all P ∈ PN , σ0(P ) ∈ P, i.e., is a weak order. Since C(x, y, P ) ∈ F
implies C(y, x, P ) /∈ F , σ0(P ) is asymmetric. Now assume that for all x, y, z ∈ C,
¬xσ0(P )y ∧ yσ0(P )z.
This means that C1 := C(x, y, P ) /∈ F , C2 := C(y, z, P ) /∈ F and C1 ∪ C2 /∈ F 3.
Formula (3.1) implies
C3 := C(x, z, P ) ⊂ C1 ∪ C2,
hence C3 /∈ F , which proves that σ0(P ) is negative transitive. Thus we have shown
that σ0 ∈ Σ. It only remains to show that the ultrafilter Fσ0 = λ(σ0) is equal to
F . It suffices to prove that Fσ0 ⊂ F . For arbitrary C0 ∈ Fσ0 , there exist x, y ∈ C
and P ∈ PN such that C0 = C(x, y, P ). Due to the properties of Fσ0 , this implies
that xσ0(P )y, which by the definition of σ0, yields C0 ∈ F .
2. First we show that if a σ ∈ Σ satisfies Axiom 3.12, then the corresponding ultra-
filter λ(σ) = Fσ is non-principal. Suppose that Fσ is a principal ultrafilter on N
and we know that this kind of ultrafilter is of the form {C ⊆ N : i0 ∈ C} for
some i0 ∈ N . Thus by the first part of the theorem, for all C ∈ Fσ, x, y ∈ C and
3An ultrafilter satisfies a contraction principle, i.e., C1 ∪ C2 ∈ F implies either C1 ∈ F or C2 ∈ F .
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P ∈ PN we have
(∀i ∈ C (xPiy)) ⇒ xσ(P )y.
Since this is true for every element in C, also for i0 ∈ C, xPi0y ⇒ xσ(P )y. Hence
i0 is a dictator.
Conversely, suppose that a σ ∈ Σ is dictated by a i0 ∈ N . Then {i0} ∈ Fσ, which
implies
⋂
A∈Fσ A 6= ∅. For otherwise, {i0} /∈ Fσ, and since Fσ is an ultrafilter,
N\{i0} ∈ Fσ. Thus the set of individuals is decisive against i0.
3.3 Assumptions
In the previous section, we have shown that a social welfare function σ satisfies all
Arrovian rationality axioms (Axioms 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12) if and only if the corresponding
ultrafilter Fσ is a non-principal ultrafilter. We therefore require that D, which is defined
in Section 3.1, is a non-principal ultrafilter on N and this is only possible if N is infinite4.
Thus, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 3.18. D is a non-principal ultrafilter on N (and therefore N is infinite).
Parametrisations are ubiquitous in macroeconomics, motivating our next assumption:
Assumption 3.19. Let Z be a compact subset of a given Banach space X (with norm
‖ ·‖X). There exists a continuous function v : Z × C → R such that for every z ∈ Z,
v(z, ·) is strictly concave and 5
M⊆ { v(z, ·) : z ∈ Z }.
(In other words, given any u ∈ MN , there is an N -sequence (zi)i∈N ∈ (Z)N such that
ui = v(zi, ·) for every i ∈ N .)
Remark 3.20. For all u ∈M, u attains its unique global maximum on C.
Proof. We are concerned with the maximisation problem
∀z ∈ Z max
r∈C
v(z, r). (3.11)
Since Z×C is compact and v is continuous, v(Z×C) is a compact (closed and bounded)
subset of R. According to boundedness of v(Z × C) in R, it has a least upper bound α
and since v(Z × C) is closed, it contains α. Therefore problem (3.11) has a solution.
4If N is finite, then every ultrafilter on it is principal.
5Properness is obvious, since v takes real values.
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For proving the uniqueness we suppose that for problem (3.11) there exist two dif-
ferent solutions r1 and r2 in C. Then from the convexity of C, r1+r22 is also a solution.
But v(z, ·) is strictly concave for every z ∈ Z and we have
v
(
z,
r1 + r2
2
)
>
1
2
(v(z, r1) + v(z, r2)) = α,
which is a contradiction.
3.4 Socially acceptable and representative utility functions
In this section we will show the existence of D-socially acceptable and representative
utility functions.
Definition 3.21. An admissible utility function ϕ : C → R is said to be D-socially
acceptable for u if and only if there exists some x˜ ∈ C with ϕ(x˜)= sup ϕ such that for
every y ∈ C\{x˜}, the coalition of i with ui(x˜) > ui(y) is decisive.
Definition 3.22. An admissible utility function ϕ : C → R is called σ-representative of
P ∈ PN if and only if there exists some x˜ ∈ C with ϕ(x˜)= sup ϕ and any such x˜ is also
σ(P )-maximal.
Theorem 3.23. Suppose Assumptions 3.18 and 3.19 hold. There exists for every u ∈
MN some D-socially acceptable utility function.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary u ∈ MN and by Assumption 3.19, let (zi)i∈N ∈ (Z)N be such
that ui = v(zi, ·) for every i ∈ N . The ultrapower construction can easily be adapted to
construct an embedding
∗ : V ((X ⊕W ) ∪ R)→ V (∗(X ⊕ W ) ∪ ∗R),
where ∗(X ⊕ W ) is a Banach space over ∗R satisfying:
• extension: ∗(X ⊕ W ) and ∗R are extensions of X ⊕W and R, respectively, and
∗x = x for all x ∈ (X ⊕W ) ∪ R, and
• transfer : If Φ(v1, · · · , vn) is an ∈-formula with bounded quantifiers and n free
variables, then for all A1, · · · , An ∈ V ((X ⊕W ) ∪ R),
V ((X ⊕W )∪R) |= Φ[A1, · · · , An] ⇔ V (∗(X ⊕W )∪ ∗R) |= Φ[ ∗A1, · · · , ∗An].
For the rest of the proof, we work in the resulting nonstandard universe. We have
to construct some parameter z˜ such that v(z˜, ·) is D-socially acceptable. Let
z¯ := [(zi)i∈N ]D ∈ ∗Z.
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Z is compact, then by Proposition 2.87, every element of ∗Z is nearstandard and let
z˜ := ◦z¯. Applying the Transfer Principle of nonstandard analysis to Remark 3.20, we
learn that ∗v(z¯, ·) attains its unique global ∗maximum in some x¯ ∈ ∗C.
Consider now the map
w : Z → C,
which assigns to each z ∈ Z the unique x = w(z) ∈ C such that (existence and uniqueness
follow from Remark 3.20)
x ∈ arg sup
r∈C
v(z, r).
By the Transfer Principle,
∗w : ∗Z → ∗C,
hence ∗w(z¯) ∈ ∗C and since C is a compact, every element of ∗C is nearstandard (see
again Proposition 2.87) and therefore x¯ = ∗w(z¯) is nearstandard. We put x˜ := ◦x¯.
Due to Assumption 3.19, v is continuous and hence by Proposition 2.89, ∗v is S-
continuous. Therefore, we have for all y ∈ C,
v(z˜, y)− v(z˜, x˜) ≈ ∗v(z¯, y)− ∗v(z¯, x˜) ≈ ∗v(z¯, y)− ∗v(z¯, x¯). (3.12)
The right-hand side of equation (3.12) is a non-positive hyperreal (since x¯ is a global
∗maximum of ∗v(z¯, ·)), so the standard part is non-positive, but the standard part is
exactly v(z˜, y)− v(z˜, x˜); then
v(z˜, y)− v(z˜, x˜) ≤ 0 ; ∀y ∈ C.
Since we have a unique global maximum (according to Remark 3.20),
v(z˜, y)− v(z˜, x˜) < 0 ; for all y 6= x˜. (3.13)
The rest of the proof is basically as in Herzberg [31]. In order to verify that v(z˜, ·) is
D-socially acceptable, we still need to show that for every y ∈ C\{x˜}, the set of all i ∈ N
with ui(x˜) > ui(y) is decisive (i.e. ∈ D). Define a function f by f(h) := v(h, x˜)−v(h, y)
for all h ∈ Z, whence
{i ∈ N : ui(x˜) > ui(y) } = {i ∈ N : f(zi) > 0 }. (3.14)
Due to the construction of the nonstandard embedding ∗ via the bounded ultrapower
(with respect to D) of the superstructure V ((X ⊕W ) ∪ R), one has the equivalence6
{i ∈ N : ui(x˜) > ui(y) } ∈ D ⇔ ∗f(z¯) > 0. (3.15)
6The sequence (f(zi))i∈N is bounded in V ((X ⊕W ) ∪ R), since zi ∈ Z ⊆ X for all i ∈ N and
f : Z → R.
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However, by applying the Transfer Principle to the defining equation for f and due to
S-continuity of ∗v, we get
∗f(z¯) = ∗v(z¯, x˜)− ∗v(z¯, y) ≈ ∗v(z¯, x¯)− ∗v(z¯, y).
The standard part of the right-hand side is strictly positive (by inequality (3.13)) and
therefore ◦(∗f(z¯)) > 0. Hence ∗f(z¯) > 0 and by equivalence (3.15) we have
{i ∈ N : ui(x˜) > ui(y) } ∈ D.
Theorem 3.24. Suppose σ satisfies Axioms 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12. Then:
1. D := Fσ satisfies Assumption 3.18.
2. If, in addition, M satisfies Assumption 3.19, then there exists for every u ∈ MN
some admissible utility function which is σ-representative of the preference profile
P u induced by u.
Proof. The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Theorem 2 in Herzberg [31].
1. We have shown in Theorem 3.17 thatD = Fσ is a non-principal ultrafilter whenever
σ satisfies Axioms 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12.
2. According to Theorem 3.23, for an arbitrary u ∈ MN there exist some ϕ ∈ M
and x˜ ∈ C such that ϕ(x˜)= sup ϕ and for every y ∈ C\{x˜}
{i ∈ N : ui(x˜) > ui(y) } ∈ Fσ.
Now fix an arbitrary y ∈ C\{x˜}. For all i ∈ N with ui(x˜) > ui(y) we have x˜P uiy
and thus x˜P
u
i y by definition. Therefore
{i ∈ N : x˜P ui y } ⊇ {i ∈ N : ui(x˜) > ui(y) } ∈ Fσ.
Since Fσ is an ultrafilter,
{i ∈ N : x˜P ui y } ∈ Fσ,
and this implies x˜σ(P u)y (part one in Theorem 3.17). The proof is complete since
y was chosen arbitrarily in C\{x˜}.

Chapter 4
Illustration:
Possible macroeconomic applications
In this chapter we provide sufficient conditions for the preceding theorems (Theorems
3.23 and 3.24 in Chapter 3) to be satisfied in economic applications. After this modifi-
cation, we show a macroeconomic application as an example. We establish some model
of the economy which consists of the government and the agents with their own prefer-
ences. Then we prove that under some assumptions, there exists a socially optimal path
for the economy, which satisfies the government and the agents’ maximisation problems.
In the end, we consider some special cases for the maximisation.
4.1 Applicability of the preceding theorems
As before, suppose C is the set of social alternatives which is a compact non-empty
convex subset of a given Banach space W . Consider a function u, defined by
∀c ∈ C u(c) = max
y:(y,c)∈Y
f(y, c), (4.1)
where Y is a set (called the choice set) and f : Y → R is some function, interpreted as a
happiness function of some agent depending on the social parameter c and his (or her)
choice y, where the optimal y, given c, depends on the social parameter c.
Lemma 4.1. Given a Banach space B (with norm ‖ ·‖B), suppose Y is a compact non-
empty convex subset of B × C and f : Y → R is continuous and strictly concave. Then
u defined by (4.1) is continuous and strictly concave.
Proof. (First proof). Since f is strictly concave, for every (y′, c′), (y′′, c′′) ∈ Y and
λ ∈ (0, 1) we have
f
(
λ(y′, c′) + (1− λ)(y′′, c′′)) > λf(y′, c′) + (1− λ)f(y′′, c′′). (4.2)
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Because Y is a compact set and f is continuous, f(Y) is a compact (closed and bounded)
subset of R. According to boundedness of f(Y) in R, it has a least upper bound α and
since f(Y) is closed, it contains α. Therefore there exists a maximiser on Y.
Now we suppose that there exist y′, y′′ ∈ B such that
∀c′ ∈ C f(y′, c′) = max
y:(y,c′)∈Y
f(y, c′) = u(c′), (4.3)
∀c′′ ∈ C f(y′′, c′′) = max
y:(y,c′′)∈Y
f(y, c′′) = u(c′′). (4.4)
For any c′, c′′ ∈ C and λ ∈ (0, 1), we can write
λu(c′) + (1− λ)u(c′′) = λf(y′, c′) + (1− λ)f(y′′, c′′) (by (4.3) and (4.4))
< f
(
λ(y′, c′) + (1− λ)(y′′, c′′)) (by (4.2))
= f
(
λy′ + (1− λ)y′′, λc′ + (1− λ)c′′)
≤ max
y:(y,λc′+(1−λ)c′′)∈Y
f(y, λc′ + (1− λ)c′′) (by convexity of Y)
= u
(
λc′ + (1− λ)c′′) , (by definition of u)
and therefore u is strictly concave.
Let c ∈ C arbitrary and (cn)n be a sequence converging to c. By definition of largest
subsequential limit, lim supu(cn), there exists (cnl)l such that
lim sup
n→∞
u(cn) = lim
l→∞
u(cnl). (4.5)
For all n ∈ N, we define
Ycn := { y ∈ B : (y, cn) ∈ Y },
which is a compact set1.
Since Ycn is compact and f(·, cn) is continuous,
∃yn ∈ arg maxYcn f(·, cn).
1For proving the compactness of Ycn , let (yk)k be a sequence in Ycn such that for every k ∈ N,
(yk, cn) ∈ Y. Since Y is compact, there exists (ykl)l in B such that
lim
l→∞
(ykl , cn) = (y, cn) ∈ Y.
By definition of Ycn , it means that y ∈ Ycn . Therefore from any sequence in Ycn we can extract
a subsequence with a limit in Ycn and this implies the compactness of Ycn (see Characterisation of
Compactness Theorem in Royden and Fitzpatrick [54]).
4.1 Applicability of the preceding theorems 61
By compactness of Y,
∃(ynlk )k ∃y ∈ B s.t. ynlk
k→∞−−−→ y,
therefore
(ynlk , cnlk )
k→∞−−−→ (y, c). (4.6)
Let us suppose that y ∈ arg max f(·, c), which will be proved later. Then
lim sup
n→∞
u(cn) = lim
k→∞
u(cnlk ) (by (4.5))
= lim
k→∞
f(ynlk , cnlk ) (since ynlk ∈ arg maxYcnlk
f(·, cnlk ))
= f(y, c) (by continuity of f and (4.6))
= u(c). (since y ∈ arg max f (·, c))
Similarly it can be shown that lim infn→∞ u(cn) = u(c). Hence
lim
n→∞u(cn) = u(c),
which proves the continuity of u.
Suppose that y /∈ arg max f(·, c), i.e. there exists a yˆ with (yˆ, c) ∈ Y such that
f(yˆ, c) > f(y, c).
By the continuity of f , we get
lim
k→∞
f(yˆ, cnlk ) = f(yˆ, c) > f(y, c) = limk→∞
f(ynlk , cnlk ).
This implies that for sufficiently large k,
f(yˆ, cnlk ) > f(ynlk , cnlk ),
which means (ynlk , cnll ) is not a maximiser and this is a contradiction to
ynlk ∈ arg max f(·, cnlk ),
and this completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof. (Second proof). u is strictly concave by the first proof. Since f is a continuous
function on the compact set Y, f is uniformly continuous (see Royden and Fitzpatrick
[54] [Chapter 9; Proposition 23]). This means that for every  > 0 there exists a δ > 0
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such that
∀(y′, c′), (y′′, c′′) ∈ Y ‖ (y′, c′)− (y′′, c′′)‖∞ < δ =⇒
∣∣f(y′, c′)− f(y′′, c′′)∣∣ < .
In other words, for any  > 0 there is a δ > 0 with
f(y′, c′)−  < f(y′′, c′′) < f(y′, c′) + , (4.7)
whenever
‖ y′ − y′′‖B < δ and ‖ c′ − c′′‖W < δ.
For fixed c′′ ∈ C, there is a point2 y′′ ∈ B with u(c′′) = f(y′′, c′′). Then
f(y′, c′)−  < u(c′′)
< f(y′′, c′) +  (by (4.7))
≤ max
y:(y,c′)∈Y
f(y, c′) + 
= u(c′) + , (by (4.3))
for all c′ in C with ‖ c′ − c′′‖W < δ. By symmetry between c′ and c′′ it follows that
|u(c′)− u(c′′)| <  such that ‖ c′ − c′′‖W < δ, which proves that the function u is
continuous on C.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose Y is a compact non-empty convex subset of B × C and g :
Z ×Y → R is continuous, where Z is as in Assumption 3.19. Furthermore suppose that
g(z, ·) is strictly concave for all z ∈ Z. Let
M⊆ { max
y:(y,·)∈Y
g(z, y, ·) : z ∈ Z },
and D be a non-principal ultrafilter on N . Then there exists for every u ∈ MN some
D-socially acceptable utility function.
Corollary 4.3. Suppose σ satisfies Axioms 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12, and let Y, g and M
be as in Corollary 4.2. Then there exists for every u ∈ MN some admissible utility
function which is σ-representative of the preference profile P u induced by u.
4.2 An example of a possible macroeconomic application
For applying our previous results, we give an example of a possible macroeconomic
application.
2As we have argued in the beginning of the first proof, existence of the maximiser is obvious by
compactness of Y and continuity of f .
4.2 An example of a possible macroeconomic application 63
4.2.1 The economy
For establishing our model, we consider there exist agents and the government in the
economy who hold some asset stocks at time t− 1 and these assets pay the interest out
at time t. Note that agents and the government carry their budget constraints over at
each time. We also suppose that they can choose their budget elements from some sets
which all belong to the lp space3 on R∞, for p ∈ [1,∞].
We employ some social choice theory notations from the previous chapter, and some
notations for monetary theory from Walsh [62].
4.2.1.1 The government
We fix a set C, chosen by the government, as a set of social alternatives. For satisfying our
results, we assume that C is a compact non-empty convex subset of lp. The government
needs to generate revenue for financing its consumptions and debts. We assume that it
generates revenue by printing money. We also suppose that the government should pay
interest only for debts held by the agents.
We denote the government’s purchases at time t byGt, which is taken to be exogenous
from X, where X is a compact subset of lp; and its payment of interest on debts by
it−1Bt−1, where it−1 is the nominal rate of interest between periods t− 1 and t. These
two expenditures can be financed with two sources. One by borrowing from the agents,
Bt − Bt−1, and second by printing money, Mt − Mt−1. Therefore we can write the
government’s budget constraint4 as following:
Gt + it−1Bt−1 = (Bt −Bt−1) + (Mt −Mt−1) .
In this budget constraint there is no revenue created by taxes other than inflation. The
government’s budget constraint can be deflated by the price level Pt and we denote all
the deflated values with lower-case letters. Then we have
gt + it−1
(
bt−1
1 + pit
)
=
(
bt − bt−1
1 + pit
)
+
(
mt − mt−1
1 + pit
)
,
where bt−1 = Bt−1/Pt−1 is real debt and pit =
Pt−Pt−1
Pt−1 is inflation rate. By subtracting
bt−1 from both sides of the last equation, we can write
gt + rt−1bt−1 = (bt − bt−1) +
(
mt − mt−1
1 + pit
)
, (4.8)
3Recall that for 1 ≤ p < ∞, lp = {x = (xt)t≥0 ∈ R∞ :
(∑∞
t=0 |xt|p
) 1
p < ∞} with the norm
‖x‖p =
(∑∞
t=0 |xt|p
) 1
p and for p = ∞, l∞ = {x = (xt)t≥0 ∈ R∞ : supt≥0 |xt| < ∞} with the norm
‖x‖∞ = supt≥0 |xt|. Note that lp space for p ∈ [1,∞] is a Banach space.
4Walsh in [62] has developed an equation for the government’s budget constraint by combining the
budget identities of the Treasury and the central bank. For more details see Walsh [62].
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where rt−1 = [(1 + it−1)/(1 + pit)]− 1 is the real rate of interest5 from t− 1 to t.
The last term in (4.8) is the government’s seigniorage revenue at time t and we
denote it by st. By adding and subtracting mt−1, the seigniorage can be written as
st = (mt −mt−1) +
(
pit
1 + pit
)
mt−1, (4.9)
the sum of (i) agents’ desired increase in real money holdings at time t and (ii) the
inflation tax on real money holdings carried over from time t− 1.
4.2.1.2 The agents
The economy is populated by an infinite number of agents and we denote their set by N .
Every agent chooses a pair of bond and money holding paths from A, which is a subset
of lp× lp. We assume that every agent in each period receives an exogenous consumption
ct from X. They also receive interest payments on government debt held at the start of
period t, (1 + rt−1)bt−1, where bt−1 is the number of real bonds held at the start of this
period. Every agent has real money holdings that are carried into period t from period
t−1, mt−1/(1+pit). Therefore we can write the budget constraint of the agent as below:
ct +mt + bt = (1 + rt−1)bt−1 +
mt−1
(1 + pit)
. (4.10)
4.2.2 Preferences
In this section we introduce the preferences of the agents and the government by using
the notations from Section 3.1.
There exists a weak order relation P on C × C and we denote the set of all weak
orders by P. For all x and y in C when we have xPy, we say that x is preferred to y.
Elements of PN are called profiles. Each agent n has preferences that can be represented
by a utility function un : C −→ R. We fix some class M of functions from C to R such
that every agent’s utility function belongs to M.
We assume the government (social planner) to maximise social welfare. Thus, the
preferences of the government are described by a social welfare function, σ : PN −→ P,
which satisfies all Arrovian rationality axioms. Recall from Section 3.1 that Arrovian
rationality axioms are:
• (Unanimity Preservation). For all x, y ∈ C and P = (Pn)n∈N ∈ PN , if
{n ∈ N : xPny} = N,
then xσ(P )y.
5The relationship between real and nominal rates of interest is 1 + it−1 = (1 + rt−1) (1 + pit).
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• (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives). For all x, y ∈ C and P , P ′ ∈ PN , if
{n ∈ N : xPny} = {n ∈ N : xP ′ny}
and
{n ∈ N : yPnx} = {n ∈ N : yP ′nx},
then
xσ(P )y ⇔ xσ(P ′)y, yσ(P )x⇔ yσ(P ′)x.
• (No Dictatorship). There is no n0 ∈ N such that for all x, y ∈ C and P ∈ PN ,
xPn0y ⇒ xσ(P )y.
In other words we aggregate the agents’ preferences according to some social welfare
function satisfying all Arrovian rationality axioms, and this aggregation yields a single
preference relation which belongs to the government.
The social welfare function induces a collection of so-called σ-decisive coalitions. A
coalition C is said to be σ-decisive if and only if for all x, y ∈ C and P = (Pn)n∈N ∈ PN
one has xσ(P )y, whenever xPny, for all n ∈ D. We denote the set of all σ-decisive
coalitions by Fσ. Since our economy consists of an infinite number of agents and the
social welfare function satisfies all Arrovian rationality axioms, Fσ is a non-principal
ultrafilter (see Section 3.2).
4.2.3 Agent’s happiness function and assumptions
Agents in the economy maximise their happiness which is a function that depends on the
social and exogenous parameters, as well as their choices. We impose some assumptions
which are crucial for our results.
At first we formulate the choice set of the agent as follows:
Y =
{
(bt,mt, rt, pit)t : ct +mt + bt = (1 + rt−1)bt−1 +
mt−1
(1 + pit)
}
, (4.11)
where (ct)t ∈ X, (bt,mt)t ∈ A and (rt, pit)t ∈ C.
The interpretation of the choice set Y is that the agent chooses paths for the number
of real bonds, real money holdings, real rate of interest and the inflation rate subject to
his (or her) budget constraint (4.10).
Assumption 4.4. The happiness functions of the agents are of the form f : X×Y → R,
where X is as in Section 4.2.1.1 and Y is as (4.11).
We impose the following additional assumptions on the choice set and the happiness
functions:
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Assumption 4.5. We assume that Y is a compact non-empty convex subset of A× C,
where A and C are as in Section 4.2.1. Furthermore every happiness function f :
X × Y → R is continuous and f(x, ·) is strictly concave for all x ∈ X.
The maximisation occurs subject to a budget constraint:
Assumption 4.6. Let Y be as in Assumption 4.5. We assume
M⊆
{
max
(bt,mt)t:(bt,mt,·)t∈Y
f ((ct)t, (bt,mt)t, ·) : f satisfies Assumptions 4.4 and 4.5,
(ct)t ∈ X
}
,
where M, as we have discussed in Section 4.2.2, is some class of functions from C to R
such that every agent’s utility function belongs to M.
It is obvious that for every utility profile u = (un)n∈N inMN , there are N -sequences
(fn)n∈N and ((cnt )t)n∈N ∈ XN such that
un = max
(bnt ,m
n
t )t:(b
n
t ,m
n
t ,·)t∈Y
fn ((cnt )t, (b
n
t ,m
n
t )t, ·) ,
for every n ∈ N .
4.2.4 A socially optimal path for the economy
The agents and the government enter a period t holding asset stocks dated t− 1. As we
have mentioned before, the government finances its expenditures by borrowing from the
agents and printing money; at the same time, the agents consume and decide what level
of real bonds and real money holdings (dated t) to carry over to the start of period t+1.
Thus the government is going to maximise a representative utility function subject to
its choices, and most importantly, subject to the agents’ demand for money and bonds.
Therefore we can define a socially optimal path for the economy, but before the definition,
we introduce the following abbreviations:
Notation 4.7. Denote ~c = (ct)t, ~r = (rt)t, ~pi = (pit)t, ~b = (bt)t and ~m = (mt)t, and
denote the path profiles for the bond and money by ~b and ~m respectively.
Now we have the following definition:
Definition 4.8. A σ-socially optimal path for the economy is a quadruple (~b, ~m,~r, ~pi) ∈
AN × C such that for all n ∈ N , (~bn, ~mn, ~r, ~pi) ∈ Y and
1. Government maximisation: (~r, ~pi) maximises the σ-representative utility function
subject to (~r, ~pi) ∈ C.
2. Agent maximisation: For all n ∈ N , (~bn, ~mn) maximises the happiness function
fn subject to the budget constraint (4.10).
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Theorem 4.9. Suppose Assumptions 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 hold and the social welfare func-
tion σ satisfies all Arrovian rationality axioms. Then there exists a σ-socially optimal
path for the economy.
Proof. The assumptions in this theorem satisfy the conditions of Corollary 4.3 in
Chapter 3. Therefore there exists a σ-representative utility function u¯ for the utility
profile u. But according to the definition of the σ-representative utility function (see
Definition 3.22),
∃(~r, ~pi) ∈ arg max
(~r.~pi)∈C
u¯.
Assumption 4.6 holds, then for all n ∈ N and every utility profile u(~r, ~pi) = (un(~r, ~pi))n∈N
in MN , there exist N -sequences (fn)n∈N and ~c ∈ XN such that
un(~r, ~pi) = max
( ~bn, ~mn):( ~bn, ~mn,~r,~pi)∈Y
fn(~cn, ~bn, ~mn, ~r, ~pi).
On the other hand fn is continuous and X ×Y is compact, therefore fn(X ×Y) is a
compact subset of R which contains its least upper bound. This proves the existence of
a maximiser (~bn, ~mn) for every happiness function fn subject to the budget constraint
(4.10), hence, the proof is complete.
Remark 4.10. (Socially Optimal Seigniorage). The government needs to generate
revenue for financing its consumptions and debts, and one way for reaching this goal is
printing money. The real government revenue from printing money is called seigniorage
and is given by equation (4.9). The government budget constraint implies that in the
case of any change in seigniorage, the government has to adjust the other parameters
of the budget constraint in order to rebalance it. For instance, reducing the inflation
rate to zero implies that the government must replace the seigniorage revenue by an
increase in real borrowings or reduce the expenditures. But seigniorage as a function of
inflation faces a Laffer curve (see Walsh [62]), which says that inflation raising after a
certain point would cause seigniorage to reduce. The government has a strong incentive
to be at that certain equilibrium point, because it is the point at which the government
collects maximum amount of seigniorage. The socially optimal inflation path that we
have found in Theorem 4.9 is the equilibrium point for the inflation.
4.2.5 Special cases
Every agent n maximises the happiness function fn subject to the budget constraint
(4.10). For solving the agent’s maximisation problem, we impose the following assump-
tion in addition to Assumptions 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6.
Assumption 4.11. Each happiness function f : X × Y → R is differentiable.
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We are confronted with the maximisation problem:
max
bnt ,m
n
t
fn(cnt , b
n
t ,m
n
t , rt, pit) (4.12)
subject to
xnt ≡ (1 + rt−1)bnt−1 +
mnt−1
(1 + pit)
− cnt = bnt +mnt , (4.13)
and
xnt+1 = (1 + rt)b
n
t +
mnt
(1 + pit+1)
− cnt+1, (4.14)
where (4.13) is the inter-temporal budget constraint at time t and (4.14) is the inter-
temporal budget constraint at time t+ 1.
To maximise the system of equations (4.12)–(4.14), we can apply the method of
Lagrangian multiplier to solve the model:
L = fn(cnt , b
n
t ,m
n
t , rt, pit) + λt(x
n
t − bnt −mnt )
+ λt+1(x
n
t+1 − (1 + rt)bnt −
mnt
(1 + pit+1)
+ cnt+1), (4.15)
where λt and λt+1 are the Lagrangian multipliers. The first–order necessary conditions
for this problem are:
∂L
∂bt
= 0 ⇒ fnbt(cnt , bnt ,mnt , rt, pit)− λt − λt+1(1 + rt) = 0 (4.16)
∂L
∂mt
= 0 ⇒ fnmt(cnt , bnt ,mnt , rt, pit)− λt − λt+1
(
1
1 + pit+1
)
= 0 (4.17)
∂L
∂xnt
= 0 ⇒ λt = 0 (4.18)
∂L
∂λt
= 0 ⇒ xnt = bnt +mnt (4.19)
∂L
∂λt+1
= 0 ⇒ xnt+1 = (1 + rt)bnt +
mnt
(1 + pit+1)
− cnt+1 (4.20)
From equations (4.16)–(4.18), we have:
fnmt(c
n
t , b
n
t ,m
n
t , rt, pit)
fnbt(c
n
t , b
n
t ,m
n
t , rt, pit)
=
1
(1 + pit+1)(1 + rt)
=
1
1 + it
, (4.21)
where 1 + it = (1 + rt) (1 + pit+1) (by the definition of rt).
The equation (4.21) states the relation between marginal benefit of additional money
holdings and the marginal benefit of additional bond holdings of every agent n at time
t. In other words, the marginal rate of substitution between money and bond for each
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agent n equals to 11+it .
Now we are interested to set the real interest and inflation rates in a steady state,
to maximise the utility of the representative agent, subject to the government revenue
requirement. The utility of the representative agent depends on the real interest and
inflation rates, u¯(r, pi). The government’s budget constraint in the steady state is
g =
(
pi
1 + pi
)
m− rb. (4.22)
We are concerned with the maximisation problem
max
r,pi
u¯(r, pi), (4.23)
subject to (4.22). We can apply again the method of Lagrangian multipliers to solve
this problem:
L = u¯(r, pi) + λ
(
g −
(
pi
1 + pi
)
m+ rb
)
,
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. The first–order necessary conditions for this
problem are:
∂L
∂r
= 0 ⇒ u¯r + λb = 0 (4.24)
∂L
∂pi
= 0 ⇒ u¯pi − λm
(
1
(1 + pi)2
)
= 0 (4.25)
∂L
∂λ
= 0 ⇒ g −
(
pi
1 + pi
)
m+ rb = 0 (4.26)
From equations (4.24)–(4.26), we have:
u¯r
u¯pi
= −b(1 + pi)
2
m
, (4.27)
where − b(1+pi)2m is the marginal rate of substitution between real interest and inflation
rates.

Chapter 5
Generalisation to the case of weak
compactness
This chapter builds on a requirement for existence of a representative agent model for
weaker conditions. In Chapter 3, we have constructed a representative utility function
for infinite-dimensional social decision problems and have assumed that the set of social
alternatives is compact. Therefore, we establish weaker conditions for our previous
results by allowing the social alternatives to be a weakly compact subset of a given
reflexive separable Banach space. At first, we introduce a new and simple nonstandard
approach to weak topological spaces and then prove the existence of a representative
utility function with respect to this new constructed weak topology.
5.1 Nonstandard characterisation of weak compactness
In this section we try to present three kinds of notions and results: (a) the nonstandard
universe for pseudo-normed linear spaces and the properties of the nonstandard hull with
respect to this new nonstandard universe; (b) the weak topology on a given normed linear
space by some pseudo-norms on this space and the properties of nonstandard hull with
respect to this new weak topology; (c) some important results in weak compactness.
5.1.1 Pseudo-norms and nonstandard hulls
In this section we follow the notations from Albeverio [2] and Ng [49]. Let X be a
vector space over R. According to Sharma and Vasishtha in [57] and Deutsch in [17], a
pseudo-norm ‖·‖ on X is a function ‖·‖ : X → R such that for all x, y ∈ X and c ∈ R
we have:
1. ‖cx‖ = |c|‖x‖, (Absolute homogeneity)
2. ‖x+ y‖ ≤ ‖x‖+ ‖y‖. (Triangle inequality)
Proposition 5.1. 1. (Positivity). If absolute homogeneity and triangle inequality
hold, then for all x ∈ X, ‖x‖ ≥ 0.
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2. A pseudo-norm that satisfies
∀x ∈ X ‖x‖ = 0 ⇒ x = 0, (Separating points)
is a norm.
Proof. 1. By the absolute homogeneity we have ‖0‖ = 0 and ‖−x‖ = ‖x‖ for all
x ∈ X, so by the triangle inequality,
0 = ‖0‖ = ‖x− x‖ = ‖x+ (−x)‖ ≤ ‖x‖+ ‖−x‖ = 2‖x‖,
hence ‖x‖ ≥ 0.
2. ‖·‖ : X → R is a norm, if it satisfies positivity, absolute homogeneity, triangle
inequality and separating points conditions. Since ‖·‖ is a pseudo-norm, by the
first part of this proposition and assumption of the second part, ‖·‖ is a norm.
Let A be a subset of X, then for x ∈ X and c ∈ R,
x+A := {x+ y : y ∈ A}
and
cA := {cx : x ∈ A}.
Given X and subspace Y ⊂ X, we define
X/Y := {x+ Y : x ∈ X}.
For x, y ∈ X and c ∈ R, the operation
(x+ Y ) + c(y + Y ) := (x+ cy) + Y,
is well-defined and X/Y form a vector space under this operation. We call this space as
quotient space.
The ultrapower construction can easily be adapted to construct an embedding
∗ : V (X ∪ R) −→ V (∗X ∪ ∗R) ,
where ∗X is a vector space over ∗R, satisfying Extension and Transfer Principles. Hence-
forth, we work in the resulting nonstandard universe. In the nonstandard universe,
∗‖·‖ : ∗X −→ ∗R is well-defined and by the Transfer Principle, properties 1 and 2 hold
for all x, y ∈ ∗X and c ∈ ∗R.
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Definition 5.2. An element x ∈ ∗X is called finite if ∗‖x‖ is a finite hyperreal.
We let Fin(∗X) denote the finite elements of ∗X and we have
Fin(∗X) := {x ∈ ∗X : ∗‖x‖ ∈ Fin(∗R)}.
Definition 5.3. We call the element x ∈ ∗X a infinitesimal if ∗‖x‖ ≈ 0.
For any elements x, y ∈ ∗X, we shall write x ≈ y to mean that the difference x− y
is infinitesimal.
Proposition 5.4. If x, y ∈ ∗X and x ≈ y, then ∗‖x‖ ≈ ∗‖y‖.
Proof. Suppose that ∗‖x‖ ≤ ∗‖y‖. Then
∗‖y‖ = ∗‖x+ (y − x)‖ ≤ ∗‖x‖+ ∗‖y − x‖.
So,
0 ≤ ∗‖y‖ − ∗‖x‖ ≤ ∗‖y − x‖ ≈ 0,
therefore,
∗‖y‖ − ∗‖x‖ ≈ 0,
that is ∗‖x‖ ≈ ∗‖y‖.
Definition 5.5. An element x ∈ ∗X is called nearstandard if ∗‖x − y‖ ≈ 0 for some
y ∈ X.
Now we give the definition of the monad of an element in ∗X:
Definition 5.6. For any x ∈ ∗X, the monad of x is given by
µ(x) = {y ∈ ∗X : ∗‖y − x‖ ≈ 0}
= {y ∈ ∗X : y ≈ x}. (5.1)
One can write
µ(0) = {y ∈ ∗X : ∗‖y‖ ≈ 0}.
Remark 5.7. Both Fin(∗X) and µ(0) are vector spaces over R.
The notion of nonstandard hull was introduced for the first time by Luxemburg in
[40]. He considered the case when X is a linear normed space. Later, Henson and Moore
in [29] introduced this notion for Banach spaces. But, we study the nonstandard hull
for the pseudo-norm linear spaces.
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Definition 5.8. The quotient space
Xˆ = Fin(∗X)/µ(0), (5.2)
is called the nonstandard hull of X.
The elements of Xˆ are x+ µ(0), where x ∈ Fin(∗X) and we have
x+ µ(0) = {x+ y : y ∈ µ(0)}
= µ(x). (5.3)
Therefore, the nonstandard hull of X can be defined as follows:
Xˆ = {µ(x) : x ∈ Fin(∗X)}. (5.4)
Henceforth, we work with saturated embeddings satisfying Extension, Transfer and
Internal Definition Principles, and suppose (W, ‖·‖) is an internal pseudo-normed linear
space. In this case we assume that the pseudo-norm is a map from W to ∗R and the
notions of finite, infinitesimal and monad still make sense. Also Fin(W ) and Wˆ =
Fin(W )/µ(0) are well-defined.
Proposition 5.9. Suppose (W, ‖·‖) is an internal pseudo-normed linear space. Then
Wˆ (the nonstandard hull of W ) is complete, i.e. is a Banach space.
Proof. At first we should show that Wˆ is a normed linear space. Recall that
Wˆ = {µ(w) : w ∈ Fin(W )}.
For convenience µ(w) is denoted by wˆ for every w ∈ Fin(W ), and µ(0) is denoted by 0ˆ.
We define ‖wˆ‖ := ◦‖w‖, for each w ∈ Fin(W ). It is easy to see that ‖wˆ‖ is well-defined.
Fix arbitrary w,w′ ∈ Fin(W ) such that wˆ = wˆ′. Then µ(w) = µ(w′), therefore w ≈ w′
and by Proposition 5.4, ‖w‖ ≈ ‖w′‖. Since ‖w‖, ‖w′‖ ∈ Fin( ∗R) and every finite element
in ∗R has a unique standard part (see Proposition 2.56), thus the standard part of ‖w‖
and ‖w′‖ are equal. Therefore ‖wˆ‖ is well-defined.
The needed properties of a normed linear space for all w, v ∈ Fin(W ) and c ∈ Fin( ∗R)
are:
1. ‖wˆ‖ ≈ ‖w‖ ≥ 0.
2. ‖cwˆ‖ = ‖ĉw‖ ≈ ‖cw‖ = |c|‖w‖ ≈ |c|‖wˆ‖. Therefore,
‖cwˆ‖ = |c|‖wˆ‖.
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3. ‖wˆ + vˆ‖ = ‖ŵ + v‖ ≈ ‖w + v‖ ≤ ‖w‖+ ‖v‖ ≈ ‖wˆ‖+ ‖vˆ‖. Therefore,
‖wˆ + vˆ‖ ≤ ‖wˆ‖+ ‖vˆ‖.
4. 0 = ‖wˆ‖ ≈ ‖w‖ ⇒ ‖w‖ ≈ 0, which means that w ∈ Fin(W ) is infinitesimal,
therefore
wˆ = µ(0) = 0ˆ.
Now we prove the completeness of Wˆ . Let (wˆn)n∈N be a Cauchy sequence in Wˆ , where
wˆn = µ(wn) for every n ∈ N. We put
An = {f | f : ∗N→W , f is ∗Cauchy , ∀i ≤ n (fi = wi)},
for every n ∈ N. By the Internal Definition Principle (Proposition 2.76), the An’s are
non-empty and internal. Moreover the sequence (An)n∈N is ⊆-decreasing and hence by
the Countable Saturation Principle (Proposition 2.79), the intersection
A =
⋂
n∈N
An
is non-empty. This means that we can extend the sequence (wn)n∈N in W to an internal
∗Cauchy sequence (wn)n∈ ∗N in W .
For any k ∈ N+, there exists an N ∈ N such that for all m,n ∈ N with m,n > N ,
‖wn − wm‖ ≈ ‖wˆn − wˆm‖ < 1
k
,
hence ‖wn − wm‖ < 1k . The set
{M ∈ ∗N : ∀m,n ∈ [N,M ] ‖wn − wm‖ < 1
k
}
is internal and {N,N + 1, . . .} ⊆ {M ∈ ∗N : ∀m,n ∈ [N,M ] ‖wn − wm‖ < 1k}. By
using the Overspill Principle (Proposition 2.77), there exists some Mk ∈ ∗N\N such that
for all N < n < m < Mk we have
‖wn − wm‖ ≤ 1
k
,
therefore for all m,n ∈ (N,Mk), ‖wˆn− wˆm‖ ≤ 1k . Hence, wm ∈ Fin(W ) for all m < Mk.
Now let α ∈ ∗N\N and α < Mk. Then wα ∈ Fin(W ) and
lim
n→∞‖wˆn − wˆα‖ = 0,
hence wˆn → wˆα ∈ Wˆ and this completes the proof of the proposition.
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5.1.2 Nonstandard hull with respect to the weak topology
Let X be a set and (fi)i∈I , where I is an index set, be a collection of maps such that
each fi maps X into R. We wish to define a topology on X that makes all the fi’s
continuous, and we want to do this in the cheapest way, that is, there should be no more
open sets in X than required for this purpose.
Obviously, all the f−1i (O), where O is an open set in R should be open in X. Then fi-
nite intersections of those should also be open. And then any union of finite intersections
should be open. By this process, we have created as few open sets as required.
Now let O ⊂ P(X) be a collection of subsets of X such that
• ∅ and X are in O;
• O is closed under finite intersections.
Then T = {⋃O∈O O : O ⊂ O} is a topology on X. Therefore the collection of all
unions of finite intersection of sets of the form f−1i (O) where i ∈ I and O is an open set
in R is a topology. It is called the weak topology on X generated by the (fi)i∈I ’s and we
denote it by T w. Also the functions (fi)i∈I are continuous for this topology.
We want to generate a weak topology on X by some pseudo-norms on X. For this
purpose, we suppose that X is a normed linear space over R with norm ‖·‖X , and let
X ′ be the dual of X (the set of all bounded linear functionals on X). For each x ∈ X
and φ ∈ X ′, the mapping ‖·‖φ : X → R given by
‖x‖φ := 1‖φ‖|φ(x)|, (5.5)
is a pseudo-norm on X, since for every x, y ∈ X and c ∈ R:
1. ‖cx‖φ = 1‖φ‖ |φ(cx)| = 1‖φ‖ |cφ(x)| = |c|‖x‖φ,
2. ‖x+ y‖φ = 1‖φ‖ |φ(x+ y)| = 1‖φ‖ |φ(x) +φ(y)| ≤ 1‖φ‖ (|φ(x)|+ |φ(y)|) = ‖x‖φ + ‖y‖φ.
Henceforth, we shall understand the weak topology on X to be the weak topology
generated by (‖·‖φ)φ∈X′ .
Definition 5.10. A sequence (xn)n∈N in X converges weakly to x ∈ X, if for all φ ∈ X ′
we have:
lim
n→∞‖xn − x‖φ = 0.
In this case we write xn
w−→ x.
As in the previous section, we construct an embedding
∗ : V (X ∪ R) −→ V (∗X ∪ ∗R) ,
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where ∗X is a normed linear space over ∗R satisfying the Extension, Transfer and Internal
Definition Principles. In the nonstandard universe, ∗‖·‖φ : ∗X → ∗R is well-defined and
by the Transfer Principle conditions 1 and 2 hold for any x, y ∈ ∗X and c ∈ ∗R. We
define the infinitely close relation with respect to the weak topology as follows:
Definition 5.11. For any element x, y ∈ ∗X, we write x ≈w y to mean that
∀φ ∈ ∗X ′ 1‖φ‖|φ(x)− φ(y)| ≈ 0.
Definition 5.12. We call the element x ∈ ∗X a infinitesimal with respect to the weak
topology if x ≈w 0.
We can define the monad of an element in the weak topology as follows:
Definition 5.13. For any x ∈ ∗X, the monad of x w.r.t. the weak topology is given by
µw(x) = {y ∈ ∗X : x ≈w y}.
Remark 5.14. For any x ∈ ∗X,
µw(x) =
⋂
δ∈R>0
{y ∈ ∗X : ∀φ ∈ ∗X ′, ‖y − x‖φ < δ}.
Proof. Take an arbitrary y ∈ µw(x). Since y ∈ µw(x), x ≈w y. That is,
∀φ ∈ ∗X ′ 1‖φ‖|φ(x)− φ(y)| =
1
‖φ‖|φ(x− y)| = ‖x− y‖φ ≈ 0.
This means that for all n ∈ N\{0}, ‖x− y‖φ < 1n . Hence by taking δ = 1n ,
µw(x) ⊆
⋂
n∈N\{0}
{y ∈ ∗X : ∀φ ∈ ∗X ′, ‖y − x‖φ < 1
n
}.
Now suppose that y ∈ ⋂δ∈R>0{y ∈ ∗X : ∀φ ∈ ∗X ′, ‖y− x‖φ < δ}. Hence, for every
δ ∈ R>0, we have
{y ∈ ∗X : ∀φ ∈ ∗X ′, ‖y − x‖φ < δ},
for any x ∈ ∗X. That is, for all φ ∈ ∗X ′,
δ > ‖y − x‖φ = 1‖φ‖|φ(x− y)| =
1
‖φ‖|φ(x)− φ(y)|.
Since this is true for every δ, we can take δ = 1n for every n ∈ N\{0}, which means that
y ∈ µw(x).
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Let SX′ be the unit sphere in X
′, defined by
SX′ := {φ ∈ X ′ : ‖φ‖X′ = 1},
where ‖φ‖X′ = sup{|φ(x)| : x ∈ X , ‖x‖X = 1}. Then we have the following definition:
Definition 5.15. An element x ∈ ∗X is called finite w.r.t. the weak topology if
supφ∈ ∗SX′ |φ(x)| is a finite hyperreal.
We let Finw(
∗X) denote the finite elements of ∗X in the weak topology, and we have
Finw(
∗X) := {x ∈ ∗X : sup
φ∈ ∗SX′
◦|φ(x)| <∞}.
Remark 5.16. As in Section 5.1.1, for every x ∈ ∗X we have µw(x) = x+ µw(0). Also
for every x ∈ Finw(∗X) and y ∈ ∗X, if x ≈w y then y ∈ Finw(∗X).
Definition 5.17. The quotient space
Xˆw = Finw(
∗X)/µw(0)
= {µw(x) : x ∈ Finw(∗X)}. (5.6)
is called the nonstandard hull of X w.r.t. the weak topology.
Consider an internal linear space B and let ‖·‖φ be a pseudo-norm on B for every
φ ∈ B′, defined as (5.5). In this case the pseudo-norm is a map from B to ∗R and
the notions of finite, infinitesimal and monad w.r.t. the weak topology generated by
(‖·‖φ)φ∈B′ still make sense. Also Finw(B) and Bˆw = Fin(B)/µ(0) are well-defined
Proposition 5.18. Suppose (B, ‖·‖φ) is an internal pseudo-normed linear space for
every φ ∈ SB′. Then Bˆw is complete (forms a Banach space).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 5.9. For convenience µw(b) is
denoted by bˆ for every b ∈ Finw(B), and µw(0) is denoted by 0ˆ. Let ‖·‖w : Bˆw → R be
a functional on Bˆw which is defined for every bˆ ∈ Bˆw by
‖bˆ‖w := sup
φ∈SB′
◦|φ(b)|.
At first we should show that ‖·‖w is a norm on Bˆw. The needed properties of a normed
linear space for all aˆ, bˆ ∈ Bˆw and c ∈ R are:
1. (Positivity). ‖bˆ‖w = supφ∈SB′ ◦|φ(b)| ≥ 0.
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2. (Absolute homogeneity).
‖cbˆ‖w = sup
φ∈SB′
◦|φ(cb)| = sup
φ∈SB′
◦|cφ(b)|
= ◦|c| sup
φ∈SB′
◦|φ(b)|
= |c| sup
φ∈SB′
◦|φ(b)|
= |c|‖bˆ‖w.
Therefore ‖cbˆ‖w = |c|‖bˆ‖w.
3. (Triangle inequality). For all φ ∈ SB′ , one can write
◦|φ(a+ b)| = ◦|φ(a) + φ(b)| ≤ ◦|φ(a)|+ ◦|φ(b)|
≤ sup
φ∈SB′
◦|φ(a)|+ sup
φ∈SB′
◦|φ(b)|
= ‖aˆ‖w + ‖bˆ‖w,
hence
◦|φ(a+ b)| ≤ ‖aˆ‖w + ‖bˆ‖w.
Since the right hand side of the inequality above is independent of φ, taking supre-
mum of both sides of the inequality over φ yields:
sup
φ∈SB′
◦|φ(a+ b)| ≤ ‖aˆ‖w + ‖bˆ‖w,
and therefore
‖aˆ+ bˆ‖w ≤ ‖aˆ‖w + ‖bˆ‖w.
4. (Separating points). If for every a ∈ Finw(B), we have 0 = ‖aˆ‖w = supφ∈SB′ ◦|φ(a)|,
then
∀φ ∈ SB′ φ(a) = 0,
which shows that a ∈ Finw(B) is an infinitesimal w.r.t. the weak topology. Hence
aˆ = µw(0) = 0ˆ.
Now we prove the completeness of Bˆw. Let (bˆn)n∈N be a Cauchy sequence in Bˆw. For
each n ∈ N and φ ∈ SB′ , we define the set
An,φ = {a | a : ∗N→ B , a is ∗Cauchy , ∀i ≤ n (φ(ai) = φ(bi))} .
By the Internal Definition Principle (Proposition 2.76), the An,φ’s are non-empty and
internal. Moreover the sequence (An,φ)n∈N is ⊆-decreasing and hence by the Countable
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Saturation Principle (Proposition 2.79), the intersection
A =
⋂
n∈N, φ∈SB′
An,φ
is non-empty. This means that we can extend the sequence (bn)n∈N in B to an internal
∗Cauchy sequence (bn)n∈ ∗N in B. For any k ∈ N+, there exists an N ∈ N such that for
all m,n ∈ N with m,n > N ,
sup
φ∈SB′
◦|φ(bn − bm)| = ‖bˆn − bˆm‖w < 1
k
,
hence supφ∈SB′
◦|φ(bn − bm)| < 1k . The set
{M ∈ ∗N : ∀m,n ∈ [N,M ] sup
φ∈SB′
◦|φ(bn − bm)| < 1
k
}
is internal and
{N,N + 1, . . .} ⊆ {M ∈ ∗N : ∀m,n ∈ [N,M ] sup
φ∈SB′
◦|φ(bn − bm)| < 1
k
}.
By using the Overspill Principle (Proposition 2.77), there exists some Mk ∈ ∗N\N such
that for all N < n < m < Mk we have
sup
φ∈SB′
◦|φ(bn − bm)| ≤ 1
k
.
Therefore for all m,n ∈ (N,Mk), ‖bˆn− bˆm‖w ≤ 1k . Hence, bm ∈ Finw(B) for all m < Mk.
Now let α ∈ ∗N\N and α < Mk. Then bα ∈ Finw(B) and
lim
n→∞‖bˆn − bˆα‖ = 0,
hence bˆn → bˆα ∈ Bˆw and this completes the proof of the proposition.
5.1.3 Weak compactness
Let X and φ be as in Section 5.1.2 and consider the weak topology T w on X generated
by the pseudo-norms (‖·‖φ)φ∈X′ . We call the elements of T w weakly open sets.
Remark 5.19. Let T wx be the family of weakly open sets containing x ∈ X. Then
µw(x) =
⋂
{ ∗T : T ∈ T wx }.
Proof. Suppose y ∈ µw(x). Due to Remark 5.14, for all δ ∈ R>0 and all φ ∈ ∗X ′, we
have ‖y − x‖φ < δ. Now suppose that T ∈ T wx . Then there exists δ ∈ R>0 such that
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the formula
∀φ ∈ X ′ ‖z − x‖φ < δ ⇒ z ∈ T,
holds in V (X ∪ R). By the Transfer Principle,
∀φ ∈ ∗X ′ ‖z − x‖φ < δ ⇒ z ∈ ∗T,
holds in V (∗X ∪ ∗R). Since this holds for each T satisfying T ∈ T wx ,
y ∈
⋂
{ ∗T : T ∈ T wx }.
Hence µw(x) ⊆
⋂{ ∗T : T ∈ T wx }.
Conversely suppose that y ∈ ⋂{ ∗T : T ∈ T wx }. Choose δ ∈ R>0 and let
T = {z ∈ X : ∀φ ∈ X ′, ‖z − x‖φ < δ}.
T ∈ T wx , so y ∈ ∗T . Therefore for all φ ∈ ∗X ′, ‖y − x‖φ < δ. Hence y ∈ µw(x).
Definition 5.20. We call a point x ∈ ∗X nearstandard w.r.t. the weak topology if
x ∈ µw(y) for some y ∈ X. According to our previous notations, an element x ∈ ∗X is
nearstandard w.r.t. the weak topology if x ≈w y for some y ∈ X.
By using the idea from Royden and Fitzpatrick [54], we give the following definition:
Definition 5.21. A subset D of X is said to be weakly dense in X if every non-empty
weakly open set contains a point of D. The space X is said to be weakly separable if
there is a countable subset of X that is weakly dense in X.
Proposition 5.22. Let X be weakly separable. Then there exists a countable collection
(Ti)i∈N of weakly open sets such that any weakly open set is the union of a sub-collection
of (Ti)i∈N.
Proof. Let D be a countable weakly dense subset of X. If D is finite, then X =
D. Assume D is countably infinite. Let (xi)i∈N be an enumeration of D. Then(
B
(
xn,
1
m
))
n,m∈N is a countable collection of weakly open sets of X. We claim that
every weakly open set of X is the union of a sub-collection of
(
B
(
xn,
1
m
))
n,m∈N. Indeed,
let T ∈ T w be a weakly open subset of X. Let x ∈ T . We must show that there are
natural numbers n and m for which
x ∈ B
(
xn,
1
m
)
⊆ T.
Since T is weakly open and x ∈ T , there is a natural number m for which B (x, 1m) ⊆ T .
Since every weakly open set contains a point of D, we may choose a natural number n
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for which xn ∈ D ∩B
(
x, 12m
)
. Thus
x ∈ B
(
xn,
1
2m
)
⊆ B
(
x,
1
m
)
⊆ T
holds for this choice of n and m.
Theorem 5.23. Suppose X is weakly separable. X is weakly compact if and only if
every element in ∗X is nearstandard w.r.t. the weak topology.
Proof. Suppose X is weakly compact and there is some y ∈ ∗X which is not nearstan-
dard w.r.t. the weak topology. Then for every x ∈ X, there exists Tx with x ∈ Tx ∈ T w
and y /∈ ∗Tx. Therefore {Tx : x ∈ X} is a weakly open cover of X. Let {Tx0 , . . . , Txn−1}
be a finite subcover of X for n ∈ N. Hence
n−1⋃
i=0
∗Txi =
∗
(
n−1⋃
i=0
Txi
)
= ∗X,
so y /∈ ∗X, which is a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that every y ∈ ∗X is nearstandard w.r.t. the weak topology. Let
{Tλ : λ ∈ Λ} be an weakly open cover of X. Since X is separable, due to Proposition
5.22, there exists a countable collection (Tλi)i∈N of weakly open sets such that any weakly
open set Tλ, for λ ∈ Λ, is the union of a sub-collection of (Tλi)i∈N. Define Cλi := X\Tλi
for every i ∈ N. If there is no finite subcover, then for every collection {λ0, . . . , λn−1},
n ∈ N, we have
n−1⋂
i=0
Cλi 6= ∅.
Therefore
n−1⋂
i=0
∗Cλi =
∗
(
n−1⋂
i=0
Cλi
)
6= ∅.
By the Countable Saturation Principle 2.79,
C =
⋂
i∈N
∗Cλi 6= ∅.
Given an arbitrary x ∈ X, there exist some λ ∈ Λ and N ∈ N such that x ∈ Tλ ⊆ TλN .
Hence x ∈ TλN . Let y ∈ C. Then y ∈ C ⊂ ∗CλN , therefore y /∈ ∗TλN and so y /∈ µw(x).
Because x is an arbitrary element of X, y is not nearstandard w.r.t. the weak topology
and this is a contradiction. Thus, {Tλ : λ ∈ Λ} has a finite subcover, and X is weakly
compact.
Theorem 5.24. Suppose the embedding ∗ is κ-saturated. X is weakly compact if and
only if every element in ∗X is nearstandard w.r.t. the weak topology.
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Proof. If X is weakly compact, the proof of every element in ∗X is nearstandard w.r.t.
the weak topology, is the same as the first part of the proof in Theorem 5.23.
Conversely, suppose that every y ∈ ∗X is nearstandard w.r.t. the weak topology.
Let {Tλ : λ ∈ Λ} be an weakly open cover of X. Define Cλ := X\Tλ for every λ ∈ Λ. If
there is no finite subcover, then for every collection {λ0, . . . , λn−1} with n ∈ N, we have
n−1⋂
i=0
Cλi 6= ∅.
Therefore
n−1⋂
i=0
∗Cλi =
∗
(
n−1⋂
i=0
Cλi
)
6= ∅.
Since |Λ| ≤ |P(X)| < κ, where κ ≥ |V1(X ∪ R)|, by κ-Saturation Principle (Definition
2.81),
C =
⋂
λ∈Λ
∗Cλ 6= ∅.
Given an arbitrary x ∈ X, there exists some λ such that x ∈ Tλ. Let y ∈ C. Then
y ∈ C ⊂ ∗Cλ, therefore y /∈ ∗Tλ and so y /∈ µw(x). Because x is an arbitrary element
of X, y is not nearstandard w.r.t. the weak topology and this is a contradiction. Thus,
{Tλ : λ ∈ Λ} has a finite subcover, therefore X is weakly compact.
5.2 Existence of a representative utility function w.r.t. the
weak topology
In this section we are going to provide weaker conditions for the existence of a repre-
sentative utility function. For this purpose, we assume weaker conditions for the set of
social alternatives and the parameter set of parametrised utility functions. We use here
the same notations and notions introduced in Chapter 3.
5.2.1 The model
Let N and C be the set of individuals and social alternatives respectively. There exists a
weak order relation P on C and we denote the set of all weak orders by P. Elements of
PN are called profiles. Every individual i ∈ N has preferences that can be represented
by a utility function ui : C → R. We fix some class M of functions from C to R such
that every individual’s utility function belongs to M. Elements of MN will be called
utility profiles and u = (ui)i∈N ∈MN .
Recall that for x ∈ C and P ∈ P, x will be called P-maximal if and only if for all
y ∈ C\{x}, we have xPy.
Notation 5.25. We have the following notations:
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• For all x, y ∈ C and P = (Pi)i∈N ∈ PN , we define
C(x, y, P ) := {i ∈ N : xPiy}.
• We use P u ∈ P to show that the utility function u induces the preference P .
• Given an N -sequence u = (ui)i∈N of functions from C to R, we define
P u := (P ui)i∈N ∈ PN .
We say that the utility profile u induces the preference profile P u.
We aggregate the individuals’ preferences with a social welfare function, σ : PN → P,
which satisfies all Arrovian rationality axioms (Axioms 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12). A coalition
C ⊆ N is said to be σ-decisive if and only if for all x, y ∈ C and P ∈ PN one has xσ(P )y
whenever xPiy for all i ∈ C. The set of σ-decisive coalitions is denoted by Fσ. We have
shown in Chapter 3, if σ satisfies Arrovian rationality axioms, then Fσ is a non-principal
ultrafilter on N and this is only possible if N is infinite.
According to our results, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 5.26. We assume that C is a weakly compact non-empty convex subset of
a given reflexive separable Banach space W (with norm ‖ ·‖W ).
Definition 5.27. Let h : W → R be a function. We call the following limit, if it exists,
lim
λ→0
h(x+ λy)− h(u)
λ
,
the directional derivative of h at x in the direction y and denote it by h′(x; y). If there
exists hx ∈W ′ (the dual space of W ) such that
∀y ∈W h′(x; y) = 〈y, hx〉 ,
we say that h is Gaˆteaux-differentiable at x, and hx is called the Gaˆteaux-differential of
h at x and we denote it by h′(x).
Remark 5.28. The uniqueness of the Gaˆteaux-differential follows directly and it is
characterised by
∀y ∈W lim
λ→0
h(x+ λy)− h(x)
λ
=
〈
y, h′(x)
〉
.
Definition 5.29. Let A be a weakly compact non-empty subset of a given separable
Banach space X (with norm ‖ ·‖X). The function h : A→ R is w-uniformly continuous
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in x ∈ A if and only if
∀ > 0 ∃δ > 0 ∀y ∈ A ((∀φ ∈ X ′ ‖x− y‖φ < δ) ⇒ |h(x)− h(y)| < ) .
We have the following parametrisation assumption:
Assumption 5.30. Let Z be a weakly compact non-empty subset of a given separable
Banach space X. Let v : Z × C −→ R be a function with the following properties:
1. v is strictly concave,
2. M⊆ { v(z, ·) : z ∈ Z },
3. v(·, x) is w-uniformly continuous for all x ∈ C,
4. Either
(a) v(z, ·) is w-uniformly continuous for all z ∈ Z,
or
(b) v(z, ·) is Gaˆteaux-differentiable with continuous derivative v′(z, ·) for all z ∈
Z.
According to Assumption 5.30, we are concerned with the maximisation problem
∀z ∈ Z sup
r∈C
v(z, r). (5.7)
Proposition 5.31. The set of solutions of (5.7) is a closed convex set for all z ∈ Z,
which is possibly empty.
Proof. Let us assume that the supremum in (5.7) is denoted by α. We notice that for
every z ∈ Z, the set of solutions of (5.7) is:
{t ∈ C : v(z, t) = α}.
Instead, we consider the set A = {t ∈ C : −v(z, t) ≤ −α} and since for every z ∈ Z,
v(z, ·) is a concave function, then −v(z, ·) is convex, therefore A is a convex set of C (see
page 8 in Ekeland and Temam [20]). Since for all z ∈ Z, v(z, ·) is Gaˆteaux-differentiable
with continuous derivative v′(z, ·), v(z, ·) is continuous. Hence, due to the definition of
the continuous functions, the set of solutions of (5.7) is also closed.
Proposition 5.32. According to Assumption 5.30, problem (5.7) has a solution for each
z ∈ Z and this solution is unique.
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Proof. (First proof). In the first part of the proof, we work in the nonstandard universe
as in Section 5.1.2. Since C ⊂W is weakly compact, it is bounded in norm. For proving
this, let arbitrary φ ∈ W ′. Suppose supx∈C |φ(x)| is infinite. By the Transfer Principle,
there is c ∈ ∗C such that ∗φ(c) is infinite. But this is impossible, as Theorem 5.23 shows
that there is an a ∈ C such that a ≈w c. Therefore C is bounded in norm, because (see
proposition 2.24 in Ng [49]) a subset C of a normed linear space W is bounded if and
only if for all φ ∈W ′,
sup
x∈C
|φ(x)| <∞.
Since φ is arbitrary, the proof is complete. Now let (tn)n∈N be a maximising sequence
of (5.7), that is, a sequence of elements of C such that:
v(z, tn)→ sup
r∈C
v(z, r) = α.
The set C is bounded, then the sequence (tn)n∈N is itself bounded, and thus we can
extract from (tn)n∈N a subsequence (tnm)m∈N, which converges weakly to an element t
belonging to C (since W is a reflexive Banach space and this implies that every bounded
sequence admits a weakly converging subsequence).
For every z ∈ Z, v(z, .) is a continuous function on C in the weak topology of W ,
and hence
v(z, t) = limm→∞v(z, tnm) = α,
which means that t is a solution of (5.7).
If two different solutions t1 and t2 exist, then from Proposition 5.31,
t1+t2
2 is also a
solution. But v(z, .) is strictly concave for every z ∈ Z and we have
v
(
z,
t1 + t2
2
)
>
1
2
(v(z, t1) + v(z, t2)) = α,
which is a contradiction.
Proof. (Second proof). Weak compactness implies closedness in the weak topology and
since the weak topology is weaker than the norm topology, every weakly open set is
open in norm, and by taking complements, every weakly closed set is closed in norm.
Therefore both C and Z are closed. They are also bounded in norm (according to the
first proof).
Since v is continuous1 and Z × C is closed and bounded, v(Z × C) is also a closed
and bounded subset of R. According to the boundedness of v(Z × C) in R, it has a
least upper bound α and since it is closed, it contains α. Therefore problem (5.7) has a
solution. Uniqueness holds due to the same argument as above.
1Gaˆteaux-differentiability with continuous derivative and w-uniformly continuity imply continuity.
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Remark 5.33. For all u ∈M, u attains its unique global maximum on C.
Definition 5.34. f : ∗Z → ∗R is said to be w-S-continuous in z¯ ∈ ∗Z if and only if
∀z˜ ∈ Z (z˜ ≈w z¯ ⇒ f(z˜) ≈ f(z¯)) .
f is w-S-continuous on ∗Z if and only if for all weakly nearstandard2 z¯ ∈ ∗Z, f is
w-S-continuous.
Proposition 5.35. If f : Z → R is w-uniformly continuous, then ∗f : ∗Z → ∗R is
w-S-continuous.
Proof. Consider a weakly nearstandard z¯ ∈ ∗Z. Let z˜ ∈ Z such that z˜ ≈w z¯. Since f is
w-uniformly continuous, it is also w-uniformly continuous in z˜, and therefore
∀ > 0 ∃δ > 0 ∀z ∈ Z ((∀φ ∈ X ′ ‖z − z˜‖φ < δ) ⇒ |f(z)− f(z˜)| < ) .
The Transfer Principle can be applied to
∀z ∈ Z ((∀φ ∈ X ′ ‖z − z˜‖φ < δ) ⇒ |f(z)− f(z˜)| < ) .
Hence
∀ ∈ R>0 ∃δ ∈ R>0 ∀z ∈ ∗Z
((∀φ ∈ ∗X ′ ‖z − z˜‖φ < δ)⇒ |∗f(z)− ∗f(z˜)| < ) . (5.8)
However, ∀φ ∈ ∗X ′, ‖z¯ − z˜‖φ < δ for all δ ∈ R>0. Then | ∗f(z¯) − ∗f(z˜)| <  for all
 ∈ R>0 by (5.8). Therefore ∗f(z¯) ≈ ∗f(z˜).
5.2.2 Representative utility function
We recall from Chapter 3 that an admissible utility function ϕ : C → R is said to be
Fσ-socially acceptable for u if and only if there exists some x˜ ∈ C with ϕ(x˜) = supϕ such
that for every y ∈ C\{x˜}, the coalition of i with ui(x˜) > ui(y) is decisive. An admissible
utility function ϕ : C → R is called σ-representative of P ∈ PN if and only if there exists
some x˜ ∈ C with ϕ(x˜) = supϕ and any such x˜ is also σ(P )-maximal.
Theorem 5.36. Suppose Assumptions 5.26 and 5.30 hold and Fσ is a non-principal
ultrafilter. Then there exists for every u ∈ MN some Fσ-socially acceptable utility
function.
Proof. We prove this theorem in two cases:
Case 1 (If properties 1, 2, 3 and 4(a) from Assumption 5.30 are satisfied). Fix an
arbitrary u ∈MN and by Assumption 5.30, let (zi)i∈N ∈ (Z)N be such that ui = v(zi, ·)
2Weakly nearstandard: nearstandard w.r.t. the weak topology.
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for every i ∈ N . The ultrapower construction can easily be adapted to construct an
embedding
∗ : V ((X ⊕W ) ∪ R)→ V (∗(X ⊕ W ) ∪ ∗R),
where ∗(X ⊕ W ) is a Banach space over ∗R satisfying the Extension and Transfer
Principles. For the rest of the proof, we work in the resulting nonstandard universe. We
have to construct some parameter z˜ such that v(z˜, ·) is Fσ-socially acceptable. Let
z¯ := [(zi)i∈N ]Fσ ∈ ∗Z.
Since Z is a weakly compact subset of a given separable Banach space, by Theorem 5.23
every element of ∗Z is nearstandard w.r.t. the weak topology, and let z˜ ∈ Z such that
z˜ ≈w z¯.
Now consider the map
t : Z −→ C,
which assigns to each z ∈ Z the unique x = t(z) ∈ C such that
x ∈ arg sup
r∈C
v(z, r).
Note that the existence and uniqueness of x follow from Remark 5.33. By the Transfer
Principle,
∗t : ∗Z → ∗C,
hence ∗t(z¯) ∈ ∗C and since C is a weakly compact subset of a given reflexive separable
Banach space, every element of ∗C is nearstandard w.r.t. the weak topology (see again
Theorem 5.23) and therefore x¯ = ∗t(z¯) is nearstandard w.r.t. the weak topology. Let
x˜ ≈w x¯.
Due to Assumption 5.30 (see properties 3 and 4(a)), v is w-uniformly continuous and
hence by Proposition 5.35, ∗v is w-S-continuous. Therefore, we have for all y ∈ C,
v(z˜, y)− v(z˜, x˜) ≈ ∗v(z¯, y)− ∗v(z¯, x˜) ≈ ∗v(z¯, y)− ∗v(z¯, x¯).
The right-hand side of the last equation is a non-positive hyperreal (since x¯ is a global
∗maximum of ∗v(z¯, ·)), so the standard part is non-positive. But the standard part is
exactly v(z˜, y)− v(z˜, x˜), so
v(z˜, y)− v(z˜, x˜) ≤ 0 , ∀y ∈ C.
Since we have a unique global maximum (according to Remark 5.33),
v(z˜, y)− v(z˜, x˜) < 0 , for all y 6= x˜. (5.9)
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In order to verify that v(z˜, ·) is Fσ-socially acceptable, we still need to show that for
every y ∈ C\{x˜}, the set of all i ∈ N with ui(x˜) > ui(y) is decisive (i.e. ∈ Fσ). Define a
function f by f(h) := v(h, x˜)− v(h, y) for all h ∈ Z, from where
{i ∈ N : ui(x˜) > ui(y) } = {i ∈ N : v(zi, x˜)− v(zi, y) > 0 }
= {i ∈ N : f(zi) > 0 }. (5.10)
Due to the construction of the nonstandard embedding ∗ via the bounded ultrapower
(with respect to Fσ) of the superstructure V ((X ⊕W ) ∪ R), one has the equivalence3
{i ∈ N : f(zi) > 0 } ∈ Fσ ⇔ ∗f(z¯) > 0 which through equation (5.10) yields
{i ∈ N : ui(x˜) > ui(y) } ∈ Fσ ⇔ ∗f(z¯) > 0. (5.11)
However, by applying the Transfer Principle to the defining equation for f , we get
∗f(h) = ∗v(h, x˜)− ∗v(h, y) for all h ∈ ∗Z, so by the w-S-continuity of ∗v (see Proposition
5.35), we have
∗f(z¯) = ∗v(z¯, x˜)− ∗v(z¯, y) ≈ ∗v(z¯, x¯)− ∗v(z¯, y).
The standard part of the right-hand side is strictly positive (by inequality (5.9)) and
therefore ◦(∗f(z¯)) > 0. Hence ∗f(z¯) > 0 and by equivalence (5.11) we have
{i ∈ N : ui(x˜) > ui(y) } ∈ D.
Case 2 (If properties 1, 2, 3 and 4(b) from Assumption 5.30 are satisfied). Fix an
arbitrary u ∈MN and by Assumption 5.30, let (zi)i∈N ∈ (Z)N be such that ui = v(zi, ·)
for every i ∈ N . Like in the proof of the previous case, we work in the resulting
nonstandard universe with the same embedding. We have to construct some parameter
z˜ such that v(z˜, ·) is Fσ-socially acceptable. Let
z¯ := [(zi)i∈N ]Fσ ∈ ∗Z.
Since Z is a weakly compact subset of a given separable Banach space, by Theorem 5.23
every element of ∗Z is nearstandard w.r.t. the weak topology, and let z˜ ∈ Z such that
z˜ ≈w z¯.
Now consider the map
t : Z −→ C,
which assigns to each z ∈ Z the unique x = t(z) ∈ C such that
x ∈ arg sup
r∈C
v(z, r).
3The sequence (f(zi))i∈N is bounded in V ((X ⊕W ) ∪ R), since zi ∈ Z ⊆ X for all i ∈ N and
f : Z → R.
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Note that the existence and uniqueness of x follow from Remark 5.33. Since v(z˜, ·) is
strictly concave, by duality of the Proposition 5.4 on page 24 in Ekeland and Temam4
[20], for all y ∈ C with y 6= x we have
v(z˜, y) < v(z˜, x) +
〈
v′(z˜, x), y − x〉 .
Due to duality of the Proposition 2.1 on page 36 in Ekeland and Temam5 [20],
〈
v′(z˜, x), y − x〉 ≤ 0.
Hence
∀y ∈ C y 6= x v(z˜, y)− v(z˜, x) < 0. (5.12)
This proves that x is the unique maximum of v(z˜, ·). Like in the proof of Case 1, in
order to verify that v(z˜, ·) is Fσ-socially acceptable, we define a function f by
f(h) := v(h, x)− v(h, y),
for all h ∈ Z. Hence
{i ∈ N : ui(x) > ui(y) } = {i ∈ N : f(zi) > 0 }.
Due to the construction of the nonstandard embedding ∗ via the bounded ultrapower
(with respect to Fσ) of the superstructure V ((X ⊕W ) ∪ R), one has the equivalence
{i ∈ N : ui(x) > ui(y) } ∈ Fσ ⇔ ∗f(z¯) > 0. (5.13)
However, by applying the Transfer Principle to the defining equation for f , we get
∗f(h) = ∗v(h, x)− ∗v(h, y) for all h ∈ ∗Z, so
∗f(z¯) = ∗v(z¯, x)− ∗v(z¯, y).
By the w-S-continuity of ∗v(·, x) and inequality (5.12), the standard part of the right-
hand side is strictly positive and therefore ◦(∗f(z¯)) > 0. Hence ∗f(z¯) > 0 and by
4Proposition 5.4 in Ekeland and Temam: Suppose Z and C are as in Assumptions 5.26 and 5.30. If
v : Z × C → R is Gaˆteaux-differentiable, then for all z ∈ Z, v(z, ·) is strictly convex if and only if
∀y, x ∈ C, y 6= x v(z, y) > v(z, x) + 〈v′(z, x), y − x〉 .
5Duality of the Proposition 2.1 in Ekeland and Temam: We assume that v satisfies Assumption 5.30.
Then x ∈ C is a solution of the maximisation problem 5.7 if and only if
∀y ∈ C ∀z ∈ Z 〈v′(z, x), y − x〉 ≤ 0.
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equivalence (5.13) we have
{i ∈ N : ui(x) > ui(y) } ∈ Fσ.
Theorem 5.37. Suppose σ satisfies all Arrovian rationality axioms (Axioms 3.10, 3.11
and 3.12), and Fσ is a non-principal ultrafilter. If, in addition, M satisfies Assumption
5.30, then there exists for every u ∈ MN some admissible utility function which is
σ-representative of the preference profile P u induced by u.
Proof. The proof is similar to the second part of the proof of Theorem 3.24 in Chapter 3.

Chapter 6
Extension: Kirman-Sondermann
correspondence for vote abstention
In this chapter we study an aggregation problem with the model theoretic approach by
means of generalised ultraproducts. Typically in the aggregation problems, we use some
ultrafilters on the set of individuals to model the set of decisive coalitions, and as we
have shown in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2), there is a one to one correspondence between
the Arrow-rational aggregator and the set of decisive coalitions (which is an ultrafilter)
induced by this aggregator. Herzberg and Eckert in [32] studied generalisation of the
Kirman-Sondermann correspondence. Since some voters might abstain from voting, in
the profile some coordinates might be empty. At the moment, the vote abstention situa-
tion is not satisfactorily covered by the generalised Kirman-Sondermann correspondence
in [32], therefore we generalise this correspondence by using the generalised ultraproduct
defined in Makkai [41] in which empty models in some coordinates do not necessarily
make the generalised ultraproduct also empty.
6.1 Arrow-rational aggregators
Fix a first-order language L, consisting of constant symbols a˙ for each element a in a
given set A and countably many n-ary relation symbols R˙n, for every n ∈ N. Let S
be the set of the atomic L-formulae, and let I be the Boolean closure of S, i.e. the
closure of S under the logical connectives ¬˙, ∧˙, ∨˙. Fix a consistent set T of universal
L-sentences1.
Recall from Chapter 2, that, an L-structure is a pair A = 〈A, (Rn)n∈N〉 where Rn ⊆
An. In this chapter, we assume that all L-structures have the domain A, and the constant
symbol a˙ is always interpreted by a, for all a ∈ A.
1A sentence is universal if it has the form (˙∀˙v˙k0 )˙ . . . (˙∀˙v˙kn−1 )˙φ for some formula φ that does not
contain any quantifiers.
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Again, due to Chapter 2, an L-structure A is a model2 of the theory T if A |= φ
for all φ ∈ T . Let Ω be the collection of models M of T which contains at least two
non-isomorphic models3 with domain A. Sometimes, abusing notation, we will use M
for elements in Ω∪ {∅}. We let R˙n, . . . , a˙, . . . denote the symbols in the language L and
let RMn , . . . , a
M , . . . denote the corresponding semantic object in the model M . We use
|M | to denote the domain of M and sometimes we use M to denote the domain directly.
As usual, for any M and λ, we write M |= λ to indicate that λ is true of M .
Fix a non-empty set I, which we will think of as the set of individuals, and the subsets
of I are called coalitions. Elements M ∈ (Ω ∪ {∅})I are the profiles. This is toward the
generalisation of [32] to the case of vote abstention. For any such profile, and any λ ∈ I,
the coalition supporting λ given M is the set C(M,λ) := {i ∈ I : Mi |= λ}.
An aggregator is a partial map f : (Ω ∪ {∅})I → Ω∪{∅}. The domain of f is denoted
by dom(f). We impose the following axioms for the aggregator:
Axiom 6.1. (Universal Domain). f : (Ω ∪ {∅})I → Ω ∪ {∅} is a total map, i.e.,
dom(f) = (Ω ∪ {∅})I .
Axiom 6.2. (Generalized Pareto Principle). For all M ∈ dom(f) and all λ ∈ I,
if f(M) |= λ, then C(M,λ) 6= ∅.
Axiom 6.3. (Generalised Systematicity). For all M,N ∈ dom(f) and all λ, µ ∈ I,
if C(M,λ) = C(N,µ), then f(M) |= λ ⇔ f(N) |= µ.
Definition 6.4. An aggregator f is Arrow-rational if it satisfies the Axioms 6.1, 6.2
and 6.3. The collection of Arrow-rational aggregators is denoted by AR.
Remark 6.5. Note that Systematicity is the conjunction of Independence of Irrelevent
Alternatives (IIA)4 and Neutrality5.
Definition 6.6. (Decisive coalition). For any aggregator f , a coalition C ⊆ I is f -
decisive if, for all λ ∈ I and all M ∈ dom(f),
if C = C(M,λ), then f(M) |= λ.
2That is, if all sentences of the theory hold true in A, with the usual Tarski’s definition of truth 2.33.
For instance, if A = 〈A, (Rn)n∈N〉, then for all a0, a1, . . . , an−1 ∈ A, one has
A |= R˙n(˙a˙0, a˙1, . . . , a˙n−1)˙ ⇔ (a0, a1, . . . , an−1) ∈ Rn.
3This is a crucial point in the proof of Lemma 6.8.
4Independence of Irrelevent Alternatives (IIA): For all λ ∈ I and all profiles M,N ∈ dom(f), if
C(M,λ) = C(N,λ), then f(M) |= λ ⇔ f(N) |= λ.
5Neutrality: For all λ, µ ∈ I and all profile M ∈ dom(f), if C(M,λ) = C(M,µ), then f(M) |= λ ⇔
f(M) |= µ.
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Let Df denote the set of the f -decisive coalitions, i.e.
Df := {C ⊆ I : for all λ ∈ I for all M ∈ dom(f), if C = C(M,λ) then f(M) |= λ}.
Lemma 6.7. If f satisfies Axiom 6.3, then for all M ∈ dom(f) and λ ∈ I, we have:
C(M,λ) ∈ Df ⇔ f(M) |= λ.
Proof. For all M ∈ dom(f) and λ ∈ I:
(⇒): If C(M,λ) ∈ Df then ∀λ′ ∈ I and ∀M ′ ∈ dom(f),
C(M,λ) = C(M ′, λ′) implies f(M ′) |= λ′.
By taking λ′ = λ and M ′ = M , we get f(M) |= λ.
(⇐): If f(M) |= λ, in order to show C(M,λ) ∈ Df , it suffices to show that for all
M ′ ∈ dom(f) and for all λ′ ∈ I,
if C(M,λ) = C(M ′, λ′), then f(M ′) |= λ′.
Now given M ′, λ′ such that C(M,λ) = C(M ′, λ′). By Axiom 6.3,
f(M) |= λ iff f(M ′) |= λ′,
and since f(M) |= λ, we have f(M ′) |= λ′.
Lemma 6.8. Let f ∈ AR, then Df is an ultrafilter over I.
Proof. We have to verify the ultrafilter properties for Df . First, since f satisfies Axiom
6.2, Df cannot contain ∅.
Secondly, we have to show that if C ∈ Df and C ⊆ C ′ ⊆ I, then C ′ ∈ Df . According
to our requirement that Ω contains at least two non-isomorphic models of domain A, we
take two of them N and N ′ such that for a relational atomic formula φ, N |= φ, N ′ 2 φ
and ∅ 2 φ. Now take an a ∈ A. It is easy to see that N |= a˙ .= a˙, N ′ |= a˙ .= a˙ and
∅ 2 a˙ .= a˙ 6. We define the profile M as follows:
Mi =

N ′ if i ∈ C
N if i ∈ C ′\C
∅ if i ∈ I\C ′
6The ∅ is in fact the empty model, and all the atomic sentences are false in the empty model. Hence
a˙
.
= a˙ is not true in it, but ¬˙(˙a˙ .= a˙)˙ is true.
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Then C(M, a˙
.
= a˙ ∧˙ ¬˙φ) = C and C(M, a˙ .= a˙) = C ′. Therefore
C(M, a˙
.
= a˙ ∧˙ ¬˙φ) = C ∈ Df ⇒ f(M) |= a˙ .= a˙ ∧˙ ¬˙φ (by Lemma 6.7)
⇒ f(M) |= a˙ .= a˙
⇒ C ′ = C(M, a˙ .= a˙) ∈ Df . (by Lemma 6.7)
Thirdly we have to show that Df is closed under intersection. Let C,C ′ ∈ Df . We
take two non-isomorphic models of domain A, namely N and N ′ such that there exists
φ ∈ S with N |= φ, N ′ 2 φ and ∅ 2 φ. Now take an a ∈ A. It is easy to see that
N |= a˙ .= a˙, N ′ |= a˙ .= a˙ and ∅ 2 a˙ .= a˙. We define the profile M as follows:
Mi =

N ′ if i ∈ C ∩ C ′
N if i ∈ C\(C ∩ C ′)
∅ if i ∈ I\C
Then C(M, a˙
.
= a˙) = C ∈ Df and by Lemma 6.7, f(M) |= a˙ .= a˙. Also C ′ ⊆ C(M, ¬˙φ),
and since C ′ ∈ Df and Df is closed under supersets (as we have already shown),
C(M, ¬˙φ) ∈ Df . Hence, by Lemma 6.7, f(M) |= ¬˙φ. Therefore
f(M) |= a˙ .= a˙ and f(M) |= ¬˙φ ⇒ f(M) |= a˙ .= a˙ ∧˙ ¬˙φ
⇒ C(M, a˙ .= a˙ ∧˙ ¬˙φ) ∈ Df . (by Lemma 6.7)
But C ∩ C ′ = C(M, a˙ .= a˙ ∧˙ ¬˙φ) and hence C ∩ C ′ ∈ Df .
It only remains to show that for all C ⊆ I, C ∈ Df or I\C ∈ Df . We take a model
N ∈ Ω with domain A and a ∈ A. It is easy to see that N |= a˙ .= a˙ and ∅ 2 a˙ .= a˙. We
define the profile M ∈ (Ω ∪ {∅})I as follows:
Mi =
N if i ∈ C∅ if i ∈ I\C
Therefore
C(M, a˙
.
= a˙) = C and C(M, ¬˙(˙a˙ .= a˙)˙) = I\C.
Since either f(M) |= a˙ .= a˙ or f(M) |= ¬˙(˙a˙ .= a˙)˙, by Lemma 6.7 we have
C ∈ Df or I\C ∈ Df ,
which completes the proof of the lemma.
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6.2 Generalised ultraproduct construction
In the present section, we introduce a construction which, for each (ultra)filter D over I
and each profile M ∈ (Ω ∪ {∅})I , yields an L-model. This construction amounts to the
specialisation of Makkai’s ultraproduct construction (Section 1.3 in [41]) from a more
general category-theoretic setting to the model-theoretic setting of interest here. In the
remainder of this section we fix a set I and an (ultra)filter D over I.
Definition 6.9. Let M ∈ (Ω ∪ {∅})I be a profile. We define the generalised union
product as follows:∐
J∈D
∏
j∈J
Mj := {(si)i∈J : J ∈ D and si ∈ |Mi| for all i ∈ J},
where |Mi| is the domain of Mi.
Remark 6.10. If J ∈ D and Mi = ∅ for some i ∈ J , then
∏
i∈JMi = ∅. Hence∐
J∈D
∏
j∈J
Mj =
∐
J∈D0
∏
j∈J
Mj ,
where D0 := {J ∈ D : ∀i(i ∈ J ⇒ Mi 6= ∅)}. Now consider the case when D is a
principal ultrafilter. In this case D is generated by the singleton {i0} of an individual i0
identified with the dictator, and we claim that∐
J∈D
∏
j∈J
Mj = ∅ iff Mi0 = ∅.
For proving this claim, suppose that
∐
J∈D
∏
j∈JMj = ∅. We want to show thatMi0 = ∅.
Since
∐
J∈D
∏
j∈JMj = ∅, for all J ∈ D, we have∏
j∈J
Mj = ∅. (6.1)
Now take J := {i0} ∈ D, then
∏
j∈JMj = Mi0 . But due to equation (6.1), for any
choice of J , we have
∏
j∈JMj = ∅, as well as this case that we take J := {i0}. Therefore
Mi0 = ∅.
Now assume that Mi0 = ∅. We want to show that
∐
J∈D
∏
j∈JMj = ∅, which is
equivalent to show that for all J ∈ D, ∏j∈JMj = ∅. Fix an arbitrary J ∈ D. We need
to show that
∏
j∈JMj = ∅ for the choice J ∈ D. By our assumption on D, it follows
that i0 ∈ J and Mi0 = ∅, and this implies that
∏
j∈JMj = ∅.
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Definition 6.11. We define the equivalence relation ≡D on the non-empty generalised
union product
∐
J∈D
∏
j∈JMj such that
(sj)j∈J ≡D (tk)k∈K iff {i ∈ J ∩K : si = ti} ∈ D,
where J,K ∈ D.
For every J ∈ D, we denote sJ = (sj)j∈J as an element in generalised union prod-
uct. Therefore the equivalence class of sJ with respect to the equivalence relation ≡D
shall be denoted by [sJ ]≡D . We also denote the set of all such equivalence classes by
(
∐
J∈D
∏
j∈JMj)/ ≡D.
Definition 6.12. Let D be an ultrafilter on I and M be an element of (Ω ∪ {∅})I . Then
the generalised ultraproduct (
∐∏
M)/D of M with respect to D is defined as follows:
• The domain is (∐J∈D∏j∈JMj)/ ≡D.
• For any constant symbol a˙, it is interpreted as [aJ ]≡D where aJ = (aj)j∈J such
that J = {i ∈ I : Mi 6= ∅}, and aj = a for all j ∈ J .
• For any n-ary relation symbol R˙n, its interpretation are as follows:
For any J0, . . . Jn−1 ∈ D and any skJk ∈
∏
j∈JkMj for k = 0, . . . , n− 1,(
[s0
J0 ]≡D , . . . , [sn−1
Jn−1 ]≡D
)
∈ R(
∐∏
M)/D
n
if and only if
{i ∈ J0 ∩ . . . ∩ Jn−1 : (s0,i, . . . sn−1,i) ∈ RMin } ∈ D.
Remark 6.13. If the set {i ∈ I : Mi = ∅} is empty, then the definition above is
equivalent to the following, simpler one, which is called the ultraproduct
∏
M/D of M
with respect to D:
• The domain is ∏i∈IMi/ ∼D, where for any s, t ∈∏i∈IMi we have:
(si)i∈I ∼D (ti)i∈I iff {i ∈ I : si = ti} ∈ D.
• For any constant symbol a˙, it is interpreted as [a]∼D where a = (ai)i∈I and ai = a
for all i ∈ I.
• For any n-ary relation symbol R˙n, its interpretation are as follows:
For any sk ∈
∏
i∈IMi and for k = 0, . . . , n− 1,(
[s0]∼D , . . . , [sn−1]≡D
)
∈ R
∏
M/D
n
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if and only if
{i ∈ I : (s0,i, . . . sn−1,i) ∈ RMin } ∈ D.
Proof. Clearly, for all (yi)i∈I and (y′i)i∈I ,
(yi)i∈I ≡D (y′i)i∈I iff {i ∈ I : yi = y′i} ∈ D iff (yi)i∈I ∼D (y′i)i∈I .
Moreover, for every K ∈ D and for every (tk)k∈K there exists some (yi)i∈I such that
(tk)k∈K ≡D (yi)i∈I : indeed let
yi =
ti if i ∈ Kany y ∈Mi 6= ∅ otherwise.
This definition guarantees that {i ∈ I ∩ K = K : yi = ti} = K ∈ D, and hence
(tk)k∈K ≡D (yi)i∈I . From the facts above, it follows that the assignment [(tk)k∈K ]≡D 7→
[(yi)i∈I ]∼D is well defined and has an inverse, given by the assignment [(yi)i∈I ]∼D 7→
[(yi)i∈I ]≡D . Therefore the domain of the generalised ultraproduct is equal to{
[(si)i∈I ]≡D : (si)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I
Mi
}
.
For any constant symbol a, its interpretation in generalised ultraproduct is [(ai)i∈I ]≡D ,
since {i ∈ I : Mi 6= ∅} = I, and its interpretation in ultraproduct is [(ai)i∈I ]∼D which
corresponds to each other.
For any relation symbol Rn, notice that the domain of the generalised ultraproduct
is {
[(si)i∈I ]≡D : (si)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I
Mi
}
,
therefore for any s0 = (s0,i)i∈I , . . . , sn−1 = (sn−1,i)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈IMi we have:(
[s0]≡D , . . . , [sn−1]≡D
)
∈ R(
∐∏
M)/D
n ⇔ {i ∈ I ∩ . . . ∩ I : (s0,i, . . . sn−1,i) ∈ RMin } ∈ D
⇔
(
[s0]∼D , . . . , [sn−1]∼D
)
∈ R(
∏
M)/D
n ,
which completes the proof of the remark.
However, if ∅ 6= {i ∈ I : Mi = ∅}, then
∏
i∈IMi/∼D = ∅, but the generalised
ultraproduct as defined above does not need to be empty.
Theorem 6.14. (Generalised  Los´’s Theorem). If λ(x0, . . . , xn−1) is a formula with n
free variables, then for any profile M ∈ (Ω ∪ {∅})I , we have:
(
∐∏
M)/D |= λ
(
[s0
J0 ]≡D , . . . , [sn−1
Jn−1 ]≡D
)
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if and only if
{i ∈ J0 ∩ . . . ∩ Jn−1 | Mi |= λ (s0,i, . . . sn−1,i)} ∈ D.
Proof. See Makkai [41] page 238.
6.3 Generalised Kirman-Sondermann correspondence
The present section is aimed at introducing the generalised Kirman-Sondermann cor-
respondence and characterising Arrow-rational aggregators in terms of the generalised
ultraproduct construction introduced in the previous section.
Definition 6.15. Let B be an L-structure with domain B. The restriction of B to
A ⊆ B is the L-structure that is obtained by restricting the interpretation of the relation
symbols to the domain A. In other words, suppose
(∐∏
M
)
/D =
〈∐
J∈D
∏
j∈J
Mj
 / ≡D , (R(∐∏M)/Dn )
n∈N
〉
,
is a relational structure with R
(
∐∏
M)/D
n ⊆
((∐
J∈D
∏
j∈JMj
)
/ ≡D
)n
for each n ∈ N
and such that there exists a canonical injective map i : A →
(∐
J∈D
∏
j∈JMj
)
/ ≡D.
Then the restriction of (
∐∏
M) /D to A with respect to i is the L-structure〈
A ,
(
i−1
[
R(
∐∏
M)/D
n ∩ i(A)n
])
n∈N
〉
,
and will be denoted by resA (
∐∏
M) /D.
Corollary 6.16. Let D be an ultrafilter on I and M ∈ (Ω ∪ {∅})I . Then
resA(
∐∏
M)/D |= λ⇔ C(M,λ) ∈ D,
for all λ ∈ I.
Proof. By the Generalised  Los´’s Theorem 6.14, C(M,λ) = {i ∈ I : Mi |= λ} ∈ D if and
only if (
∐∏
M)/D |= λ. Since by assumption λ is quantifier-free, the latter condition
is equivalent to resA (
∐∏
M) /D |= λ.
Proposition 6.17. Let f ∈ AR, then for all M ∈ dom(f) we have
f(M) = resA
(∐∏
M
)
/Df ,
where Df is defined in 6.6.
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Proof. By Lemma 6.8, Df is an ultrafilter, and therefore f(M) =resA(
∐∏
M)/Df is
well-defined for all M ∈ dom(f). Now we fix an arbitrary M ∈ dom(f) and λ ∈ I. By
using Corollary 6.16 and Lemma 6.7 we get
resA
(∐∏
M
)
/Df |= λ ⇔ C(M,λ) ∈ D ⇔ f(M) |= λ,
therefore
resA
(∐∏
M
)
/Df |= λ ⇔ f(M) |= λ.
Since λ ∈ I was arbitrary, we claim that resA (
∐∏
M) /Df = f(M).
Now it only remains to prove our claim which says that for every M1,M2 ∈ Ω ∪ {∅}
if
∀λ ∈ I (M1 |= λ ⇔ M2 |= λ)
then M1 = M2. For the proof we consider three cases:
• If both M1 and M2 are empty models, then it is trivial.
• If M1 = ∅ and M2 6= ∅, then consider the atomic formula a˙ .= a˙. Hence M1 2 a˙ .= a˙
and M2 |= a˙ .= a˙. This is a contradiction with our assumption
∀λ ∈ I (M1 |= λ ⇔ M2 |= λ) .
• If both M1 and M2 are non-empty models, then |M1| = |M2| = A. If M1 = M2
then it is trivial. If M1 6= M2, then there exists an n-ary relation symbol R˙n
such that RM1n 6= RM2n . Since M1 and M2 have the same domain A, both RM1n
and RM2n are subsets of A
n. Hence there exists some (a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ An such
that (a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ RM1n but (a0, . . . , an−1) /∈ RM2n or (a0, . . . , an−1) /∈ RM1n but
(a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ RM2n . In both cases
(a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ RM1n < (a0, . . . , an−1) /∈ RM2n .
Therefore
M1 |= R˙n(˙a˙0, . . . , a˙n−1)˙ <M2 |= R˙n(˙a˙0, . . . , a˙n−1)˙,
which is a contradiction with our assumption
∀λ ∈ I (M1 |= λ ⇔ M2 |= λ) ,
and this completes the proof of the lemma.
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Proposition 6.18. Let D be an ultrafilter and suppose the aggregator f : (Ω∪ {∅})I →
Ω ∪ {∅} is defined by
fD(M) = resA
(∐∏
M
)
/D.
Then fD ∈ AR.
Proof. Since M belongs to (Ω ∪ {∅})I , the generalised ultraproduct (∐∏M) /D and
its restriction to A are well-defined (notice that resA (
∐∏
M) /D might be an empty
model). By using the Generalised  Los´’s Theorem 6.14, the generalised ultraproduct
(
∐∏
M) /D is a model of T , and since T is universal, resA (
∐∏
M) /D |= T . Therefore
resA (
∐∏
M) /D ∈ Ω∪ {∅}. Then fD is well-defined on (Ω ∪ {∅})I and so it is satisfied
Axiom 6.1.
For proving Axiom 6.2, let M ∈ (Ω ∪ {∅})I and λ ∈ I such that fD(M) |= λ, that
is resA (
∐∏
M) /D |= λ. Then by using Corollary 6.16, we have C(M,λ) ∈ D, hence
C(M,λ) 6= ∅, since D is an ultrafilter.
For proving Axiom 6.3, suppose that for all M,M ′ ∈ (Ω∪ {∅})I and all λ, λ′ ∈ I we
have C(M,λ) = C(M ′, λ′). By using Corollary 6.16 we get
fD(M) |= λ ⇔ C(M,λ) ∈ D ⇔ C(M ′, λ′) ∈ D ⇔ fD(M ′) |= λ.
Hence
fD(M) |= λ ⇔ fD(M ′) |= λ′.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
The more general definition is suited to cater for those situations in aggregation the-
ory in which some voters might abstain from voting, thus giving rise to profiles (Mi)i∈I
in which some coordinates might be empty. At the moment, the vote abstention situa-
tion is not satisfactorily covered by the generalised Kirman-Sondermann correspondence
(see Theorem 3.10 in Herzberg and Eckert [32]), because it is not reasonable to assume
that the abstention of any single voter would force the outcome of an AR-aggregator
f((Mi)i∈I) to be empty. However, by adopting the Definition 6.12, Theorem 3.10 in [32]
can be generalised to the following:
Theorem 6.19. (Generalised Kirman-Sondermann Correspondence). There is a bi-
jection between AR and the set βI of the ultrafilters over I, given by Λ : AR → βI,
f 7→ Df . Its inverse is given by Φ : βI → AR, D 7→ fD, where fD is the aggregator
defined by the Proposition 6.18.
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Proof. For all f ∈ AR, Lemma 6.8 implies that Λ(f) = Df is an ultrafilter. For every
f ∈ AR, we have
Φ(Λ(f)) = Φ(Df ) (by the definition of Λ)
= fDf , (by the definition of Φ)
and for every D ∈ βI one can write
Λ(Φ(D)) = Λ(fD) (by the definition of Φ)
= DfD . (by the definition of Λ)
To show that Φ is the inverse of Λ, it suffices to show that fDf = f and DfD = D. So
for all M ∈ (Ω ∪ {∅})I , we have
fDf (M) = resA(
∐∏
M)/Df (by Proposition 6.18)
= f(M). (by Proposition 6.17)
To show DfD = D it suffices to show that for all X ⊆ I,
X ∈ DfD ⇔ X ∈ D.
Given X ⊆ I, consider two models M,M ′ ∈ Ω ∪ {∅} and λ ∈ I such that M |= λ and
M ′ 2 λ, and define the profile M ∈ (Ω ∪ {∅})I such that
Mi =
M if i ∈ XM ′ if i /∈ X
then C(M,λ) = X. Now we have
C(M,λ) ∈ DfD ⇔ fD(M) |= λ (by Lemma 6.7)
⇔ resA(
∐∏
M)/D |= λ (by Proposition 6.18)
⇔ C(M,λ) ∈ D. (by Corollary 6.16)
(6.2)
So
X ∈ DfD ⇔ X ∈ D.
Thus we have proved DfD = D and this completes the proof of the theorem.

Chapter 7
Conclusion
The traditional reason for using the assumption of the representative agent in mathe-
matical models of macroeconomic theory is that it provides microeconomic foundations
for aggregate behaviour. So far there have been few attempts at rigorously justifying
this assumption. Our contribution combines Arrovian aggregation theory (on an in-
finite electorate) with structural assumptions on the individual optimisation problem.
We adopt the hypothesis that the social planner’s goal is maximising the social welfare
function. After aggregating individual preferences, we show that there is a representative
utility function by proving that the maximiser of this representative utility function is
the optimal alternative according to the social preference relation, by using an explicit
mathematical construction based on techniques from mathematical logic and analysis.
We also provide sufficient conditions for these results to be satisfied in economic appli-
cations and afterwards give an example of a possible macroeconomic application.
We establish a new and simpler nonstandard account of the weak topology and study
the nonstandard hull with respect to this weak topology. Due to nice assumptions on
the class of admissible utility functions, we construct a representative utility function
for infinite-dimensional social decision problems under weaker conditions for the set of
social alternatives.
Generalised ultraproducts allow us to make a correspondence between Arrow-rational
aggregators and ultrafilters on the set of individuals even in the setting of vote absten-
tion. For this purpose, we give the generalised Kirman-Sondermann correspondence
and characterise Arrow-rational aggregators in terms of the generalised ultraproduct
construction. For the generalised ultraproduct, even if there are empty models in some
coordinates, the resulting generalised ultraproduct is not necessarily empty. If the set of
individuals is finite, then we have a dictator which can participate in voting or be absent.
When the dictator votes, it is obvious that the aggregation result is non-empty, even
other voters are absent. When the dictator is absent, the aggregation result is empty,
even if other voters vote. For an infinite number of individuals, if the corresponding ul-
trafilter is principal, then the case is like the finite case. If the corresponding ultrafilter
is nonprincipal, then the aggregation result is non-empty if and only if there exists a
105
106 Chapter 7 Conclusion
decisive coalition such that each member turns out in the voting (that is, everyone in
the dictator group goes to vote).
This setting for vote abstention allows us to prove a strengthened version of Arrow’s
impossibility theorem which, unlike the standard one, holds also for two candidate elec-
tions. More technically, the usual assumption on the existence of three non-isomorphic
models of the theory is dropped and replaced by the weaker requirement on the exis-
tence of two non-isomorphic models (the proof and more discussion appear in Bedrosian,
Palmigiano and Zhao [9]).
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